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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
The principal functions of financial markets include channeling capital from lenders
to borrowers, producing and disseminating information and pooling risks among
market participants. The acquisition and dissemination of information is at the
centre of all financial activities as information is inevitably involved in every trade
and it plays a key role in price determination.
The actual data generating process of future cashflows are usually uncertain.
Investors must learn about the unknown process using all available information.
Bayes’ rule describes a rational agent’s belief updating process after a piece of
new information is received, which is the cornerstone of learning in finance liter-
ature. Under Bayes’ rule, the posterior belief is a precision-weighted average of
the prior mean and the average value of the new signals. Moreover, the impacts
of unanticipated information on asset price depends on the relative precision of
investors prior belief and the new signal.(Hautsch and Hess [2007] provides de-
tailed analysis on Bayesian learning.) Due to learning uncertainty of the economic
parameters declines over time. Investors in the market trade upon their updated
beliefs. Through this Bayesian learning mechanism new information can be re-
flected in asset prices, which fluctuate over time in response to the unexpected
component of news. Ideally, market prices should provide accurate signals for
resources allocation.
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The efficient market hypothesis by Malkiel and Fama [1970] is built on the
premise that publicly available information transmits to economic agents instan-
taneously and is incorporated into asset prices accurately. Malkiel and Fama
[1970] also provide compelling evidence to support their argument that asset
prices adjust rapidly in response to new information by examining the price re-
action to mergers, stock-splits and other corporate events. In an informationally
efficient market, all known information is already reflected in the current prices.
Since new information is ex ante unpredictable, the future price changes must
be also unpredictable. Therefore, a stock price series can be characterized by a
random walk, which means that any future price movements are only random
departures from the current price level.
However, this perfect-information assumption does not always hold in reality
for at least the following two reasons. Firstly, obtaining and processing infor-
mation can be very costly, depending on the nature of the information, which
might result in imperfect learning among agents. Secondly, information asym-
metry is ubiquitous in financial markets. In the presence of limits to arbitrage,
the privately possessed information might not be fully reflected in security prices.
Kyle [1985] develops a seminal auction equilibrium model to explain how asset
prices are determined in the presence of private information. In his sequential
auction model an insider investor trades on his private information while other
investors trade on noise. His model suggests that the insider’s information is
incorporated into prices only gradually and the existence of noise traders helps
improve the market liquidity in meaningful ways. Therefore, due to these infor-
mational frictions, security prices are not always consistent with ‘fundamentals’
and the past asset returns in some cases have predictive power for future returns.
For instance, stock prices are found to display a positive serial correlation in the
short run, which is the well-known momentum effect. In addition, Campbell and
Shiller [1998] document that the historical P/E ratios explained around 40 % of
the variance of future returns in US stock markets, which suggests that equity
returns are predictable to a large extent. Moreover, these predictable patterns
can generate abnormal risk adjusted returns. The most notable example is the
puzzling price drift after firms’ earnings announcements. By buying stocks with
good earnings news and short-selling stocks with adverse earnings news, investors
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can earn substantial excess returns, which is obviously hard to reconcile with the
efficient market theory. Ball and Brown [1968] and Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakon-
ishok [1996] provide a in-depth analysis on this topic. Grossman and Stiglitz
[1980] even argue that there would be no financial incentives to acquire infor-
mation if all information was already fully reflected in asset prices. Therefore,
the conventional models built upon frictionless markets and perfect information
assumptions are not adequate to capture the complexity of rationality in the real
financial world.
1.2 Imperfect Learning
Learning helps us better understand various market anomalies documented in the
finance literature. For instance, Pastor and Veronesi [2009] show that investors
learn about future dividends gradually over time, during which uncertainty sur-
rounding the growth rate of a firm increases the firm’s M/B ratio. The higher
the uncertainty, the higher the price. Hence, they argue that high-tech stocks
were not necessarily overpriced before the bursting of the Internet Bubble as the
future profitability of those firms were highly uncertain. Moreover, they suggest
that the learning process also explains why young firms are highly valued and
their returns exhibit high volatility.
Nevertheless, learning in financial markets is not always perfect. When ra-
tional investors try to make best use of available information, they might be
subject to some learning constraints, causing asset prices to deviate from their
true values. Hence, it is of particular importance to study the potential learning
biases caused by those constraints and their economic consequences. One of the
factors which might hinder investors from learning properly is that information
acquisition can be very costly sometimes. When the marginal cost of processing
information exceeds the marginal benefits of acting on the information, a group
of investors might choose to follow other investors instead of learning by them-
selves. The phenomenon of relying on other agents’ actions to form one’s own
beliefs is called ‘information cascades’, under which individuals would rationally
take identical actions even if they have different private signals. Since followers
do not trade on their own information, their private information is not revealed
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in market prices. Welch [1992] develops a sequential trading model to rationalize
some investors’ imitation behavior. Alevy, Haigh, and List [2007] ’s field experi-
ment on market professionals’ trading behavior lend support to the ‘information
cascades’ hypothesis.
Learning is undoubtedly facilitated by media, professional financial analysts
and the large amount of financial data thanks to new technologies. At the same
time, however, investors are more likely to suffer from information overload prob-
lem than before, which makes them selective in learning new information. The
Rational Inattention theory has gained prominence during the past two decades
as it rationalizes the imperfect learning behaviors of economic agents with lim-
ited information processing capacity. In the extant models of rational inattention,
agents are still rational in that they optimally neglect certain information to max-
imize their expected utilities. Sims [2003] argues that the idea of limited attention
is intuitively appealing as it can explain a wide range of anomalies using a rel-
atively simple mechanism. For instance, it can be used to explain much of the
investors’ inertia behavior in financial markets. Also, Corwin and Coughenour
[2008] find that limited attention significantly affects liquidity provision in secu-
rity markets as market specialists pay more attention to their most active stocks,
causing insufficient price improvement and increased transaction costs to other
stocks. Huang, Wei, and Yan [2007] demonstrate that costly information acquisi-
tion makes investor inattentive to certain news and this type of inattention serves
to explain the under-diversification of investors’ portfolio choice. Rational Inat-
tention also has plentiful implications for macroeconomic research. Sims [2005]
provides us with some useful insights. For instance, he discusses a central bank’s
information disclosure policy and disputes the point of view that a detailed report
will cause more overreaction than a brief summary that contains only the heavily
filtered view of the Fed. He argues that when the central bank provides more in-
formation, investors would seek various sources for filtered signals and the noises
in those signals might cancel out. Hence, a transparent monetary policy does
not necessarily lead to more market fluctuations even if investors have limited
computational capacity.
In the finance literature, imperfect learning arises in myriad settings. Non-
Bayesian learning, learning with incomplete information and higher order beliefs,
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among others, are also examples of departures from the rational and perfect
learning framework.1 Pastor and Veronesi [2009] provide a comprehensive analysis
on this topic.
1.3 Incentive Issues
The study of incentive structures is the key to understanding the decision-making
process of economic agents. An incentive is something which motivates a self-
interested agent to do what he is expected to do in the forms of fines or rewards.
In financial markets, various incentive contracts are designed to promote agents’
effort and to ensure they act in the interest of contract suppliers. Moreover, one of
the major roles of government in regulating the financial sector is to address the
underlying incentive inefficiency and align market participants’ private motives
with public interest.
As mentioned earlier, the central role of financial markets is to transfer cap-
ital from lenders to borrowers. In the presence of information asymmetries and
inappropriate incentive contracts, however, financial intermediaries might not
necessarily channel the scarce resources to the economic activities which yield
the highest returns as information asymmetry causes misplaced incentives. For
instance, through relationship banking, banks play an indispensable role in gath-
ering information, screening loan applicants and monitoring borrowers after loans
are issued. Yet, they do not always act for the interest of investors as investors
are not able to observe the true value of the loans or monitor banks’ actions.
At the same time, financial innovation significantly contributed to the rise of
information asymmetries as many financial instruments are highly complex and
nontransparent, which aggravates the perverse incentives.
The misplaced incentives can be very powerful and result in unintended con-
sequences. A large body of research suggests that severely distorted incentives
significantly contributed to the US sub-prime mortgage crisis. Both the US gov-
ernment and financial institutions played major roles in fostering the crisis. In the
pre-crisis period, the US government issued a series of policies to promote home
1See Gervais and Odean [2001] for non-Bayesian learning, Feldman [2007] for incomplete
information equilibria and Allen, Morris, and Shin [2006] for higher order beliefs.
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ownership and encouraged sub-primer borrowers to purchase their own properties
by taking a huge amount of loans, sowing the seeds of the crisis.
Distorted incentives also plague the hedge fund industry. As we know, hedge
funds are exempt from most of the reporting and regulatory requirements which
are imposed on mutual funds. Since they operate in a largely opaque man-
ner, a central question surrounding hedge fund management is if hedge fund
managers’ risk taking incentive is in line with investors’ interest. Most of the
work in this genre is concentrated on the option-like feature of the High-Water-
Mark(HWM) provision and documents a bell-shaped risk-performance pattern.
Intuitively speaking, any convex compensation scheme would induce high risk
taking as managers can benefit from increased underlying volatility, and this
high-risk propensity should be most pronounced near the exercise price of the
option. Hodder and Jackwerth [2007] argue that hedge fund managers would
substantially increase risk when the fund value is somewhat below HWM in order
to increase the chance of finishing the option in the money. Buraschi, Kosowski,
and Sritrakul [2013] also find a similar hump-shaped risk taking pattern based
on a large set of hedge fund data. Such risk shifting pattern can be detrimental
to the interests of investors.
1.4 Outline of the Thesis
This thesis aims to explore the impacts of investors’ imperfect learning behav-
ior on asset prices and the economic consequences of misaligned incentives of
financial intermediaries in a world with asymmetric information. Moreover, the
next three chapters are all motivated by some well known phenomena on the
recent financial crisis. For instance, asset prices tend to move very closely during
crisis periods despite the low correlations in their fundamentals.(See Buraschi,
Trojani, and Vedolin [2013], Peng and Xiong [2006] and Didier, Love, and Mart-
nez Pera [2012] for detailed discussion.) To account for this anomaly, Peng and
Xiong [2006] put forward the ‘catergory-learning’ behavior model and point out
that when attention constraint is binding, rational agents should devote more
attention to market-level information than to firm-level information. The sec-
ond chapter of the thesis empirically tests if investors indeed exhibit this type
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of learning propensity, how it affects asset prices and moreover how it can be
related to the well-documented phenomenon of underreaction to earnings news.
To the best of my knowledge, it is the first study on investors’ category-learning
behavior in the context of earnings announcements.
Specifically, we conduct an event study to quantify the extent to which in-
vestors tend to be distracted away from firm’s earnings news by market-level
shocks. Our analysis also shows that market state, which determines the level of
attention that investors pay to the stock market, also has impacts on the magni-
tude of post-earnings announcement drift. Moreover, our preliminary results on
the timing of earnings announcements uncover some interesting facts regarding
firm managers’ reporting choice, which contributes to the growing literature on
managerial strategy of corporate information disclosure.
The third chapter of the thesis focuses on the origin of the recent crisis and
provides a rational expectations model to show the mechanism through which
securitization could lead to deterioration in banks’ asset quality. Securitization is
the financial practice of selling various types of contractual debt to the secondary
loan market investors in the form of pass-through securities. It helps banks
convert illiquid assets into liquid assets. It also marks the transition of banks
from ‘originate-to-hold’ to ‘originate-to-distribute’ in their lending business. The
rapid expansion of subprime mortgage market in the past decade was largely
facilitated by the development of mortgage-backed securities(MBS). According
to Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig [2010], mortgage-based securities were worth
3.6 trillion dollars in year 2006 and accounted for 60% of outstanding mortgage
debt in the U.S. However, the quality of mortgage loans monotonically declined
for six consecutive years before the outbreak of the credit crunch.(See Demyanyk
and Van Hemert [2011] for example) Figure 1 depicts the rising default rate of
mortgages between year 2001 to year 2007. (Source: Figure 1 in Demyanyk and
Van Hemert [2011]) .
Securitization market was at the epicentre of the 2007-2008 crisis beyond dis-
pute. The origin of the crisis is believed to be the sharp rise in the US market
mortgage default rates, which triggered a sudden liquidity dry-up in the money
market, driving many financial institutions into insolvency.(See Brunnermeier
[2009] and Gorton and Metrick [2012].) Since the collapse of secondary loan mar-
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Figure 1.1: Actual delinquency rate of mortgage loans between year 2001 and
2007 in the US
ket in 2007, critiques of the securitization practice have gained great prominence.
Due to information asymmetry, loan purchasers cannot observe the quality of
securitized loans. A number of empirical papers show that securitization seems
to have distorted loan originators’ incentives. Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig
[2010] find that securitization significantly reduced banks’ screening standards
and their incentive to monitor borrowers afterwards. Berndt and Gupta [2009]
document that firms with loans traded in the secondary loan market significantly
underperform their peers by 9% risk-adjusted returns in the stock market every
year. They argue that this is because investors in the stock market expect banks
to sell bad-quality loans.
Our equilibrium model shows that the originate-to-distribute practice can
largely increase the lending capacity of the banking sector as banks have the
opportunity to reallocate their resources and outsiders get to enjoy more in-
vestment opportunities. Moreover, we provide theoretical explanations of why
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the securitization practice inevitably causes deterioration in banks’ asset quality.
The outcome of the model also suggests the channels through which regulators
can uplift banks’ optimal lending standards and market price of securitized assets
by imposing loan sale limits.
The fourth chapter of the thesis studies the risk taking behavior of hedge fund
managers in the presence of various compensation incentives. Although hedge
funds did not play a major role in the recent financial crisis, they precipitated
the crisis in certain ways. Before the collapse of the subprime mortgage market in
2007, hedge funds held around 47 % of the 3-trillion-dollar worth of CDOs while
the banks held only 25 % and other financial institutions held 28 %.1 Hedge
funds that aim to meet high targeted returns usually adopt aggressive trading
strategies and try to magnify the returns using a high degree of leverage. By
virtue of leverage, a fund could buy more CDOs than it could with its own capital,
which drove down subprime interest rates further and exacerbating the problem.
Moreover, Chan, Getmansky, Haas, and Lo [2005], among others, suggest that
hedge funds pose systematic risk to the whole financial system. They argue that
the risk exposures of funds exert a material impact on the banking sector, which
might create a new source of systematic risks.
In our paper, we investigate which incentives the hedge fund managers are
subject to when making risk taking decisions in the context of hedge fund tour-
naments. In particular, we attempt to bridge the gap in the literature by in-
troducing the money flow concern into hedge fund manager’s objective function.
Several papers on the empirical relationship between fund flow and fund’s relative
performance all suggest that hedge funds exhibit a concave fundflow-(relative)
performance relation.(See Getmansky [2012] , Chen [2011] and Goetzmann, In-
gersoll, and Ross [2003].) Based on Taylor [2003]’s two-period model of mutual
fund tournament, we add the component of management fee from new flows to
the managers’ compensation and derive the optimal risk level which maximizes
risk averse managers’ expected utility. Following Hodder and Jackwerth [2007],
we numerically solve the model and obtain some interesting results regarding
managers’ optimal risk choice in various scenarios. Our study contributes to a
1Statistics are obtained from the article ‘The real role of hedge funds in the crisis’ on
Financial Times.
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substantial body of literature on hedge funds’ risk taking decisions by examining
the combined effects of hedge fund managers’ tournament concern, incentive con-
tract and liquidation threat. Compared with existing work, our paper provides a
richer set of predictions on managerial risk-shifting choices. (Chapter 3 is a joint
work with Dr Xuewen Liu and Dr Tianxi Wang and Chapter 4 is a joint work
with Lei Ding, a PhD candidate at Imperial College Business School.)
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Chapter 2
Category-learning with Limited
Attention and Under-reaction to
Earnings Announcements
Summary
It has been documented that investors have limited attention and tend to under-
react to new information when they have attention constraints. If we classify
information into market level and firm specific level, rational investors should
pay more attention to market-level news as it helps reduce the uncertainty of
the portfolios to a larger extent than firm level news. This chapter studies if in-
vestors indeed exhibit this type of category-learning behavior (market-level news
is processed before firm-level news) in the context of earnings announcement
and the main findings are the following: (1) Investors tend to be distracted
away from firms’ earnings news when there is a market-level shock, causing
more pronounced under-reaction on earnings announcement day and stronger
post-earnings-announcement drift(PEAD) afterwards; (2) After resolving market-
wide uncertainty, investors shift their attention back to firm-level news quickly
and the initial under-reaction is corrected within one month after announce-
ments for our sample period; (3) Consistent with our inattention hypothesis,
the ‘PEAD’ rolling portfolio yields substantially higher risk-adjusted abnormal
returns in high-market-news months than other times; (4) Firm managers strate-
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gically time their earnings announcements to avoid days which have at least one
major macroeconomic announcement, especially when they have favorable news
to release.
2.1 Introduction
In traditional asset pricing models, investors are assumed to be perfectly ratio-
nal and have infinite capacity to process information. However, more and more
psychological studies have demonstrated that as a cognitive resource, people’s
attention has its limit and with this constraint, people cannot perform multiple
tasks at the same time. Therefore, in the past decade researchers began to take
into account the limits of investors’ attention capacity in their asset pricing mod-
els and a substantial body of studies support the notion that investors’ attention
constraint significantly affect their trading behavior as well as asset prices in fi-
nancial markets. (Sims [2003], Huang, Wei, and Yan [2007] and Mac´kowiak and
Wiederholt [2010] provided detailed discussions on this topic.)
To explain the phenomenon of excess asset price comovements during finan-
cial crises, Peng and Xiong [2006] develop a rational expectations model with
attention constraints to show why people prefer market information over firm
information when they are unable to process both of them instantaneously and
they call this learning preference as category-learning behavior. It is worth men-
tioning that investors who exhibit this learning propensity are still rational in
that they update their beliefs based on Bayes rule and they optimally allocate
less attention on firm-specific news to maximize their expected utility when their
attention constraints are binding. Therefore, their category-learning propensity
is not the consequence of any behavioral biases.
In addition, a bunch of empirical papers suggest that investors tend to be
distracted by extraneous events due to limited attention. If inattentive investors
only gradually learn about an event, and if market frictions, limits to arbitrage
for example, prevent attentive investors from arbitrating away the mispricing,
then asset returns will display continuations. If we combine limited attention
with documented investors’ behavioral biases, the consequences of investors’ be-
havior could be reinforced by the attention constraint (See Dellavigna and Pollet
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[2009] and Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh [2009]). Motivated by the existing stud-
ies, this paper aims to find out if investors indeed exhibit the ‘category-learning’
propensity and to what extent it exerts influence on asset prices.
In this paper, we test for this type of learning preference in the context of
earnings announcements, as earnings announcements convey the most important
information of firms and the announcements are made regularly on a quarterly
basis. Dating back to Ball and Brown [1968], a great deal of papers find that
investors tend to underreact to earnings news, leading to price drift after an-
nouncements. Although researchers have put forward various theories to explain
this phenomenon, more and more people believe that the return continuation
is due to people’s initial underreaction. If category learning behavior is true,
we should expect the under-reaction to be more pronounced when investors are
distracted by market-level news.
Another important ingredient of our study is the aggregate level of attention
investors can devote to the stock market. If investors’ attention capacity is time-
varying, then we shall expect to see the time-varying level of underreaction to
firms’ news as well. Karlsson, Loewenstein, and Seppi [2009] propose a Selective
Attention model, in which they show that investor pay more attention to rising
markets than to falling markets. The key assumption in their model is that
investors derive utility not only from their final consumption but also from the
changes in their financial wealth. To maximize their expected utilities, investors
are predicted to “put their heads in the sands” to avoid further information after
receiving bad news. According to their model, market state is the key determinant
of the optimal amount of attention investors should pay to the news in the stock
market.
Based on Peng and Xiong [2006] and Karlsson, Loewenstein, and Seppi [2009],
we develop two Rational Inattention hypotheses as follows: (1) When market-level
news and earnings announcements arrive in the market at the same time, people
tend to process market information first. Underreaction to earnings announce-
ment is therefore reinforced by the arrival of market information. (2) Underreac-
tion to earnings announcements should be more severe in down markets than in
up markets due to time-varying attention capacity. It is worth noting that these
attention propositions do not result from investors’ behavioral bias, as investors
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are still rational in the sense that they use Bayesian law to update their beliefs,
i.e., they correctly interpret the information they obtain. Also, they derive the
optimal attention allocation by maximizing their expected utility.
Following the literature on investors’ inattention and earnings announcements,
we focus on investors’ immediate reaction to earnings announcements and post-
announcement response. If distraction hypothesis holds, distracting news should
have opposite effects on the announcement day and for the post-announcement
period. Specifically, we examine three important measures of people’s reaction,
namely abnormal trading volumes, cumulative abnormal returns and abnormal
profits from ‘PEAD’ portfolio strategies based on market distraction effects. To
capture market level shocks we use jump in VIX as a proxy as a rise of market-
level uncertainty is characterised by a sharp increase in VIX. Following Cooper,
Gutierrez, and Hameed [2004], we define a month/day as a up market if the most
recent two years’ cumulative market return is positive, and a down market if it is
negative. By doing so, we can compare investors’ reaction under different market
conditions.
To test our hypotheses, we conduct both univariate tests and multivariate
regression analyses. Firstly, all the trading days in our sample are sorted into
ten deciles based on daily change in VIX and the top decile days are defined as
‘high-market-news’ days. By analysing share turnover, abnormal trading volumes
and abnormal log dollar trading volumes, we find that investors trade consider-
able less on earnings announcement stocks on high-market-news days than other
days. Similar result is obtained when we compare Down markets and Up mar-
kets. More importantly, these patterns hold across different types of earnings
news (good news and bad news). To control for other factors which might affect
investors’ responsiveness, we estimate the regression model of stocks’ abnormal
trading volumes on a market shock dummy, a market state dummy and the
attention-related firm characteristics. The estimation result shows that market
news and Down market state are both negatively associated with investors’ im-
mediate trading volumes. Secondly, after controlling for firm characteristics and
calendar effects, the cumulative abnormal returns for the post-announcement win-
dow are significantly larger when announcements are made on ‘high-market-news’
days (or in Down markets) than other times. Specifically, the post-announcement
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differential drift between good news and bad news is increased by 47.6% follow-
ing high-market-news days. Similarly, the delayed response to earnings news is
economically smaller by 30% in Up market than in Down market. Our results
are robust to different criteria of choosing ‘high-market-news’ days and different
definitions of market states. In addition, the estimated coefficients of the control
variables support the inattention theory as firms which are more visible to in-
vestors enjoy more attention and thus suffer less from under-reaction on earnings
announcement day and have smaller post-announcement price drift. To investi-
gate how inattentive investors adjust their initial under-reaction over time, we
analyze the cumulative abnormal returns over different post-announcement win-
dows and find that distracted investors shift back to earnings news quickly after
market-level shocks and the initial under-reaction caused by market-distracting
news can be corrected within one month after announcements. In a related paper,
Dellavigna and Pollet [2009] find that investors can be distracted by weekends
and pay less attention to earnings news released on Fridays. They also find that
the total cumulative abnormal returns tend to be surprisingly larger for those
earnings announcements when they add up returns on and after announcement
days. Consistent with their findings, our test result also suggests the price reac-
tion to earnings news is magnified in the long run when investors are distracted
initially.
To measure the economic importance of market distraction effects, we con-
struct the classic ‘PEAD’ portfolio by buying the good-news stocks and selling
the bad-news stocks and rebalance the portfolio at the end of every month. In
the meantime, the monthly volatility of VIX is used to identify the most tur-
moil months during our sample period, based on the assumption that a highly
volatile VIX indicates that investors update their beliefs of the aggregate market
frequently in response to new information. We define the months with the largest
volatility of VIX as ‘high-market-news’ months and expect that our ‘PEAD’ port-
folio formed at the end of these months to deliver superior performance. After
regressing the monthly returns of the portfolio on Fama-French and Momentum
factors, we find that the risk-adjusted abnormal return is substantially higher for
‘high-market-news’ months compared with the rest of the sample period. Specifi-
cally, the alpha associated with the portfolio following high-market-news months
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is 2.17% per month while it is only 1.45% for other times. In addition, we exam-
ine some other measures of portfolio performance (average monthly return and
Sharpe ratio for example), similar findings are obtained. To address the liquidity
issues raised by Sadka [2006] and others, we include different liquidity measures
which are widely used in the literature in the regression models. Our results are
highly robust.
Our study also contributes to the growing literature in managerial earnings
management by linking the timing of announcements with investors’ category
learning preference. Specifically, we investigate if managers take into the account
the market distraction effects caused by macro-economic announcements when
they manage their earnings news release. The extant studies on the US macro an-
nouncements suggest that there are 7 macro indicators (CPI, Housing, Newhome,
PPI, Trade imbalance, Unemployment and GDP final) which exert significant im-
pacts on stock markets and other financial markets on their release days. We thus
introduce a Macro-announcement dummy variable to study their impacts on the
seasonal distribution of the number of earnings announcements. The regression
analysis shows that after adjusted for seasonality, the daily number of earnings
announcement is significantly decreased by 15% for Macro-announcement days.
This tendency holds across all types of earnings news. Furthermore, it is most
pronounced for managers with favourable news to release as we find that the
release of macro indicators cause 27% reduction in the number of earnings an-
nouncements which have the highest earnings surprise.
To conclude, this paper provides the first direct evidence on investors’ category-
learning behavior and quantifies the magnitudes of its economic consequences on
firms’ earnings announcements and it also sheds light on the managerial strategy
of corporate information disclosure. The rest of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section 2 introduces the related literature and the motivation of our study.
Section 3 describes the main hypotheses, data and methodology of this paper.
Section 4 presents the preliminary univariate tests. Section 5 contains multi-
variate regression analysis and economic interpretation of the estimation results.
Section 6 shows the profitability of portfolio trading strategy based on market
distraction effects. Section 7 investigates how the market distraction effects re-
lates to managers’ strategy in timing their earnings announcements. Section 8
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provides concluding remarks.
2.2 Related Literature
An extensive body of studies on psychology have demonstrated that human brain
has its limit, and people cannot deal with many tasks at the same time, especially
those which require central cognitive processing of human brain. For example,
Kahneman [1973] points out that due to limited attention, people have to al-
locate their cognitive resources to different tasks, and when they focus on one
task, attention paid to other tasks decreases consequently. In addition, many
experiments have been conducted to assess limitations on simultaneous cogni-
tion. Pashler and Johnston [1998] provide a review on these empirical findings.
More importantly, Yantis [1998] suggests that people can use deliberate strate-
gies and intentions to control their allocation of attention. 1 These psychological
findings lend support to our Rational Inattention Hypothesis. In the context of
financial markets, investors who are facing numerous information signals have to
optimally allocate their attention using deliberate strategies. In particular, our
study pertains to four strands of the literature in finance.
2.2.1 Rational Inattention
2.2.1.1 Category Learning Behavior
Peng and Xiong [2006] present a rational expectation model to show that rational
investor should allocate more attention to market-level information than industry
and firm-level information when they are facing attention constraints. This type
of category-learning behavior results from people’s optimal attention allocation
decision. In their model, each dividend process is determined by three indepen-
dent factors: market, sector and firm-specific factors (denoted by ht, fi,t, and gi,j,t
1They also distinguish between the ‘goal-driven’ and ‘stimulus-driven’ attention: the former
is referred to as ‘active’ mode of attention, as it is directed by people’s perceptual goals. In
contrast, the latter is said to be ‘passive’, as it is captured by salient events or ‘abrupt visual
onsets’. Since this paper is to investigate the optimal choice of attention allocation, we will
concentrate on the ‘goal-driven’ attention only, although the stimulus-driven attention is also
interesting on its own right, and can be applied in explaining other aspects of investors’ behavior.
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respectively) and the representative investor who is assumed to hold a diversi-
fied portfolio needs to decide on the optimal consumption level to maximize her
expected utility .
Investor’s objective:
MaxEt[
∞∑
s=t
δs−tu(cs)] (2.1)
Dividend process for firm i in sector j at time t:
di,j,t = ht + fi,t + gi,j,t, i = 1, ...,m, j = 1, ..., n. (2.2)
Investor cannot observe those fundamental factors, but she knows the distri-
bution of the them and she can analyze different signals to form the posterior
beliefs about those factors according to the Bayes rule before dividends are re-
alized. By doing so, the investor obtains more accurate forecasts about future
dividends, and then she can make more efficient decisions in choosing consump-
tion level. They use κ to denote the attention limit, and λh,t ∈ [0, 1], λf,i,t ∈ [0, 1]
and λg,i,j,t ∈ [0, 1] to stand for fractions of attention allocated to market, sec-
tor, and firm factors respectively. Accordingly, the attention constraint can be
expressed as follows:
λh,t +
m∑
i=1
λf,i,t +
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
λg,i,j,t ≤ 1 (2.3)
Where n is the number of sectors and m is the number of firms in each sector.
They show that when m2σ2h > σ
2
f and n
2σ2f > σ
2
g , the representative investor
should pay more attention to the market information than the sector and firm
information. They argue that this condition can be easily satisfied in reality.
In the extreme case, when κ < (m/θ)log(n2σ2f/σ
2
g), she should pay attention to
the market and sector information only. Intuitively speaking, when holding a
diversified portfolio, investors can benefit from devoting more attention to com-
mon factors (i.e., market and sector), because learning these common factors can
reduce the uncertainty of the portfolio to a larger extent than the firm-specific
factor. Hence, an investor with attention-constraint should learn more category
information than firm-level information, and “the degree of categorization de-
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pends on her attention constraints” (Peng and Xiong [2006]). 1
In addition, Peng, Xiong, and Bollerslev [2007] provide empirical evidence
that “market volatility and the comovement of individual stocks with the mar-
ket increase contemporaneously with the arrival of market-wide macroeconomic
shocks, but decrease significantly in the following five trading days”. Their finding
supports the category-learning-behavior hypothesis as it shows the time-varying
process of investors’ attention allocation. However, they do not examine category-
learning behavior directly through investors’ reaction to firm-level news and the
consequences of time-varying attention allocation has not been fully investigated.
To overcome these limitations, our paper aims to find out whether the arrival
of market information distracts investors from firm-specific information, and the
outcomes of this attention-shifting process.
2.2.1.2 ‘Ostrich Effect’
Karlsson, Loewenstein, and Seppi [2009] point out that conventionally investors
are assumed to derive utility from the real cashflows from their investment, which
means they care about the value of the assets only when they liquidate them
and consume the proceeds. However, this assumption contradicts with our daily
experience- people’s utility level can be easily affected by the changes in their fi-
nancial wealth. They take this psychological impact of new information on utility
into account and propose a novel model of Selective Attention towards informa-
tion, in which rational investors decide if they should obtain new information
about the value of their investments or not.
In their model, investors receive information about the aggregate market be-
fore they decide whether to learn new information about their portfolios. The
main prediction of their model is so-called ‘Ostrich Effect’- Given a series of bad
news, rational investors would optimally choose not to learn additional informa-
tion to avoid further disappointing news. On the other hand, given good news,
investors would want to have further information to confirm the value of their
1They also combine this category-learning behavior with investors’ overconfidence bias to
show that when people process more market information and then overreact to this common
factor, return correlation of stocks is higher than that of the fundamentals, causing excessive
asset price comovements.
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portfolios. They conclude that in up markets, people may check the value of
their portfolios more frequently than is required for decision-making, while in
downturns, information-averse investors would give up portfolio rebalancing op-
portunities by not attending to new information. This ‘Ostrich Effect’ hypothesis
is consistent with investor rationality because investors shield themselves from
new information to maximize their utility. Their key assumption that investors
can derive utility from information is also justified by prior research.1 They also
analyze accounts data of investors in Sweden and the US, and find that investors
monitor their portfolios online much more frequently when stock market is rising
than when it is falling. The negative relationship between account look-up and
past market returns supports their ‘Ostrich Effect’ hypothesis. 2
2.2.2 Under-reaction to Earnings Announcements and Dis-
traction Effects
Ball and Brown [1968] was the first to notice that the cumulative abnormal re-
turns after announcements keep going up for positive-news stocks and down for
negative-news stocks. This type of return continuation is also known as post-
earnings-announcement drift anomaly (PEAD). Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakon-
ishok [1996] analyze the profitability of rolling trading strategies based on PEAD,
which is refered to as ‘Earnings Momentum’ strategy in their article. They con-
firm that there is delayed reaction of stock prices to earnings news. A large num-
ber of explanations have been put forward to account for this market anomaly
and most of them resort to investors’ behavioral biases. In general, more and
more researchers believe that this drift is due to investors’ underreaction to the
information content of earnings announcements, and the extent of underreac-
tion depends on the type of the announcements and the characteristics of the
firms. For example, Bernard and Thomas [1989] investigate the returns serial
correlations, and suggest that investors underestimate the implications of cur-
1Barberis, Huang, and Santos [2001] argue that by assuming that investors utility depends
on the value of their financial wealth, their model offers an intuitive and parsimonious expla-
nation for the equity premium puzzle.
2Based on Karlsson, Loewenstein, and Seppi [2009]’s model, Hou, Peng, and Xiong [2008]
empirically test if the ‘PEAD’ portfolio and ‘Momentum’ portfolio is affected by market states.
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rent earnings for future earnings. Mendenhall [2004] provides empirical evidence
in favor of this explanation by examining the relationship between the stocks’
arbitrage risk and the post-announcement drifts.
During the past decade, a bunch of papers provide empirical evidence that
investors have limited attention and they can be distracted by some salient or
unexpected events. Moreover, this distraction effect has significant influence on
financial markets. In the literature, trading volume, number of analysts, and me-
dia coverage are the most widely used proxies of investors’ attention. For instance,
Barber and Odean [2008] argue that investors are more likely to be attention con-
strained when they buy stocks rather than sell stocks, because many of them are
subject to short-selling constraints and can only sell the stocks they already hold.
Their results show that compared to institutional investors, individual investors
are net buyers of attention grabbing stocks, and their buying behavior is more
heavily influenced by attention constraint than selling behavior is. Corwin and
Coughenour [2008] investigate the impacts of specialists’ limited attention on se-
curity markets. They find that specialists tend to exert more effort toward their
most active stocks during periods of high activity, resulting in insufficient price
improvement and increased transaction costs for the remaining stocks. Thus,
the allocation of effort subject to specialists’ limited attention significantly affect
liquidity provision in stock markets. More specifically, the rate and magnitude
of price improvement for a stock is negatively related to specialist’s attention
paid to other stocks in the same trading panel, and these effects of limited atten-
tion are most pronounced for the least active stocks and are robust to different
econometric techniques. Peress [2008] uses media coverage to proxy for market
participants’ attention and examine if post-earnings-announcement drift can be
related to investors’ attention level. Specifically, he calculates the number of Wall
Street Journal articles which mention the earnings news to measure how much
attention the market as a whole pays to the announcement. His main finding
is that stocks with more intensive media coverage enjoys stronger price reaction
on earnings announcement day and weaker subsequent drift. Gilbert, Kogan,
Lochstoer, and Ozyildirim [2012] focus on the US leading economics index (LEI)
to study if investors react to stale information, as the constituents of the index
are released before the index itself and the method used to construct the index is
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publicly available. They find that the release of LEI has a statistically and eco-
nomically significant impact on market returns, volatility and trading volumes.
Moreover, they show that a trading strategy which trades in the direction of the
announcement before its release and trades in the opposite direction after its
release yields a 8% annual return. Hence, they conclude that some inattentive
investors would react to the repackaging of stale information, causing temporary
yet significant mispricing.
In the literature, the most related papers to ours are Dellavigna and Pollet
[2009] and Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh [2009]. They both conduct event study
and choose Earnings Announcements to examine the economic consequences of
investors’ limited attention. Specifically, Dellavigna and Pollet [2009] test the
hypothesis that investors tend to pay less attention to stock markets on Friday as
they are distracted by the upcoming weekends and the earnings news released on
Fridays thus experience more pronounced under-reaction than other week days.
They find that weekends distraction effect is statistically significant as Friday
announcements on average have a 15% lower immediate response and a 70%
percent stronger delayed response. Moreover, a trading strategy to exploit the
different responses to Friday announcements and to other weekday announce-
ment earns 4% abnormal returns per month. Similarly, Hirshleifer, Lim, and
Teoh [2009] directly test the distraction effects of competing earnings news from
other firms in the market. They propose a distraction hypothesis that extraneous
earnings news prevent investors from reacting promptly to the information con-
tent of a given firms’ announcement. In particular, they sort trading days into
10 deciles every quarter based on the total number of earnings announcements
on each day and define the top decile as ‘high-news-days’ and the bottom decile
as ‘low-news-days’. By examining abnormal returns, abnormal trading volumes
and post-announcement drift, they find that underreaction to earnings news is
more sever when the distraction from extraneous news is higher. Their empirical
results show that the number of earnings announcements from competing firms
has significant impact on the investors’ response coefficient to earnings announce-
ments. A greater number of earnings announcements is positively related to a
weaker price and trading volume reaction to a given earnings announcement, and
a larger post-announcement drift. The findings of these two papers are consistent
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with the notion that attention constraints cause stronger market under-reaction
to earnings news, which can explain part of the PEAD anomaly.
2.2.3 Earnings Management and Timing of Announce-
ments
Earnings has been considered the most important signal of a company’s per-
formance to investors. Earnings management is a common practice among man-
agers who often manipulate earnings by moving income between different periods.
For example, Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser [1999] provide empirical evidence
that earnings threshold induces different types of earnings management behaviors
and among the three thresholds they propose in their model, the positive profit
threshold plays a crucial and predominant role in manager’s reporting decision.
In particular, managers have a strong incentive to adjusted upward earnings when
they are slightly below thresholds.
In addition, timing of announcement is also crucial to managers. For instance,
Aboody and Kasznik [2000] focus on scheduled CEO option awards and they
find that manager have a strong tendency to release bad news before option
awards and good news after option awards as the exercise price of the option is
usually equal to the stock price on the award day. Penman [1987] is one of the
earliest work on the distribution and seasonality of earnings news. It documents
that earnings report arriving during the second half-month periods tend to carry
bad news and during the week, Mondays and Fridays on average have more
bad earnings news compared with other week days. The author claims that the
seasonality of earnings news can serve to explain the seasonality in market returns.
Begley and Fischer [1998] also study the relation between the delay of earnings
announcements and the content of earnings news (bad news or good news). They
confirm the hypothesis of good news early and bad news late. These papers all
suggest that managers in reality strategically decide on when to disclose firm
information to the public for the purpose of maximizing shareholders’ or their
own interest.
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2.2.4 Macroeconomic Announcements
In the last section of our paper, we link the major macro announcements with
the distribution of earnings news to see if the firm managers’ earnings disclosure
decision is subject to the release of market aggregate information.
Mitchell and Mulherin [1994] is one of the first to study the impacts of public
information on the aggregate stock market. They find that stock market activities
are positively related to the daily number of Dow Jones news announcements. In
addition, they proxy the importance of news by the size of New York Times
headlines, and find it to be positively related to both market returns and market
trading volumes.
The US scheduled macroeconomic announcements have received great re-
search interest as they are considered to carry the most fundamental information
on the economy and help market participant adjust their expectations of the fu-
ture. Flannery and Protopapadakis [2002] utilize a GARCH model to study the
relation between conditional volatility of daily equity returns and 17 US monthly
macroeconomic announcements. They identify three nominal variables: PPI, CPI
and Monetary Supply, and three real variables: Unemployment, Balance of Trade,
and Housing Starts, as risk factors which exert influences on both the level and
the volatility of stock returns. In addition, Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and
Vega [2007] employ a high-frequency dataset to study how the US, German and
British investors react to US macro announcements in stock, bond and foreign
exchange markets. They find interactions across different countries and different
markets surrounding US macro announcements. Specifically, they identify the
conditional mean jumps caused by macro announcements and suggest that these
target markets are all closely linked to economic fundamentals.
2.3 Hypotheses, Data and Methodology
2.3.1 Main Hypotheses
Based on Peng and Xiong [2006] and Karlsson, Loewenstein, and Seppi [2009], I
develop two ‘Rational Inattention’ hypotheses:
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Hypothesis 1 When market news and earnings announcements arrive in the
market at the same time, people tend to process market informa-
tion first. Underreaction to earnings announcement is therefore
reinforced by the arrival of market-level information.
Hypothesis 2 Since people in general pay more attention to rising markets’
news than to falling markets’ news, under-reaction to earnings
announcements should be more severe in Down markets than in
Up markets.
The first hypothesis is related to investors’ category-learning behavior and the
second hypothesis is related to the aggregate level of attention investors pay to
the new information in the capital market.
2.3.2 Data Description
We obtain the data from the following sources: market returns, stock returns,
prices, trading volumes, and other fundamental data of all the common stocks
listed on NYSE, AMSE and NASDAQ between January 2001 and December 2010
are obtained from CRSP and Compustat. Analysts’ forecasted earnings, actual
earnings, actual earnings announcement dates and number of analysts reporting
forecasts are obtained from database I/B/E/S. Daily VIX and VOX data between
year 1986 and 2010 are obtained from Chicago Board Options Exchange. Monthly
data of Fama-French three factors, Momentum factor, Sadka’s liquidity factors
and Pastor-Stambough’s liquidity factors are obtained from WRDS. Breakpoints
of the 25 size and book-to-market portfolios are obtained from Kenneth French’s
website. Institutional Ownership, the percentage of stock shares owned by in-
stitutions, is obtained from Thomson Reuters 13F filings. Announcement dates
of Housing Starts and New Home Sales are obtained from US Census Bureau.
Announcement dates of PPI, CPI and Unemployment rates are obtained from
US Bureau of Labor Statistics. Announcement dates of GDP and Trade Balance
are obtained from US Bureau of Economic Analysis.
In addition, the following criteria are applied in filtering data:
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1. Our sample is restricted to common stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX and
NASDAQ (with share code 10 or 11 from the CRSP database)
2. Stocks are excluded from the sample if their prices are once below 1 dollar.
3. When merged with the fundamental data from Compustat, the unmatched
stocks are dropped from the sample.
4. Stocks with non-positive total assets or total liabilities are dropped from
the sample.
5. We only use median forecasted earnings which are released within 60 days
before announcement to exclude stale forecasts.
6. When a firm announced two quarters’ earnings on the same day, we only
use the latest quarter’s earnings data to compute earnings surprise.
7. Observations with actual earnings or forecasted earnings higher than the
stock price are eliminated.
2.3.3 Methodology
Following Dellavigna and Pollet [2009] and Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh [2009], We
investigate investors’ reaction by examining abnormal trading volumes, abnormal
stock returns and the profitability of trading strategies based on post-earnings
announcement drift. Specifically, comparative statistics on investors’ reaction
to earnings news are analysed under different market conditions and multivari-
ate regression estimations are conducted to further examine the significance and
magnitude of the market distraction effect after we control for other possible fac-
tors which might be related to investors’ responsiveness. In addition, we also
study if firm managers are aware of the distracting effects of market-level news
and strategically time their earnings announcements accordingly. Detailed tests
procedures are presented in the following sections.
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2.4 Univariate Tests of Market Distraction Ef-
fects
2.4.1 Abnormal Trading Volume
Prior studies have provided ample evidence of the link between trading volumes
and investors’ attention. For instance, Barber and Odean [2008] argue that com-
pared with firm size, media coverage and analysts’ report, trading volume is a
more direct measure of attention investors actually pay to a stock through their
trading activities, and the daily abnormal trading volume reflects the change in
investors’ attention level. Moreover, Chordia and Swaminathan [2000] find that
high-volume-stocks respond more quickly to news than low-trading-volume stocks
after they control for the size factor. Following existing papers, we adopt trading
volumes to measure how much attention investors actually devote to stocks.
In the following test, we use three measures of trading volumes: Share Turnover,
Abnormal Trading Volume and Abnormal Log Dollar Volume. Share Turnover is
the number of shares traded over certain period divided by shares outstanding. It
is one of the most common ways to measure trading volume.1 Abnormal trading
volume for individual stock at announcement day is defined as the difference be-
tween the daily number of shares traded at announcement and the average daily
number of shares traded over the preceding 30 days divided by their sum. Dollar
volume is the product of stock price and its trading volume. Abnormal log dollar
volume is computed as the difference of log dollar volume between announcement
window and the pre-announcement window [-40,-11] divided by their sum.
DV OL[0, 1] =
1
2
∑1
t=0 log(DollarV olt + 1)− 130
∑−40
t=−11 log(DollarV olt + 1)
1
2
∑1
t=0 log(DollarV olt + 1) +
1
30
∑−40
t=−11 log(DollarV olt + 1)
(2.4)
where DollarV olt is dollar volume traded on day t. [0, 1] indicates the trading
days relative to announcement date, where 0 stands for the announcement day
and 1 stands for the day after announcement. Similarly, we define the average
1See Lo and Wang(2009) for detailed discussion.
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Table 2.1: Trading Volume Response to Earnings Announcements
This table compares different measures of trading volume response of investors to firms with
earnings announcements and to firms without earnings announcements. Trading days with no
earnings announcements are excluded from our sample. Average turnover is the shares traded
on announcement day divided by shares outstanding. The abnormal trading volume VOL is the
difference between the daily number of shares traded at announcement (or post announcement)
and the average daily number of shares traded over the preceding 30 days divided by their
sum. DVOL is the difference of log dollar volume between announcement window (or post
announcement window) and the pre-announcement window divided by their sum.
Immediate Reaction Post Reaction Firms Days
DVOL[0,1] VOL[0,1] Turnover DVOL[2,31] VOL[2,31]
Announcement Firms 59.98% 22.53% 1.73% 4.93% 1.89% 48 2457
Other Firms -0.33% -7.28% 0.83% 0.80% 0.51% 3909 2457
Difference 60.32%*** 29.81%*** 0.91%*** 4.13%*** 1.38%***
abnormal trading volume for post-announcement window [2, i] as:
DV OL[2, i] =
1
i−1
∑i
t=2 log(DollarV olt + 1)− 130
∑−40
t=−11 log(DollarV olt + 1)
1
i−1
∑i
t=2 log(DollarV olt + 1) +
1
30
∑−40
t=−11 log(DollarV olt + 1)
(2.5)
First of all, stocks are assigned into two groups on a daily basis: Announce-
ment Group and No-announcement Group, and then the average share turnover,
average abnormal trading volume and average abnormal log dollar volume are
computed for each group. Table 1 summarizes the statistics of the three trading
volume measures. The sample period is from January 2001 to December 2010.
Table 2.1 shows that: (1) on average, firms with earnings announcements
have much higher share turnover than firms without earnings announcements
and the difference between these two groups is highly significant. (2) V OL[0, 1]
and DV OL[0, 1] also measure the immediate response to earnings announcements
and the comparison between these two stock groups reveals the attention-shifting
process: since people pay more attention to earnings-announcement firms, those
firms’ trading volume soar up over announcement window(day 0 and day1). In
contrast, stocks with no earnings announcement receive less attention than before
and their trading volume plunge consequently, which is shown by the negative
V OL[0, 1] and DV OL[0, 1]. (3) Post-announcement response DV OL[2, 31] and
V OL[2, 31] (abnormal trading volume over post-announcement window (day 2 to
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day 31)) suggests that people do not shift their attention back immediately after
earnings news, which is consistent with the notion that it takes time for people
to process new information.
2.4.2 Jump in VIX: The Proxy of Market-level Shock
In this paper, we use the change in the index VIX to proxy for market-level
news. According to Chicago Board Option Exchange, VIX is the weighted average
of the implied volatilities of various S&P 500 options and it reflects investors’
expectation of future market volatility. Therefore, we should expect the level
of VIX to fluctuate as investors receive new information about the market and
update their expectations accordingly. We believe that change in VIX is better
than other proxies as it is a relatively clean measure of market-level news while
other measures including market aggregate trading volumes, market returns and
market actual volatilities are the consequences of market participants’ reaction
to news.
In particular, we use a jump in VIX as an indicator of a market-level shock. We
focus on positive changes in VIX as they are usually associated with bad macro
news and bad news should be more distracting than good news. Changes in VIX
(∆V IX) are calculated on a daily basis for our sample dated from year 2001 to
2010. Trading days are sorted according to change in VIX and the days with the
top 10% highest change in VIX are labelled as ‘high-market-news’ days and the
days with smallest change in VIX as ‘low-market-news’ days. Days when stock
market is closed and days which have no earnings announcements are excluded
from the sample. Summary statistics of change in VIX are presented in panel A
of Table 2.2.
Panel B of Table 2.2 examines three different measures of trading volumes of
stocks with earnings news and of stocks without earnings news. By comparing
high-market-news days and low-market-news days, we can see that investors re-
act less to earnings announcements when there is a market-level shock, as the
average share turnover, average abnormal trading volume and abnormal log dol-
lar volumes for announcement firms are all lower than low-market-news days.
Moreover, the spread between announcement firms and no-announcement firms
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shrinks in the presence of market-level shocks. To investigate if this spread is sta-
tistically significant, we estimate the following regression using only observations
from high-market-news days and low-market-news days.
DV OL[0, 1] = α0 + α1Announcement+ α2Shock+ α3(Announcement× Shock)
(2.6)
where Announcement is an indicator variable which is equal to 1 for an-
nouncement firms and 0 for no-announcement firms, and Shock is an indicator
variable which equals 1 for high-market-news days and 0 for low-market-news
days. Hence, α3 captures the spread of the difference of abnormal trading vol-
umes between high-market-news days and low-market-news days. The estimated
α3 is shown in the bottom row labeled as ‘DID’ (Difference in Difference) for
different measures of trading volumes. Except for turnover, the ‘DID’ is highly
significant for the other measures. To exclude the distraction effects of other
firms’ earnings announcements documented by Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh [2009],
the average number of stocks with earnings announcements under different mar-
ket conditions are also calculated. Since there are more firms releasing earnings
news on low-market-news days than on high-market-news days in our sample (55
vs. 47), we can rule out the alternative explanation that investors are distracted
because of too much firm-level information.
Another variable of interest in our study is Market State, which is related
to market participants’ aggregate attention level. Following Cooper, Gutierrez,
and Hameed [2004] and Hou, Peng, and Xiong [2008], we calculate the past two
years’ cumulated S&P 500 returns for each month, and define the trading days
as Up market if the past cumulated market return is positive or Down market
if it is negative.1 We compare investors’ reaction to earnings announcements
under different market conditions. Table 2.3 shows that in Up markets when
investors are more attentive to new information, stocks with earnings announce-
ments have higher abnormal trading volumes compared with Down markets. For
example, the average abnormal log dollar trading volume of announcement stocks
1We also use the past three years’ and one year’s cumulative return to measure market
states. The findings of this paper are robust to different definitions of market states.
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Table 2.2: Trading Volume Response and Market Shock
Panel A of this table presents the summary statistics of change in VIX, the proxy of market
news. Trading days with no earnings announcements are excluded from the sample. High-
Market-News are the trading days which have the top 10% highest change in VIX and Low-
Market-News are the trading days which have the smallest change in VIX. Panel B compares
the abnormal trading volumes between firms with earnings announcements and firms without
earnings announcements. Investors’ immediate reaction is measured by Abnormal Log Dollar
Trading Volume DV OL[0, 1] and Abnormal Trading Volume V OL[0, 1] over announcement
window (day 0 and day1) and Share Turnover on announcement day. The bottom row of the
table shows the spread of difference in investors’ immediate reaction to earnings news between
High-Market-News days and Low-Market-News days. *, ** and *** indicate significance at
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Change in VIX
Percentiles
Mean St.Dev No. >=0 No. < 0 P10 Median P90 No. obs
∆VIX -0.0048 1.79 1130 1313 -1.51 -0.09 1.63 2443
Panel B. Trading Volume Response
Immediate Reaction
DVOL[0,1] VOL[0,1] Turnover No. Firms No. days
Low-Market-News Announcement Firms 65.37% 23.90% 1.77% 55 238
Other Firms 2.40% -7.35% 0.82% 3917
Difference 62.97%*** 31.25%*** 0.95%***
High-Market-News Announcement Firms 51.03% 22.02% 1.74% 47 245
Other Firms -1.60% -4.45% 0.89% 3870
Difference 52.63%*** 26.47%*** 0.85%***
DID 10.34%*** 4.79%*** 0.10%
in Up markets is 61.53%, which is higher than 57.96% in Down markets. More
importantly, the difference in abnormal trading volumes between announcement
group and no-announcement group is significantly larger in Up markets than in
Down markets as the estimated ‘DID’ is highly significant for each trading volume
measure, and the results are not driven by the distraction effects of competing
announcements.
To examine the impacts of earnings news content on investors’ trading be-
havior, we assign earnings news into different groups based on their Earnings
Surprise, which is measured by analysts’ Forecast Error :
FE = (Eiq − Fiq)/Piq (2.7)
where Eiq is the actual earnings per share, Fiqis the median forecasted earnings
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Table 2.3: Trading Volume Response and Market States
Market states are identified through the past two years’ cumulative market returns. Trading
days with positive cumulated returns are labeled as Up Market while trading days with negative
cumulated returns are labeled as Down Market. This tables compares investors’ responses to
earnings news under different market states. Investors’ immediate reaction is measured by
Abnormal Log Dollar Trading Volume DV OL[0, 1] and Abnormal Trading Volume V OL[0, 1]
over announcement window (day 0 and day1) and Share Turnover on announcement day. The
bottom row of the table shows the spread of difference in investors’ immediate reaction to
earnings news between Up markets and Down markets. Sample period is from January 2001 to
December 2010. Trading days with no earnings announcements are excluded from the sample.
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Immediate Reaction
DVOL[0,1] VOL[0,1] Turnover No. Firms No. days
Up Market Announcement Firms 61.53% 23.82% 1.79% 50 1350
Other Firms -1.26% -7.24% 0.82% 4004
Difference 62.79%*** 31.06%*** 0.97%***
Down Market Announcement Firms 57.96% 20.86% 1.66% 47 1093
Other Firms 0.87% -7.33% 0.81% 3791
Difference 57.09%*** 28.19%*** 0.85%***
DID 5.70%*** 2.87%*** 0.12%***
from analysts and Piq is the announcement month-end price of the stock.
To avoid stale forecasts, we only use the latest estimates on IBES summary
statistics tape for each announcement. Also, observations with actual earnings
or forecast higher than the stock price are dropped from the sample to mitigate
potential data error, and stocks with prices lower than 1 dollar are excluded
from the sample as well. When forecast errors is positive, an earnings announce-
ment is regarded as good news. Otherwise, it is bad news. Based on forecast
errors/earnings surprise, we rank announcements at the end of each calendar
quarter, and assign them into ten deciles. Decile 1 consists of stocks with the
lowest (negative) earnings surprise, while decile 10 consists of stocks with the
highest (positive) earnings surprise.
Table 2.4 compares abnormal log dollar trading volumes in response to earn-
ings announcements under different market conditions. Panel A shows that stocks
with earnings news experience lower abnormal trading volumes on high-market-
news days than on low-market-news days and this pattern holds across different
types of earnings news. Except for FE3 and FE7, the difference in abnormal
trading volumes ∆DV OL[0, 1] is highly significant. In addition, Panel B reveals
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Table 2.4: Abnormal Log Dollar Trading Volume and Earnings Surprise
DVOL[0,1] is the abnormal log dollar volume over the announcement window (day 0 to day 1).
Forecast error is the difference between actual earnings per share and analysts’ forecast divided
by month-end stock price, which is used to measure Earnings Surprise. Earnings announcements
in the sample are ranked according to forecast error every quarter. FE10 presents the stocks with
the highest earnings surprise and FE1 are stocks with the lowest earnings surprise. High-Market-
News are the trading days which have the top 10% highest change in VIX and Low-Market-News
are the trading days which have the smallest change in VIX. Trading days with positive two
years’ cumulated returns are labeled as Up Market while trading days with negative cumulated
returns are labeled as Down Market. Sample period is from January 2001 to December 2010.
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Abnormal Trading Volume and Market-level Shock
Low-Market-News High-Market-News Difference
DVOL[0,1] Forecast Error DVOL[0,1] Forecast Error ∆ DVOL[0,1] No.obs
FE 1 63.75% -3.66% 39.46% -6.54% 24.29%*** 2293
FE 2 59.40% -0.35% 49.56% -0.68% 9.84%* 2142
FE 3 59.58% -0.10% 52.19% -0.19% 7.39% 2147
FE 4 58.44% -0.01% 47.06% -0.04% 11.38%** 2225
FE 5 62.27% 0.02% 52.14% 0.01% 10.13%** 2206
FE 6 64.35% 0.06% 57.90% 0.06% 6.45%* 2174
FE 7 64.89% 0.11% 58.25% 0.14% 6.64% 2189
FE 8 71.19% 0.19% 57.60% 0.25% 13.59%*** 2187
FE 9 76.09% 0.36% 57.70% 0.48% 18.39%*** 2251
FE 10 76.19% 1.76% 54.24% 2.68% 21.95%*** 2311
Panel B. Anormal Trading Volume and Market States
Up Market Down Market Difference
DVOL[0,1] Forecast Error DVOL[0,1] Forecast Error DVOL[0,1] No.obs
FE 1 54.56% -4.12% 50.33% -6.00% 4.23%* 10128
FE 2 57.16% -0.37% 51.07% -0.57% 6.09%*** 10352
FE 3 56.39% -0.11% 52.30% -0.14% 4.09%** 10530
FE 4 55.87% -0.02% 53.48% -0.02% 2.39% 10741
FE 5 57.53% 0.01% 55.38% 0.03% 2.15% 10781
FE 6 63.03% 0.05% 60.09% 0.09% 2.94%* 10821
FE 7 65.65% 0.09% 62.56% 0.16% 3.09%* 10727
FE 8 68.88% 0.17% 63.04% 0.29% 5.84%*** 10623
FE 9 70.35% 0.33% 67.10% 0.55% 3.25% 10556
FE 10 68.44% 1.74% 68.51% 2.87% -0.07% 10444
that investors trade relatively less on earnings news in Down markets compared
with Up markets.
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2.5 Multivariate Tests: Regression Analysis
2.5.1 Abnormal Trading Volume at Announcement DV OL[0, 1]
Our market distraction hypothesis posits that market-level news will distract
investors and thus reduce investors’ trading volume response. In this section,
we perform regression analysis of the abnormal trading volume DV OL[0, 1] over
the announcement window (day 0 and day1) while controlling for other possible
sources of variation in investors’ response to see if the market distraction effect
is still statistically significant.
In particular, the following factors are included in our control variable set, as
they have been documented to affect investors’ attention and(or) investors’ reac-
tion to earnings news: (1) Firm Size. Stocks in the sample are sorted based on
their market capitalization and assigned into one of the ten Size deciles; (2) B/M
(book-to-market ratio) deciles; Glamour stocks should be more-attention grab-
bling than value stocks.1 (3) Friday dummy. Dellavigna and Pollet [2009] show
that people tend to pay less attention to stock markets on Fridays as they are dis-
tracted by weekends, causing more pronounced under-reaction to earnings news
on Fridays. (4) Number of analysts following the stock. Stocks with more analysts
following should enjoy more attention from market participants and thus suffer
less from investors’ under-reaction. Analysts’ data is obtained from I/B/E/S. (5)
Share Turnover, which is the average monthly share trading volume divided by
the average number of shares outstanding over the past 12 months before the an-
nouncement. This is also a proxy for investors’ attention paid to a stock at normal
times. (6) Number of competing announcements. According to Hirshleifer and
Teoh [2003], other earnings announcements would significantly distract investors’
attention, leading to more severe under-reaction. For each calendar quarter, we
rank trading days based on the number of earnings announcements made on each
day and assign trading days into ten deciles. Decile 10 indicates high distraction
from competing firm’s announcements; decile 1 means low distraction from other
firms. (7) Institutional Ownership, which is the percentage of shares owned by
1Market capitalization is the number of ordinary shares multiplied by the month-end stock
price; Book equity is computed according to the formula: BE = TotalAsset−TotalLiability+
DeferredTaxes− PreferredStockCapital
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financial institutions. Individual investors and institutional investors are found
to have different levels of attention constraints and individual investors are docu-
mented to be more likely to buy attention-grabbing stocks. Moreover, Hirshleifer,
Myers, Myers, and Teoh [2008] find that individual investors cause stronger post-
earnings announcement drift. (8) Age, which is measured by the number of years
elapsed since the firm first appears in CRSP. Older firms are supposed to be
more attention-grabbing than younger firms (See Barber and Odean [2008]). (9)
Indicator variables for months to control for the different responses to earnings
news across quarters and within a quarter.
In this section, we focus on the earnings news with the biggest or lowest earn-
ings surprise (FE1 and FE10). As analyzed before, the spread in abnormal trading
volumes between announcement firms and no-announcement firms shrinks in the
presence of market-level shocks. To investigate if the decrease in the spread is
still statistically significant when we control for firm characteristics, we estimate
the following regression model using a Marketshock dummy (1 for a market shock
and 0 otherwise) and an Announcement dummy(1 for announcement stocks and
0 otherwise). The variable of interest to us is the interaction term between the
Announcement dummy and the Marketshock Dummy as it captures the differ-
ence of the spreads in abnormal trading volumes between high-market-news days
and low-market-news days (which is also called Difference in Difference). The
estimation results are summarized in Table 2.5. Dependent variable DV OL[0, 1]
is shown under each column heading, and independent variables are listed in the
first column of the table.
DV OL[0, 1] = β0 + β1Announcement+ β2Marketshock + β3Announcement×Marketshock
+
n∑
i=1
ciControli +
n∑
i=1
di(Announcement× Controli) + ε
(2.8)
As can be seen in the table, the coefficient estimate of the interaction term of
Marketshock and Announcement dummy is significantly negative in all regression
models, which supports our prediction that when there is a market-wide shock,
investors’ trading volume response is less sensitive to earnings news, causing a
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Table 2.5: DID: Determinants of Trading Volume Response DVOL[0,1]
The dependent variable DVOL[0,1] is the abnormal log dollar volume over announcement win-
dow (day 0 and day 1). Announcement is an indicator variable, which is 1 for announcement
stocks and 0 otherwise. Market Shock is an indicator variable, which is equal to 1 for high-
market-news days and 0 otherwise. Up Market is an indicator variable for market state, which
is equal to 1 for Up Market and 0 for Down Market. Acc. Market Returns is the past 2 years’
accumulated market returns. Control variable set contains Size deciles, B/M ratio deciles, Age,
average Share turnover of the past 12 months, log of (1+Number of Analysts), Deciles of the
number of Competing News, Friday dummy, IO(Institutional Ownership), market abnormal
trading volume, and indicator variables for months. Panel A reports the results of market
distraction effects while Panel B reports the estimated coefficients of attention-related control
variables. Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering of the announcement
day are reported in parentheses. Sample period is from January 2001 to December 2010. *, **
and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Market Distraction Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DVOL[0,1] DVOL[0,1] DVOL[0,1] DVOL[0,1] DVOL[0,1] DVOL[0,1]
Announcements 0.675*** 0.968*** 0.592*** 0.895*** 0.663*** 0.950***
(0.0114) (0.0727) (0.0189) (0.0725) (0.0120) (0.0722)
Announce x Marketshock -0.174*** -0.169*** -0.155*** -0.153*** -0.163*** -0.160***
(0.0428) (0.0405) (0.0406) (0.0384) (0.0398) (0.0381)
Announce x Up Market 0.148*** 0.127***
(0.0224) (0.0219)
Announce x Acc. Market Returns 0.276*** 0.241***
(0.0418) (0.0422)
Controls X X X
Constant -0.00199 -0.0134 -0.00935 -0.0170 -0.00426 -0.0142
(0.00390) (0.0195) (0.00631) (0.0203) (0.00406) (0.0197)
Observation 6,326,470 6,288,933 6,326,470 6,288,933 6,326,470 6,288,933
R2 0.002 0.015 0.002 0.015 0.002 0.016
Panel B. Coefficients of Control Variables
Announce x Size -0.0516*** -0.0457*** -0.0461***
(0.00645) (0.00657) (0.00654)
Announce x B/M -0.00172 0.00336 0.00418
(0.00571) (0.00570) (0.00573)
Announce x Turnover 0.204*** 0.225*** 0.228***
(0.0407) (0.0406) (0.0405)
Announce x Age 0.0375*** 0.0355*** 0.0353***
(0.0104) (0.0103) (0.0103)
Announce x Competing News -0.0567*** -0.0559*** -0.0560***
(0.00667) (0.00660) (0.00658)
Announce x Friday -0.176*** -0.168*** -0.169***
(0.0369) (0.0372) (0.0369)
Announce x IO 0.247*** 0.188*** 0.189***
(0.0330) (0.0342) (0.0338)
smaller spread in abnormal trading volumes between announcement stocks and
other stocks. In addition, following Cooper, Gutierrez, and Hameed [2004]’s
36
definition of market state, we use dummy variable UpMarket to examine the
ostrich effect. Specifically, UpMarket is equal to 1 when the announcement is
made in an Up market and 0 for a Down market. The interaction term between
the Up market dummy and the Announcement dummy is added to regressions (3)
and (4) in Table 2.5, and the positive coefficients suggest that when earnings news
is released in a rising market, people tend to react more to it on the announcement
day than in a falling market. To ensure the robustness of the result, we replace
the UpMarket dummy with the corresponding lagged cumulated market returns
in regressions (5) and (6). The result is not qualitatively changed.
Except for the size factor, coefficient estimates on the other control variables
are consistent with our inattention conjecture. For instance, the coefficient for
the Friday dummy is negative, suggesting that investors pay less attention to
news on Fridays, and those news receive weaker immediate trading response.
Also, as documented in Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh [2009], announcements made
on high-competing-news days have experience more severe under-reaction, which
is confirmed by the negative coefficient of Competing News in our model. Be-
sides, turnover, age and institutional ownership seem to have positive effects on
investors’ immediate response to earnings announcements as all the coefficient
estimates on these control variables are significantly positive, which is also con-
sistent with the attention story: attention grabbing stocks tend to receive stronger
trading volume response than firms which are less salient.
To control for the possible non-linear effect of earnings surprise on trading
volume, we use an indicator variable for Earnings Surprise, which is equal to 1
for top-decile stocks (good-news stocks) and 0 for bottom-decile stocks (bad-news
stocks). W also include market’s abnormal trading volume during the same pe-
riod in the following regression model to control for the market-wide variation in
trading volumes. Market abnormal trading volume for each day is defined as the
average abnormal trading volume for all the stocks listed in CRSP. Test results
are summarized in Table 2.6. Panel A reports the estimated coefficients of Mar-
ket Shocks and Market States while Panel B lists the estimated coefficients of the
attention-related control variables. Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedastic-
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ity and clustering of the announcement day are shown in parentheses.
DV OL[0, 1] = β0 + β1TopDecile+ β2Marketshock +
n∑
i=1
ciControli + ε (2.9)
The coefficient estimate of the Marketshock dummy variable is significantly
negative in all regression models, which supports our prediction: when there
is a market-wide shock, investors tend to distracted away from firm-level news.
Therefore, investors’ trading volume response is less sensitive to earnings news
and the positive coefficient of the market state dummy suggests that when earn-
ings news is released in rising markets, people tend to react more to it on the
announcement day than in falling markets.
In addition, coefficient estimates on the control variables are in general con-
sistent with our inattention conjecture. It is worth mentioning that our market
distraction effect is economically comparable to the Friday effects documented by
Dellavigna and Pollet [2009] as the arrival of a market shock is associated with
a 15% reduction in the abnormal trading volume of announcement stocks while
Fridays on average cause a 18% decrease. (The sensitivity is 1.02−0.15×1 = 0.87
when the dummy variable Marketshock = 1 and 1.02 when Marketshock = 0.)
2.5.2 Post-announcement Drift- CAR[2, 61]
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) after announcements is the most important
measure of investors’ delayed reaction to earnings news. In this paper, we define
it as the sum of the daily abnormal returns over the post-announcement window.
In the literature, three benchmark models are widely used to measure abnormal
returns: (1) Market Model; (2) Fama-French or other asset pricing models; (3)
Matched Portfolio’s returns. Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers [1997] find
that firms’ characteristics can explain the cross-section of average returns better
than estimated covariance. Hence, we follow their method to form the matched
portfolio as the return benchmark for each stock.
Firstly, 25 Size-B/M portfolios are constructed using all the listed stocks on
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ by sorting size and B/M independently, and then
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Table 2.6: Determinants of Trading Volume Response DVOL[0,1]
The dependent variable DVOL[0,1] is the abnormal log dollar volume over announcement win-
dow (day 0 and day 1). Market Shock is an indicator variable, which is equal to 1 for high-
market-news days and 0 otherwise. Up Market is an indicator variable for market state, which
is equal to 1 for Up Market and 0 for Down Market. Acc. Market Returns is the past 2 years’
accumulated market returns. Control variable set contains Size deciles, B/M ratio deciles, Age,
average Share turnover of the past 12 months, log of (1+Number of Analysts), Deciles of the
number of Competing News, Friday dummy, IO(Institutional Ownership), market abnormal
trading volume, and indicator variables for months. Panel A reports the results of market
distraction effects while Panel B reports the estimated coefficients of attention-related control
variables. Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering of the announcement
day are reported in parentheses. Sample period is from January 2001 to December 2010. *, **
and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Market Distraction Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DVOL[0,1] DVOL[0,1] DVOL[0,1] DVOL[0,1] DVOL[0,1] DVOL[0,1]
Market Shock -0.150*** -0.137*** -0.140*** -0.145*** -0.133*** -0.135***
(0.0266) (0.0261) (0.0262) (0.0265) (0.0260) (0.0262)
Up Market 0.0999*** 0.0965***
(0.0168) (0.0168)
Acc. Market Returns 0.216*** 0.213***
(0.0310) (0.0309)
Indicator of Top Decile X X X
Controls X X X X X X
Constant 1.020*** 0.961*** 1.002*** 0.956*** 0.900*** 0.939***
(0.0682) (0.0685) (0.0678) (0.0670) (0.0674) (0.0668)
Observation 12,213 12,213 12,213 12,213 12,213 12,213
R2 0.093 0.096 0.098 0.107 0.110 0.111
Panel B. Attention-related Control variables
Size -0.0457*** -0.0415*** -0.0415*** -0.0494*** -0.0454*** -0.0454***
(0.00729) (0.00736) (0.00733) (0.00726) (0.00734) (0.00731)
B/M -0.000375 0.00357 0.00457 -0.000288 0.00353 0.00458
(0.00559) (0.00557) (0.00560) (0.00554) (0.00552) (0.00554)
Turnover 0.0251 0.0403 0.0447 0.0254 0.0402 0.0448
(0.0411) (0.0414) (0.0413) (0.0397) (0.0400) (0.0400)
Age 0.0302*** 0.0288*** 0.0284*** 0.0365*** 0.0351*** 0.0348***
(0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0101)
Analyst 0.00701 0.00816 0.00866 0.00974 0.0108 0.0113
(0.0138) (0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0135)
Competing News -0.0689*** -0.0679*** -0.0678*** -0.0724*** -0.0713*** -0.0713***
(0.00595) (0.00587) (0.00586) (0.00591) (0.00583) (0.00582)
Friday -0.185*** -0.178*** -0.179*** -0.183*** -0.177*** -0.177***
(0.0323) (0.0325) (0.0323) (0.0322) (0.0325) (0.0322)
IO 0.275*** 0.230*** 0.227*** 0.256*** 0.212*** 0.208***
(0.0325) (0.0330) (0.0328) (0.0324) (0.0329) (0.0327)
each stock is matched with 1 of 25 size-B/M portfolios at the end of June based
on its market capitalization at the end of June and Book to Market ratio at the
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end of prior year.
Secondly, daily abnormal return (ABR) for each stock is computed as the dif-
ference between stock’s return and the matched portfolio’s equal-weighted return.
ABRt = Ri,t − PRt (2.10)
where Ri,tis the stock return and PRt is the matched portfolio return.
Thirdly, abnormal cumulative abnormal returns over different time horizons
are obtained by adding up the daily abnormal returns.
CAR[2, 61] =
t+61∑
i=t+2
ABRi (2.11)
If the market distraction hypothesis holds, we should expect that for those an-
nouncements made on high-market-news days, their cumulative abnormal returns
after announcements are larger than announcements made on low-market-news
days after controlling for their earnings surprises and firm characteristics, as in-
vestors gradually shift their attention back to firm-specific news after they resolve
market-wide uncertainty. In this section, we perform regression analysis on the
post-announcement cumulative abnormal returns while controlling for other pos-
sible sources of variation in investors’ responsiveness. Specifically, we focus on the
top decile group (FE10) and the bottom decile group (FE1) and regress the Cu-
mulative Abnormal Returns of 60 trading days after announcements CAR[2, 61]
on the TopDecile dummy variable. Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh [2009] notice that
the relation between announcement day abnormal returns and earnings surprise
is highly nonlinear as small negative surprises usually have disproportionately
big effects. Hence, we use the decile dummy of earnings surprise instead of the
surprise itself following the literature. Moreover, the market shock dummy vari-
able and control variables are all interacted with TopDecile. The reason why we
choose 60 trading days to measure post-announcement drift is because Bernard
and Thomas [1989] document that most of the drift after earnings announce-
ments is significant over the 60 trading days window. The OLS specification is
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as follows.
CAR[2, 61] = β0 + β1TopDecile+ β2Marketshock + β3(TopDecile×Marketshock)
+
n∑
i=1
ciControli +
n∑
i=1
di(TopDecile× Controli) + ε
(2.12)
The coefficient β1 measures the returns to good-news stocks relative to bad-
news stock and the coefficient β3 measures the effects of market shock on the sen-
sitivity of investors’ delayed reaction to different news. If investors are distracted
by market shock on the announcement day, the coefficient of the interaction term
between earnings surprise and Market news dummy, β3, should be positive, as
the market shock which causes initial under-reaction leads to a larger difference
in post-announcement returns between good-news stocks and bad-news stocks.
Table 2.7 summarizes the estimation results. Standard errors adjusted for
heteroskedasticity and clustering by the day of announcement are reported in
parentheses. Dependent variable CAR[2, 61] is shown under each column heading,
and independent variables are listed in the first column of the table. The estimates
of control variables’ coefficients are reported in panel B of Table 2.7. In regression
(1), we examine the market distraction effects only and in regression (2) we add
control variables to the model. The estimated coefficients of the interaction term
TopDecile ×Marketshock are positive and significant at the 1% level for both
specifications, which supports our inattention hypothesis: Investor reacting less
to earnings news on high-market-news days cause stronger post-announcement
drifts. Specifically, the post-announcement differential drift at normal times is
10.6% and it is increased by 47.6% for high-market-news days. (The sensitivity
is 0.106 + 0.0505× 1 = 0.1565 when the dummy variable Marketshock = 1 and
0.106 when Marketshock = 0.
Another important determinant of investors’ attention we aim to test is Mar-
ket State, which is examined in regression (3) without control variables and re-
gression (4) with control variables. According to ‘Ostrich Effect’ by Karlsson,
Loewenstein, and Seppi [2009], rising markets should attract more attention from
investors than falling markets. The estimated coefficient of the ‘Up Market’
dummy is negative and highly significant, which is consistent with their ‘Ostrich
41
Table 2.7: Determinants of Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift CAR[2,61]
CAR[2,61] is the cumulative abnormal returns of stocks over the post-earnings-announcement
window (day 2 to day 61). Market Shock is an indicator variable, which is equal to 1 for high-
market-news days and 0 otherwise. Up Market is an indicator variable for market state, which
is equal to 1 for Up Market and 0 for Down Market. Acc. Market Returns is the past 2 years’
accumulated market returns. Control variable set contains Size deciles, B/M ratio deciles, Age,
average Share turnover of the past 12 months, log of (1+Number of Analysts), Deciles of the
number of Competing News, Friday dummy, IO(Institutional Ownership) and indicator variables
for months. All the control variables are interacted with TopDecile dummy. Panel A reports the
results of market distraction effects while Panel B reports the estimated coefficients of attention-
related control variables. Standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering of
the announcement day are reported in parentheses. Sample period is from January 2001 to
December 2010. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Market Distraction Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CAR[2,61] CAR[2,61] CAR[2,61] CAR[2,61] CAR[2,61] CAR[2,61]
Top Decile 0.106*** 0.217*** 0.128*** 0.231*** 0.109*** 0.219***
(0.00519) (0.0459) (0.00843) (0.0462) (0.00543) (0.0457)
Market Shock -0.00266 -0.00339 -0.00271 -0.00443 -0.00359 -0.00472
(0.0132) (0.0121) (0.0133) (0.0122) (0.0131) (0.0121)
Top D X Market Shock 0.0505*** 0.0496*** 0.0459*** 0.0461*** 0.0479*** 0.0475***
(0.0164) (0.0159) (0.0163) (0.0157) (0.0162) (0.0156)
Top D X Up Market -0.0385*** -0.0273***
(0.00996) (0.0102)
Top D X Acc. Market Returns -0.0608*** -0.0449**
(0.0191) (0.0195)
Controls (Interacted) X X X
Constant -0.0457*** -0.132*** -0.0455*** -0.127*** -0.0451*** -0.130***
(0.00406) (0.0340) (0.00687) (0.0345) (0.00436) (0.0340)
Observation 13,174 13,051 13,174 13,051 13,174 13,051
R2 0.042 0.055 0.044 0.057 0.045 0.058
Panel B. Attention-related Control Variables
Top D X Size -0.00927* -0.00969* -0.00932*
(0.00545) (0.00549) (0.00551)
Top D X B/M 0.00235 0.00143 0.00158
(0.00352) (0.00354) (0.00355)
Top D X Turnover -0.0272 -0.0326 -0.0321
(0.0331) (0.0331) (0.0330)
Top D X Age -0.00234 -0.00162 -0.00173
(0.00690) (0.00690) (0.00691)
Top D X Analyst -0.0132 -0.0134 -0.0132
(0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111)
Top D X Competing News -0.00287 -0.00301 -0.00307
(0.00391) (0.00389) (0.00389)
Top D X Friday 0.0238 0.0223 0.0221
(0.0213) (0.0210) (0.0209)
Top D X IO -0.0704*** -0.0586*** -0.0612***
(0.0214) (0.0219) (0.0222)
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Effect’ hypothesis. The delayed response to earnings news is economically smaller
(by 30%) in Up Market than in Down market. For robustness check, we also use
the past 2 years’ cumulative value-weighted market return to replace UpMarket
in regressions (5) and (6) and the conclusion still holds.
Panel B of the table presents the estimated coefficients of the control vari-
ables. Except for size and competing news, the results for the other factors all
suggest that firms which are more salient to investors suffer less from investors’
under-reaction and the delayed response to their earnings news is also smaller.
More importantly, we can see that share turnover, age, analyst coverage, Friday
dummy and institutional ownership all have opposite impacts on immediate reac-
tion DV OL[0, 1] and post-announcement drift CAR[2, 61]. The opposite signs of
the control variables confirm the investor under-reaction hypothesis as a variable
which affects the degree of under-reaction on announcement days should have
opposite effects on the post-announcement drift.
2.5.3 Speed of Correction
If investors underreact to earnings news at announcement, they will adjust their
initial assessments during post-announcement periods. This section aims to find
out when investors shift their attention back to earnings news after market shock,
and how long the market distraction effect lasts. For this purpose, we perform
regression analysis of the post-announcement cumulative returns over different
post-event horizons.
In Table 2.8, we examine various post-announcement windows, which are
shown under the headings of the columns. Panel A suggests that investors shift
their attention back to earnings news quickly after market shock, as the estimated
coefficient of the term TopD ×Marketshock for window [2,15] is already signif-
icant. This is consistent with the findings of Peng, Xiong, and Bollerslev [2007]
from their high-frequency trading data. In contrast, Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh
[2009] document that the distraction effects of competing earnings news on the
post-announcement returns become significant only 45 days after announcements.
To see how long the market distraction effect persists, we also move the post-
announcement window from [2,30] to [30, 60] and [60, 90] respectively. Results
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Table 2.8: Speed of Correction
Different post-announcement windows are examined for investors’ delayed response to earnings
news. CAR[i,j] indicates the cumulative abnormal returns between day i and day j after the
earnings announcement. Dependent variables are shown under the heading of each column.
Market Shock is an indicator variable, which is equal to 1 for high-market-news days and 0
otherwise. Control variable set contains Size deciles, B/M ratio deciles, Age, average Share
turnover of the past 12 months, log of (1+Number of Analysts), Deciles of the number of Com-
peting News, Friday dummy, IO(Institutional Ownership) and indicator variables for months.
All the control variables are interacted with the TopDecile dummy. Standard errors adjusted for
heteroskedasticity and clustering of the announcement day are reported in parentheses. Sample
period is from January 2001 to December 2010. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%
and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift Over Different Horizons
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CAR[2,15] CAR[2,30] CAR[2,45] CAR[2,61] CAR[2,90]
Top Decile 0.0295 0.122*** 0.181*** 0.231*** 0.214***
(0.0263) (0.0339) (0.0414) (0.0462) (0.0539)
Market Shock -0.0137** -0.00682 -0.00341 -0.00443 0.00599
(0.00619) (0.00843) (0.0106) (0.0122) (0.0161)
Top D X Market Shock 0.0255*** 0.0266** 0.0410*** 0.0461*** 0.0253
(0.00786) (0.0111) (0.0147) (0.0157) (0.0192)
Controls (Interacted) X X X X X
Constant -0.0170 -0.0909*** -0.114*** -0.127*** -0.0932**
(0.0201) (0.0260) (0.0311) (0.0345) (0.0416)
Observations 13,051 13,051 13,051 13,051 12,959
R2 0.030 0.047 0.051 0.057 0.036
Panel B. Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift Over Different Event Windows
(1) (2) (3)
CAR[2,30] CAR[30,60] CAR[60,90]
Top Decile 0.122*** 0.114*** -0.0132
(0.0339) (0.0312) (0.0340)
Market Shock -0.00682 0.00620 0.00524
(0.00843) (0.00949) (0.0124)
Top D X Market Shock 0.0266** 0.0167 -0.0120
(0.0111) (0.0121) (0.0156)
Controls (Interacted) X X X
Constant -0.0909*** -0.0436* 0.0398
R2 (0.0260) (0.0232) (0.0253)
Observations 13,051 13,051 12,959
0.047 0.023 0.005
are reported in Panel B of Table 2.8. Column (1) in the table shows that the
coefficient of the interaction term is significantly positive for the post-event win-
dow [2, 30] (day 2 to day 30). However, this effect disappears for the period
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between day 30 and day 60 (see column (2)). While the coefficient estimates for
TopDecile is still significantly positive, the coefficient of TopD ×Marketshock
becomes insignificant, which suggests that people still adjust their assessment
during this post-event period [30, 60]. Nevertheless, the distraction of Market
shock does not influence their adjustment anymore. Therefore, the part of under-
reaction to earnings news due to market shock is corrected within 1 month after
announcements for our sample period. Moreover, the underrection effect is not
evident anymore for the post-event window [60, 90] (See column (3)), as the co-
efficient estimate of TopDecile is not significant either, which confirms Bernard
and Thomas [1989]’s conclusion that most of the earnings news drift occurs in
three calendar months (about 60 trading days) following announcements.
2.5.4 Total Reaction
Table 2.9 investigates the impacts of market shocks on investors’ long-term re-
sponse to earnings news. Specifically, we calculate the cumulative abnormal re-
turns of stocks between day 0 and 60 (or 90) in order to see if the total reaction
is affected by market distracting news and the market state. As shown in the
table, when there is market distracting news on the earnings announcement day,
investors’ total reaction to earnings news is 28% larger compared with other
trading days. (28% is obtained by dividing the coefficient of TopDecile by the
coefficient of the interaction term TopD×MarketShock.) In addition, investors
in Down Market react more strongly to earnings news in the long run than in Up
Markets, as the coefficient for TopD×UpMarket is significantly negative. Inter-
estingly, this result echoes Dellavigna and Pollet [2009]’s Friday effect. Dellavigna
and Pollet [2009] find that the long-term response to Friday’s earnings announce-
ment is larger than to other earnings announcements. It seems that investors
who are initially distracted away from earnings news will actually trade more on
these news to correct their previous under-reaction, causing larger price reaction
in the long run.
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Table 2.9: Total Reaction to Earnings Announcements
Long-term response to earnings news is measured by the cumulative abnormal returns at an-
nouncement and after announcement. CAR[0,61] is the cumulative abnormal returns between
day 0 and day 61. CAR[0,90] is the cumulative abnormal returns between day 0 and day 90.
Market Shock is an indicator variable, which is equal to 1 for high-market-news days and 0
otherwise. Up Market is an indicator variable for market state, which is equal to 1 for Up
Market and 0 for Down Market. Control variable set contains Size deciles, B/M ratio deciles,
Age, average Share turnover of the past 12 months, log of (1+Number of Analysts), Deciles
of the number of Competing News, Friday dummy, IO(Institutional Ownership) and indicator
variables for months. All the control variables are interacted with Top Decile dummy. Standard
errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering of the announcement day are reported in
parentheses. Sample period is from January 2001 to December 2010. *, ** and *** indicate
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CAR[0,61] CAR[0,61] CAR[0,61] CAR[0,90] CAR[0,90] CAR[0,90]
Top Decile 0.222*** 0.257*** 0.366*** 0.213*** 0.244*** 0.351***
(0.0054) (0.0085) (0.0475) (0.0063) (0.0095) (0.0553)
Market Shock -0.0192 -0.0175 -0.0073 -0.0071
(0.0128) (0.0121) (0.0159) (0.0153)
Top D X Up Market 0.0621*** 0.0527*** 0.0428** 0.0318*
(0.0167) (0.0161) (0.0194) (0.0193)
Market State 0.0017 -0.0036 -0.0080 -0.0129
(0.0078) (0.0080) (0.0090) (0.0095)
Top D X Up Market -0.0534*** -0.0440*** -0.0487*** -0.0385***
(0.0103) (0.0105) (0.0120) (0.0124)
Controls (interacted) X X
Constant -0.104*** -0.107*** -0.178*** -0.0978*** -0.0944*** -0.146***
(0.0040) (0.0064) (0.0340) (0.0046) (0.0072) (0.0411)
Observation 13,174 13,174 13,051 13,079 13,079 12,959
R2 0.149 0.151 0.163 0.099 0.102 0.11
2.6 Trading Strategies and Market Distraction
Effects
An alternative way of testing for investors’ under-reaction and the magnitude of
the market distraction effects is through the abnormal profits that can be gener-
ated from trading strategies that exploits investors’ inattention. The conjecture
is that if investors are distracted by market-level news, then the stronger return
continuation after earnings announcements should bring about larger profits than
other times.
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2.6.1 Profitability of the ‘PEAD’ Portfolios
Following Jegardeesh and Titman [1993], we employ a rolling portfolio strategy
which consists of long positions in good-news stocks and short positions in bad-
news stocks to exploit the post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD). The sample
period is from January 1986 to December 2010.1 At the end of each month,
earnings announcements which are released on that month are ranked into 5
quintiles based on their Forecast Error (earnings surprise) and then we buy stocks
with the highest earnings surprise (FE5) and short-sell stocks with the lowest
earnings surprise (FE1). This zero-cost portfolio is held for one month and
rebalanced at the end of next month. The monthly portfolio returns are the
equal-weighted average of individual stock’s returns.
To assess the performance of this trading strategy, we regress portfolio’s
monthly returns on Fama-French risk factors and Carhart’s Momentum factor
2, and the abnormal return should be captured by the constant term α, which
is the unexplainable part of the returns by risk factors. Newey-West standard
errors with 12 lags are reported in parentheses. Panel B of Table 2.9 shows the
average monthly return and the alpha (monthly abnormal return) of the trading
strategy for the full sample. Consistent with existing papers (e.g. Jegardeesh
and Titman [1993] and Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok [1996]), this ‘PEAD’
portfolio yields abnormally high returns which cannot be explained by traditional
asset pricing models. As summarized in the table, the average monthly return of
this portfolio is 1.73% and the abnormal return is 1.64%.
ERet = α+β1×Market+β2×SMB+β3×HML+β4×Momentum+ε (2.13)
In order to study the effects of market shocks, we use monthly volatility of
VIX to measure the aggregate amount of market distracting news. We assume
that volatile VIX indicates large amount of market news/shocks. If earnings
1The reason for choosing this sample period is because VIX data is available only starting
from year 1986.
2Some stocks’ return continuation might be caused by price momentum rather than earnings
drift. To address this issue, we use Momentum factor to control for past winner and past loser’s
influence.
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announcements are made on high-market-news months (characterized by highly
volatile VIX), they should experience stronger post-announcement drift, which
leads to higher abnormal returns of our ‘PEAD’ portfolios. Monthly volatilities
of VIX are computed for the full sample period (1986-2010) and sorted into ten
deciles. The months in the top decile are defined as high-market-news months.
Summary statistics of the monthly volatility of VIX can be found in Panel A of
Table 2.10. By comparing the abnormal returns from earnings announcements
made on these high-market-news months with the rest of the sample period, we
can see that larger abnormal profits can be generated following high-market-
news months. As shown in panel B of Table 2.10, the average monthly return
for the high-news months is 2.39%, which is almost 1.5 times as much as for the
other months. After adjusted for risks, the zero-cost portfolios formed after high-
market-news months also yield higher alpha than the other months. In addition,
the comparison of Sharpe ratios also indicate that the impacts of the market
distraction effect on our ‘PEAD’ portfolio is economically considerable.1
To further examine if the market distraction effect is statistically significant,
we regress the portfolios’ monthly returns on the common risk factors and the VIX
Dummy which equals 1 for high-news months and 0 otherwise. To ensure the ro-
bustness of our regression results, we also replace the VIX Dummy with monthly
volatility level of VIX. Results are shown under model specifications (1) and (2)
in panel C of Table 2.10. Newey-West standard errors with 12 lags are reported
in parentheses. The coefficient of VIX Dummy is positive and highly significant,
implying that portfolios constructed at the end of high-market-news months gen-
erate superior abnormal returns. On average, high-market-new months generate
around 1% higher abnormal return than the other months. Moreover, this result
does not change qualitatively when the absolute level of volatility of VIX is used
(see regression (2)).
ERet = α+β1×Market+β2×SMB+β3×HML+β4×Momentum+β5×V IXDummy+ε
(2.14)
1The annualized Sharpe ratio is the annualized portfolio return divided by the annualized
volatility.
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Table 2.10: Zero-cost Portfolios and Alphas
For each month from January 1986 to December 2010, we sort stocks with earnings announce-
ments into five quintiles based on their earnings surprise (Forecast Error) and then construct a
zero-cost portfolio by buying the stocks with the highest earnings surprise (FE5) and selling the
stocks with the lowest earnings surprise (FE=1) for the purpose of exploiting the post-earnings-
announcement drift. This portfolio is held for one month and rebalanced at the end of next
month. The equal-weighted returns of the portfolio is calculated every month and regressed on
the widely used Fama-French factors and Momentum factor to obtain the values of Alphas. The
variable VIX Dummy is equal to 1 if the portfolio is formed at the end of the high-market-news
month and 0 otherwise. Panel A of the table reports the summary statistics of the volatility of
VIX. Panel B compares the performance of different samples. High-market-news refers to the
months which experienced the highest (top 10%) volatility of VIX. Panel C summarizes the
regression results of the portfolio’s first month’s returns and the second months’ returns on the
VIX Dummy (or the volatility of VIX) and risk factors. Newey-West standard errors with 12
lags are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
Panel A. Volatility of VIX
Mean St.Dev P10 Median P90 No. obs
VIX VOL 1.97 2.76 0.63 1.42 3.41 300
Panel B. Four Factors Alphas(Monthly Returns)
FE1(Bad news) FE5(Good news) FE5-FE1 FE5-FE1 FE5-FE1
Alpha Alpha Alpha Sharpe Ratio Monthly Return No. obs
Full sample -0.66%*** 0.98%*** 1.64%*** 1.67 1.73% 299
High-Market-News -1.39%* 0.78% 2.17%*** 2.17 2.39% 31
Other months -0.60%*** 0.85%*** 1.45%*** 1.59 1.65% 268
Panel C. Regression Analysis (Zero-cost Portfolios)
The First Holding Month The Second Holding Month
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FE5-FE1 FE5-FE1 FE5-FE1 FE5-FE1 FE5-FE1 FE5-FE1 FE5-FE1 FE5-FE1
Alpha 0.0151*** 0.0146*** 0.0173*** 0.0159*** 0.0176*** 0.0158*** 0.0104*** 0.0101***
(0.00197) (0.00210) (0.0036) (0.0022) (0.0038) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0017)
VIX Dummy 0.0106* 0.0099* 0.0101* -0.0058
(0.00595) (0.0058) (0.0059) (0.0056)
VIX Volatility 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0008*** -0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Up Market Dummy -0.0026 -0.0036
(0.0043) (0.0044)
Acc. Market Returns -0.0031 -0.0049
(0.0059) (0.0054)
Market factor 0.0871** 0.0882** 0.0880** 0.0873** 0.0896** 0.0892** 0.0887** 0.0895**
(0.0385) (0.0400) (0.0391) (0.0386) (0.0405) (0.0398) (0.0407) (0.0415)
SIZE factor -0.124* -0.126* -0.128* -0.129* -0.132* -0.134* -0.288*** -0.285***
(0.0732) (0.0736) (0.0723) (0.0701) (0.0726) (0.0705) (0.0603) (0.0607)
B/M -0.0591 -0.0711 -0.0600 -0.0596 -0.0711 -0.0704 -0.284*** -0.276***
(0.0706) (0.0700) (0.0706) (0.0706) (0.0700) (0.0701) (0.0981) (0.0986)
Momentum 0.159*** 0.152*** 0.160*** 0.161*** 0.155*** 0.156*** 0.134*** 0.136***
(0.0485) (0.0513) (0.0486) (0.0483) (0.0507) (0.0502) (0.0416) (0.0417)
No. obs 299 299 299 299 299 299 298 298
In regressions (3) to (6), the Up Market dummy and the past 2 years’ market
cumulative returns are included into the regression models to see if market state
also affects the profitability of our trading strategy. If investors’ attention level
is determined by market state, then post-announcement drift should be weaker
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and abnormal returns should be smaller when earnings news are released in Up
markets than in Down markets. Our finding is consistent with this ‘Ostrich effect’
hypothesis as the coefficients for Up Market dummy and the cumulative market
returns are both negative.
As shown in the analysis on the speed of correction, the distraction effect of
market shock is not significant anymore 1 month after the shock. We should
therefore expect that the market distracting effect news has no impacts on the
profitability of the long-short portfolio one month after the shock. To test this
hypothesis, we extend the holding period of the long-short portfolios from 1 month
to 2 months and examine the abnormal returns for the second holding month
as well. Under model specification (7) and (8), the dependent variable is the
portfolio returns of the second holding month while the independent variable
remain the same. As can be seen in Table 2.10, the ‘PEAD’ portfolio still yields
abnormal returns in the second month, which is manifested by the positive alpha,
although its magnitude is diminished compared with the one of the first holding
month. This result also echoes the findings in the literature that post-earnings-
announcement drifts lasts up to 3 months. Nevertheless, the market distraction
effect disappears as the coefficients of the VIX Dummy and the VIX Volatility are
not significant anymore, which supports our previous conclusion that the initial
under-reaction to earnings news due to market shocks can be corrected within 1
month after the announcements.
2.6.2 Robustness Check: Liquidity Risk
Since the PEAD portfolio needs to be frequently rebalanced, one must bear liq-
uidity risk while engaging in trading this market anomaly. Sadka [2006] finds that
market-wide liquidity fluctuation can account for between 40% and 80% of the
cross-sectional variation of the momentum and PEAD portfolio returns. Pastor
and Stambaugh [2003] also suggest that the innovations of their liquidity factor
can explain half of the profits from a momentum portfolio. To see whether the
abnormally high returns during periods of highly volatile VIX are caused by liq-
uidity factors, we add the liquidity proxies proposed by Amihud [2002], Sadka
[2006] and Pastor and Stambaugh [2003] to our previous regressions, respectively.
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Table 2.11: Robustness Check: Liquidity Risk
The liquidity measures proposed by Amihud [2002], Sadka [2006] and Pastor and Stambaugh
[2003] are added to the previous regressions to examine the impacts of liquidity risk on the rolling
portfolio’s returns. The sample period is from January 1986 to December 2010. The dependent
variables are the zero-cost portfolio’s monthly returns. VIX Volatility is the monthly volatility
of index VIX. Amihud Level is the monthly level of illiquidity calculated based on Amihud
[2002]. Amihud Innovation is the residuals of second-order autoregression of the Amihud Level.
PS Level is the aggregate level of Pastor-Stambaugh market liquidity measure. PS Innovation is
the monthly innovation in aggregate liquidity. Sadka FT is Sadka’s Fixed-Transitory component
of market liquidity. Sadka VP is Sadka’s Variable-Permanent component of market liquidity.
Newey-West standard errors with 12 lags are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE5-FE1 FE5-FE1 FE5-FE1 FE5-FE1 FE5-FE1 FE5-FE1
Alpha 0.0105*** 0.0146*** 0.0146*** 0.0143*** 0.0147*** 0.0151***
(0.00221) (0.00201) (0.00211) (0.00245) (0.00210) (0.00223)
VIX Volatility 0.000793*** 0.000783** 0.00107** 0.000982** 0.000748** 0.000583*
(0.000285) (0.000316) (0.000497) (0.000471) (0.000342) (0.000331)
Amihud Level 0.000316***
(7.10e-05)
Amihud Innovation 0.000199*
(0.000104)
PS Level 0.0185
(0.0365)
PS Innovation 0.0136
(0.0406)
Sadka FT -0.987**
(0.448)
Sadka VP -0.413
(0.326)
Fama French Factors YES YES YES YES YES YES
Momentum Factor YES YES YES YES YES YES
No. obs 299 299 299 299 299 299
1 Estimation results are summarized in Table 2.11, in which the dependent vari-
1Following Amihud [2002], we calculate the individual stock’s daily illiquidity as the ratio
of its absolute return to the dollar trading volume and then average cross the trading days in
that month to obtain the monthly illiquidity ratio. The monthly stock market illiquidity is the
equal-weighted average of illiquidity ratios across stocks. In Sadka [2006], liquidity measure is
defined as the price-impact caused by trades, and it consists of fixed and variable components.
He uses intra-day trades data to estimate the price-impacts components of each firm every
month, and market aggregate liquidity components are just the equal-weighted averages of the
firms’ estimate. The shocks extracted from each time series of market aggregate components
are regarded as systematic liquidity factors. Pastor and Stambaugh [2003] use daily data of
stock returns to measure the extent to which a given dollar trading volume causes stock’s return
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able is the monthly return of the ‘PEAD’ portfolio and the independent variables
including the liquidity factors are displayed in the first column of the table.
In regressions (1) through (6), the Amihud’s levels, Amihud’s innovations,
the Pastor-Stambough (PS hereafter) liquidity levels, PS innovations and Sadka’s
two liquidity components are examined respectively. Table 2.11 suggests that the
market distraction effect is highly robust after we control for liquidity risk, as the
coefficient of the volatility of VIX is significantly positive throughout the 6 model
specifications. Moreover, out of the 6 liquidity measures, only Amihud’s levels,
innovations and Sadka’s FT(Fixed-Transitory) component significantly influence
the returns of our trading strategy. Specifically, positive FT liquidity shocks are
negatively associated with portfolio returns. In other words, the more liquid the
market is, the lower returns the PEAD portfolio can generate. This finding is
consistent with the notion that investors must be compensated with high returns
when they purchase illiquid assets. Since Amihud’s measures capture the illiq-
uidity of the market, the positive signs of the estimated coefficients also suggest
the same.
2.7 Timing of Earnings Announcements
Our previous analyses suggest that investors tend to be distracted when there
is market distracting news and thus react less to firms’ earnings announcements
than usual times. In this section, we investigate if managers take into the account
the market distraction effects when they disclose firms’ earnings information. In-
tuitively speaking, managers with good earnings news should have an incentive to
avoid announcing news when investors are likely to be distracted. When it comes
bad earnings news, there are two opposing factors which might affect managers’
decision. On one hand, investors might react less to firm-level news on the an-
nouncement day when there is market distracting news and cause overpricing of
the bad-news stocks in the short run. On the other hand, the total reaction to
reversal on the subsequent day. They compute the market liquidity level as the equal-weighted
average of all the individual stocks’ volume-related return reversal tendency on a monthly basis.
Their idea is that in a market which is not perfectly liquid, order flows can move prices which
are expected to partially reversed in the future. The monthly data on Pastor-Stambough ’s and
Sadka’s liquidity factors are obtained from WRDS.
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Table 2.12: Descriptive Statistics of 7 Macroeconomic Announcements
Panel A describes the 7 Macroeconomic Announcements which are examined in this paper.
BLS: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; BC: U.S. Bureau of the Census; BEA: U.S. Bureau
of Economic Analysis. Panel B distinguishes the trading days with Macro-Announcements
from the days without Macro-Announcements. Macro Announcements which were made on
Saturdays or Sundays or when the stock market was closed are excluded from our sample.
Panel A. Macro Announcements
Macro Indicator Obs. Frequency Sample Period Source
CPI (Consumer Price Index) 120 Monthly 01/2010- 12/2010 BLS
PPI (Producer Price Index) 119 Monthly 01/2010- 12/2010 BLS
Unemployment 118 Monthly 01/2010- 12/2010 BLS
Housing Starts 120 Monthly 01/2010- 12/2010 BC
New Home Sales 119 Monthly 01/2010- 12/2010 BC
Trade Balance 119 Monthly 01/2010- 12/2010 BEA
GDP final 40 Quarterly 01/2010- 12/2010 BEA
Panel B. Trading Days by Macro Announcement Status
No. of Days % of Days
Full sample 2515
With Announcements 678 26.96%
Without Announcements 1837 73.04%
bad news stocks tend to be higher than other times (as shown in Table 2.9).
Specifically, we investigate if managers try to avoid macro-economic announce-
ments days when they have earnings news to release. The reason why we choose
macro-economic announcements is because these announcements are believed to
convey important information on economic fundamentals and are documented
to have substantial impacts on the aggregate stock market. Moreover, their re-
lease dates are usually scheduled in advance. Therefore, firm managers should
have enough time to respond and strategically change their news release dates.
Among all the macro announcements, we focus on CPI, Housing, Newhome, PPI,
Trade imbalance, Unemployment and GDP, because these indicators have been
found to significantly influence the stock market and other financial markets.
(See Flannery and Protopapadakis [2002] and Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and
Vega [2007].) Descriptive statistics of the 7 macro announcements are presented
in Table 2.12.
Firstly, we calculate the total number of earnings news for days of the week
and months of the year to see the distribution of earnings announcements in our
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Figure 2.1: Average number of earnings announcements
sample period. As can be seen in panel A of Table 2.13, the release of earnings
news exhibits strong seasonal patterns. The number of earnings announcements
increases steadily from Monday to Thursday and drops sharply on Friday, which
has the least earnings news release. Moreover, March, June, September and
December tend to have much fewer earnings announcements than other months.
This pattern holds across earnings news of different nature.
Secondly, taking into account the seasonal patterns of the earnings news re-
lease, we regress the number of the announcements for each trading day on the
macroeconomic indicator variable, which is equal to 1 when there is at least one
of the 7 macro announcements and 0 otherwise. Specifically, a Tobit regression
model is employed to estimate the effects of the macro-announcements as the
number of earnings announcements with a lower bound 0 do not follow a normal
distribution and the traditional OLS estimators would be biased as well as in-
consistent. Announcements made on holidays or weekends are excluded from the
sample. Estimation results are reported in panel B of Table 2.13. After adjust-
ing for the seasonality, we find that managers are less likely to release earnings
news on days which have macroeconomic announcements as the coefficient of the
Macro-dummy is significantly negative as shown in Table 2.13. Moreover, on
a macro announcement days, the total number of earnings news is significantly
reduced by more than 15% on average. (The average number of announcement
is 46 across the sample and it is decreased by 7 on macro announcement days.)
54
This tendency holds across most types of news and is most pronounced for man-
agers who have favorable news to release (FE8, FE9 and FE10). Figure 2.1
shows the average number of earnings announcements with and without macro-
announcements, respectively. To see the effects of each type of macro announce-
ment, we replace the Macro Dummy with 7 indicator variables for the macro
announcements. panel C reveals that except for New Home Sales, all the other
announcements are associated with fewer earnings news release, which suggests
that macro announcements in general cause fewer earnings announcements.
Thirdly, to see if managers with good news/bad news to release have a stronger
propensity to avoid the macro-announcement days compared with other man-
agers, we calculate the fraction of earnings news (which is the number of each FE
category announcements divided by the total number of announcements on that
trading day), and regress the fractions of announcements on the independent vari-
ables of interest. A Tobit regression is conducted to estimate the coefficients of
the macro dummies. Panel D and E of Table 2.13 confirm that managers with fa-
vorable earnings news to announce are more likely to shun macro-news compared
to other managers. The proportion of the best earnings news (FE10) significantly
decreases on macro announcement days as the coefficient of the Macro Dummy
is significantly negative in regression (10) in panel D of the table. 1
1We also analyse the effect of Macro announcement on the frequency of earnings news.
Specifically, we calculate the ratio of the number of earnings announcement to the total number
of announcements over the calendar quarter to control for the seasonal variance on the number
of announcements. The main conclusions are qualitatively unchanged. Regression analysis on
this ratio is included in Appendix A.
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Table 2.13: Timing of Earnings Announcements
Panel A of this table shows the summary statistics of the number of earnings news and its
distributions over days and months. FE is the earnings surprise decile. FE1 refers to stocks
which have the lowest forecast errors. FE10 refers to stocks which have the highest forecast
errors. Panel B presents test results of the effects of macroeconomic announcements on the
number of earnings news release. The dependent variables are the number of earnings news,
shown on each column heading. N is the total number of earnings announcements. NFE1 is
the number of earnings news with lowest earnings surprise. NFE10 is the number of earnings
news with highest earnings surprise. Macro Dummy is an indicator variable, which equals 1
when there is at least one of the 7 macro announcements, and 0 otherwise. Indicator variables
for days and months are also included in the regressions. Announcements made on Saturdays
or Sundays are excluded from the sample. In Panel C, we replace the Macro Dummy with 7
indicator variables for the macro announcements of interest. In Panel D and E, the dependent
variable is the ratio between the number of each type of announcements and the total number
of announcements on that trading day. For instance, PFE1 is the fraction of announcements
with the lowest FE in the total number of announcements. A Tobit regression is employed to
estimate the models and standard deviations are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Summary Statistics
Mean St.Dev Min P10 Median P90 Max
N (Full Sample) 46 61 0 3 19 135 333
Distribution of Earnings Announcement: Day of the week
Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun Total obs.
N (Full Sample) 15021 27228 29661 37147 7447 90 98 116692
FE1(bad news) 1674 2438 2507 3446 963 6 7 11041
FE2 1505 2527 2635 3496 879 6 7 11055
FE3 1388 2566 2818 3499 777 2 9 11059
FE4 1345 2687 2841 3597 576 5 8 11059
FE5 1233 2784 2918 3540 569 3 6 11053
FE6 1289 2685 3003 3546 529 6 6 11064
FE7 1299 2674 2877 3640 567 3 6 11066
FE8 1328 2495 2915 3675 629 4 6 11052
FE9 1381 2622 2796 3629 625 8 1 11062
FE10(Good news) 1475 2427 2749 3705 715 7 3 11081
Distribution of Earnings Announcement: Month of the Year
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC Total obs.
Full Sample 10732 12911 5494 16357 10778 1897 16572 10914 1835 16580 10689 1933 116692
FE1(bad news) 622 1263 842 1149 1385 215 1145 1414 240 1150 1399 217 11041
FE2 913 1231 584 1454 1121 178 1479 1143 181 1479 1114 178 11055
FE3 1213 1119 398 1690 898 167 1661 975 167 1724 882 165 11059
FE4 1138 1169 425 1685 912 156 1768 880 156 1754 835 181 11059
FE5 1251 1121 357 1824 790 140 1904 748 148 1812 793 165 11053
FE6 1258 1122 350 1782 810 164 1813 819 173 1853 755 165 11064
FE7 1173 1214 347 1686 899 171 1798 857 149 1769 846 157 11066
FE8 1100 1241 387 1633 947 172 1695 942 166 1690 886 193 11052
FE9 976 1299 455 1534 1019 203 1538 1086 179 1572 1029 172 11062
FE10(Good news) 728 1350 659 1358 1176 225 1358 1296 155 1308 1262 206 11081
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Table 2.12 (Continued): Timing of Earnings Announcements
Panel A of this table shows the summary statistics of the number of earnings news and its
distributions over days and months. FE is the earnings surprise decile. FE1 refers to stocks
which have the lowest forecast errors. FE10 refers to stocks which have the highest forecast
errors. Panel B presents test results of the effects of macroeconomic announcements on the
number of earnings news release. The dependent variables are the number of earnings news,
shown on each column heading. N is the total number of earnings announcements. NFE1 is
the number of earnings news with lowest earnings surprise. NFE10 is the number of earnings
news with highest earnings surprise. Macro Dummy is an indicator variable, which equals 1
when there is at least one of the 7 macro announcements, and 0 otherwise. Indicator variables
for days and months are also included in the regressions. Announcements made on Saturdays
or Sundays are excluded from the sample. In Panel C, we replace the Macro Dummy with 7
indicator variables for the macro announcements of interest. In Panel D and E, the dependent
variable is the ratio between the number of each type of announcements and the total number
of announcements on that trading day. For instance, PFE1 is the fraction of announcements
with the lowest FE in the total number of announcements. A Tobit regression is employed to
estimate the models and standard deviations are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel B. Regression Analysis on the Number of Earnings Announcements
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
N NFE1 NFE2 NFE3 NFE4 NFE5 NFE6 NFE7 NFE8 NFE9 NFE10
Macro Dummy -6.10** -0.45 -0.95*** -0.47 -0.58* -0.31 0.08 -0.32 -0.79** -1.08*** -1.26***
(2.51) (0.29) (0.34) (0.34) (0.35) (0.36) (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.37) (0.39)
Indicators of
Day of week YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Indicators of
Months YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2515 2515 2515 2515 2515 2515 2515 2515 2515 2515 2515
Panel C. Regression Analysis on the Number of Earnings Announcements
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
N NFE1 NFE2 NFE3 NFE4 NFE5 NFE6 NFE7 NFE8 NFE9 NFE10
CPI -7.46 -0.60 -1.54** -0.22 -0.73 -0.65 -0.21 -1.04 -1.04 -1.31* -2.09***
(5.141) (0.61) (0.70) (0.70) (0.71) (0.74) (0.72) (0.72) (0.74) (0.75) (0.74)
Housing -0.02 -0.90 0.02 0.37 1.10 1.18* 1.69** 1.17* -0.20 -0.48 -0.97
(5.16) (0.60) (0.69) (0.69) (0.69) (0.71) (0.69) (0.69) (0.73) (0.73) (0.72)
Newhome 11.79** 0.76 0.76 1.41** 0.34 2.06*** 1.93*** 2.57*** 1.54** 1.64** 1.11
(4.99) (0.58) (0.67) (0.67) (0.70) (0.70) (0.69) (0.67) (0.71) (0.71) (0.70)
PPI -14.83*** -0.89 -2.57*** -1.61** -1.59** -1.67** -1.20* -1.87*** -1.97*** -2.37*** -2.32***
(5.08) (0.60) (0.70) (0.70) -0.71 (0.73) (0.72) (0.71) (0.74) (0.75) (0.74)
Trade -13.59*** -0.04 -0.65 -1.75** -2.08*** -1.87*** -1.46** -1.27* -2.33*** -2.18*** -1.88***
(4.99) (0.59) (0.67) (0.68) (0.70) (0.72) (0.70) (0.69) (0.73) (0.73) (0.72)
Unem -3.90 -0.42 -0.40 -1.47* -0.48 -0.73 -0.53 -0.70 -0.70 -0.02 -0.34
(5.58) (0.69) (0.79) (0.83) (0.83) (0.89) (0.88) (0.86) (0.88) (0.87) (0.84)
GDP -8.60 -0.39 -0.18 -0.01 0.37 -1.72 -1.18 -2.37* -0.48 -1.91 -2.15*
(8.55) (1.04) (1.17) (1.19) (1.20) (1.35) (1.30) (1.33) (1.28) (1.34) (1.30)
Indicators of
Day of week YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Indicators of
Months YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2515 2515 2515 2515 2515 2515 2515 2515 2515 2515 2515
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Table 2.12 (Continued): Timing of Earnings Announcements
Panel A of this table shows the summary statistics of the number of earnings news and its
distributions over days and months. FE is the earnings surprise decile. FE1 refers to stocks
which have the lowest forecast errors. FE10 refers to stocks which have the highest forecast
errors. Panel B presents test results of the effects of macroeconomic announcements on the
number of earnings news release. The dependent variables are the number of earnings news,
shown on each column heading. N is the total number of earnings announcements. NFE1 is
the number of earnings news with lowest earnings surprise. NFE10 is the number of earnings
news with highest earnings surprise. Macro Dummy is an indicator variable, which equals 1
when there is at least one of the 7 macro announcements, and 0 otherwise. Indicator variables
for days and months are also included in the regressions. Announcements made on Saturdays
or Sundays are excluded from the sample. In Panel C, we replace the Macro Dummy with 7
indicator variables for the macro announcements of interest. In Panel D and E, the dependent
variable is the ratio between the number of each type of announcements and the total number
of announcements on that trading day. For instance, PFE1 is the fraction of announcements
with the lowest FE in the total number of announcements. A Tobit regression is employed to
estimate the models and standard deviations are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel D. Regression Analysis on the Proportions of Different Earnings Announcements
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
PFE1 PFE2 PFE3 PFE4 PFE5 PFE6 PFE7 PFE8 PFE9 PFE10
Macro Dummy 0.014* -0.007 -0.005 -0.001 0.004 0.018*** 0.009 -0.002 -0.002 -0.012*
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Indicators of
Day of week YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Indicators of
Months YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2448 2448 2448 2448 2448 2448 2448 2448 2448 2448
Panel E. Regression Analysis on the Proportions of Different Earnings Announcements
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
PFE1 PFE2 PFE3 PFE4 PFE5 PFE6 PFE7 PFE8 PFE9 PFE10
CPI 0.028 -0.019 0.007 0.001 0.002 0.019 -0.005 0.009 0.006 -0.031**
(0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015)
Housing -0.025 -0.004 -0.003 0.018 0.013 0.037*** 0.037*** -0.006 -0.001 -0.011
(0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015)
Newhome 0.015 -0.016 -0.006 -0.046*** 0.011 0.001 0.031*** -0.001 0.007 0.007
(0.017) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014)
PPI 0.021 -0.016 -0.001 0.005 0.018 0.013 -0.015 -5.76e-05 -0.011 -0.025*
(0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015)
Trade 0.029* 0.016 -0.003 -0.020 -0.004 0.017 0.009 -0.024** -0.021 -0.002
(0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014)
Unem -0.018 0.018 -0.047*** 0.018 -0.012 0.010 -0.008 -0.015 0.030** 0.001
(0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017)
GDP 0.044 0.032 0.007 0.070*** -0.035 -0.007 -0.032 0.017 -0.027 -0.070***
(0.029) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.025)
Indicators of
Day of week YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Indicators of
Months YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 2448 2448 2448 2448 2448 2448 2448 2448 2448 2448
2.8 Conclusion
A bunch of papers have demonstrated that human’s limited capacity in process-
ing information or making investment decisions causes nontrivial market fric-
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tions. It affects not only retail investors but also professional market makers.
This paper is the first to link category-learning behavior with investors’ under-
reaction to earnings news. Due to attention constraint, rational investors should
optimally allocate more attention to market-wide information than to firm-level
information. As a result, the well-documented phenomenon of underreaction
to earnings announcements should be more pronounced when investors are dis-
tracted by market-level news. Consistent with this prediction, our univariate tests
and multivariate regression analysis both suggest that investors are less respon-
sive to earnings news when market shocks arrive at the same time as earnings
announcements. This paper also confirms that mispricing caused by investors’
category-learning propensity is of a temporary nature as the post-announcement
cumulative abnormal returns are larger when investors are distracted initially.
Moreover, the traditional ‘PEAD’ portfolio strategy is found to be more profitable
when earnings announcements are made on turmoil times than other times. In
addition, this paper provides empirical evidence for the ‘Ostrich effect’ hypothe-
sis as our tests results show that Down market is associated with more sluggish
responses to earnings news at announcement and larger abnormal returns after-
wards.
Another interesting phenomenon we find here is that managers in reality are
actually aware of the market distraction effects and they respond to it by mov-
ing their earnings releases away from macroeconomic announcements dates. This
tendency is particularly evident for managers who have good news to disclose.
Hence, this paper also contributes to the literature that managers strategically
time their corporate events or announcements in order to maximize shareholders’
or their own benefits. Our paper suggests that investors’ category-learning pref-
erence not only guides investors’ investment decision, but also exert influences on
firms’ managerial choice.
This paper also sheds light on the future empirical work on the consequences
of investors’ inattention in a wide variety of economic situations. For example,
the category-learning behavior should be observed in other financial markets as
well and our tests regarding the distraction effects of market-level news should
be applicable to studying the releases of other firm-level information or corporate
events.
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Chapter 3
Securitization, Loan Quality and
Regulation
Summary
This chapter presents a rational expectations general equilibrium model to study
the economic consequences of securitization. We provide theoretical explanations
of how securitization helps the economy obtain more capital, and why its advent
inevitably causes deterioration in banks’ asset quality. In addition, we evaluate
the effects of proposed regulation which requires originating banks to retain a
portion of the loans on their balance sheets. The outcome of the model shows the
channels through which regulators can uplift banks’ optimal lending standards
and the market prices of securitized assets by imposing loan sale limits under
different economic conditions. Consistent with prior literature, our model sug-
gests that securitization alone does not necessarily lead to systematic failure of
the banking sector.
3.1 Introduction
The past two decades witnessed the rapid growth of the secondary loan market,
which was coupled with significant transformation within the banking system. In
particular, the practice of ‘Originate and Distribute’ banking or disintermediation
has profoundly changed the role of banks as intermediaries in providing capital
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to the real economy. Instead of keeping their assets on the balance sheets, banks
started selling securitized loans in the secondary market to outside investors,
who could then directly lend money to the borrowers by investing in securities.
According to Gande and Saunders [2012], the trading volume in the US secondary
loan market soared from 8 billion dollars in 1991 to nearly 350 billion dollars in
2007. Undoubtedly, securitization has enabled banks to pump much more capital
into the economy than before.
However, the 2007-2008 financial crisis revealed the other facet of securitiza-
tion: the prosperity of the secondary loan market was accompanied by a plummet
in loan quality. When the situation worsened in the summer of 2007 with the
busting of the US housing bubble, the subprime mortgage crisis quickly evolved
into a full-blown financial crisis, causing rippling effects throughout the economy.
People were surprised to find that the initial loss in the mortgage market was still
modest on scale while the whole financial system suffered a wealth evaporation
tantamount to 8 trillion dollars. (Brunnermeier [2009], Mian and Sufi [2009],
Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig [2010], and Demyanyk and Van Hemert [2011]
provide thorough analyses on the immediate cause of the recent financial crisis.)
Since then, the future of securitization has become an issue of contention among
scholars and practitioners.
More and more people believe that securitization largely contributed to the
deterioration of banks’ asset quality, but what is the micro mechanism? What
is the incentive for banks to issue bad-quality loans? What is the policymaker’s
optimal choice in regulating the market? In this paper, we seek to answer these
questions in a unified framework. First of all, the primary benefit that securitiza-
tion offers is that banks can redeploy their capital efficiently by selling the illiquid
assets in pursuit of more profitable investment opportunities. We propose a par-
simonious two-period model to show that with the aid of securitization, banks
can achieve higher expected profits. We consider two long-term projects which
arrive in the market at t0 and t1 respectively and both mature at time T . In the
absence of secondary market, banks with limited capital can only invest in one
of the projects, and are in a state of autarky. They would never fund negative
NPV projects, and they could even forsake positive NPV projects today if they
expect an even better project in the future. Now suppose they can securitize
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t0-initiated loans and sell them to outside investors at t1. Banks are essentially
given the opportunity to reallocate their capital. As a consequence, banks’ selling
behavior at t1 should be driven by two motives: either the t0-initiated loan is a
lemon and overpriced by outsiders or the loan has positive NPV, but banks have
encountered a better project and thus need to oﬄoad the existing one to finance
the new one.
Outside investors are assumed to be rational in our model. They cannot ob-
serve the quality of the projects and thus anticipate that banks would sell both
lemons and good-quality loans. By holding a pool of diversified securities, in-
vestors are able to obtain the expected value of the pool. In contrast with this
assumption, the received wisdom was built upon investors’ irrationality, blaming
their inadequate appreciation of risks. For example, in the terms employed by
Shin [2009] describing investors’ irrationality, “there is a greater fool next in the
chain. Final investor(e.g. pension fund) is the greatest fool.” This paper, how-
ever, shows that the problem is actually rooted in the ‘originate and distribute’
banking itself, because uninformed investors can always break even in equilibrium
of the model. We prove that the existence of the secondary market inevitably
entails lemons as long as there is information asymmetry, even if loan buyers are
perfectly rational.1 In the unique pooling equilibrium, banks have low underwrit-
ing standards, under which they will issue loans for both positive NPV projects
and negative NPV projects. In this paper, we do not consider the signaling effect
of the fractions of loans retained in banks as in reality the fraction is difficult for
investor to verify due to the complex structure of securitization. Keys, Mukher-
jee, Seru, and Vig [2010] also point out that “there is limited disclosure on who
holds what in the originate-to-distribute chain”. Without signalling, separating
equilibrium cannot be sustained in our model. Suppose banks in equilibrium
underwrite loans of positive NPV only. Anticipating this, outsiders will offer a
good price for the securitized loans although they cannot observe the real returns
1We believe that the assumption of information asymmetry between banks and loan buyers
is realistic. As well documented, banks not only possess hard information that investors cannot
access, such as bank account records of borrowers, but also have localized soft information
regarding the borrowers and their collateral (e.g. houses) (see Rajan, Seru, and Vig [2010],
Gorton and Pennacchi [1995]). This informational friction cannot be completely eradicated,
although it could be alleviated by requiring more information disclosure from banks’ side or
third-party rating.
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of the assets. Expecting to pass any assets onto loan buyers in the secondary
market, banks will in fact finance projects of any quality, even including the bad
ones, which contradicts with the conjecture of separating equilibrium.
With the intention of elevating asset quality, both the EU commission and the
US government are proposing that the originating banks should retain a portion
of loans on their balance sheets. By doing so, banks would have a weaker incen-
tive to finance negative-NPV projects as they would have to bear part of the loss.
We evaluate this proposed regulation by analyzing the channels through which
it influences banks’ optimal lending decision, as well as outsiders’ anticipation.
The interaction between loan originators and loan buyers leads to a unique equi-
librium, which consists of banks’ optimal lending standard and a market clearing
price. Let α refer to the maximum fraction of assets that banks are allowed
to transfer to outside investors, it can be derived that both of the optimal un-
derwriting criterion and equilibrium loan price are determined by α. Our main
findings are the followings: (i)Loan sales limits improves the equilibrium quality
of loans. The outcome of equilibrium shows that banks’ optimal lending standard
is a decreasing function of α. By requiring more loans to be retained, regulators
can effectively increase the lowest return that banks would accept when funding
projects. (ii) Tougher regulation on loan sales can also induce higher market
prices. As will be shown in the model, investors form their expectation of loan
values based on banks’ lending choice. Since banks would adopt stricter criterion
in choosing projects if they have to keep most of the loans on their books, out-
siders in this case can rationally expect good-quality securities in the secondary
market and are thus willing to pay a higher price. (iii) Regardless of the social
costs of negative NPV projects and liquidity issues, our model demonstrates that
banks’ ax ante profit decreases with mandatory retention of loans.
The general equilibrium framework employed in this paper allows us to study
the feedback effect between prices and banks’ lending decision. Intuitively, we
would expect banks’ ex ante wealth to rise with a higher portion of loans allowed
to be sold, simply because banks enjoy more flexibility in redeploying their re-
sources. But this simple intuition is not necessarily true because the price of
loans varies with the regulatory interventions as well. Our model shows that an
increment in α causes two offsetting effects on banks’ profit: (i) the option value
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of securitization increases with α. Intuitively speaking, the more illiquid assets
banks can get rid of in the secondary market, the more efficient allocation of
capital banks can achieve when encountering better projects; (ii) a high α incurs
low-quality loans, which lowers the equilibrium price as market clearing price re-
flects loan purchasers’ rational expectation of the project-based security value,
and the amount of capital banks can obtain from the market diminishes as a con-
sequence. We further show that this price effect in magnitude is only a fraction
of the option value. We therefore conclude that the price effect is not enough to
offset the benefits that securitization offers to the banks, and the banks’ expected
welfare is indeed enhanced with a looser loan sales constraint.
Moreover, we distinguish between normal times and booms to see how mar-
ket participants respond under different economic prospects. We find that the
equilibrium price and loan quality in the secondary loan market is subject to
people’s expectations about the future. In particular, the equilibrium loan price
is procyclical. In times of strong economic growth, investors are willing to pay
more for asset-backed securities as their conditional prediction on loan quality
is adjusted upward due to increased average return of investments. During eco-
nomic downturn, investors revise their forecasts accordingly, which drags down
the price of securitized assets. Nevertheless, the change in equilibrium loan qual-
ity depends on loan sale limits imposed by regulators. When securitization is
prohibited, banks will raise their lending standard at t0 in economic expansion
due to increased opportunity cost. In contrast, when banks are free to sell the
entire loans to outside investors, banks’ lending standard will drop significantly
in economic expansion.
We also touch upon one of the liquidity issues in the extended model. A sim-
plified maturity mismatch scenario is examined. Random deposit withdrawal can
lead to liquidity shortfall of banks. With increasing probability of cash withdrawal
in the middle of its operation, banks become more cautious towards lending and
the underwriting standard is thus raised in the absence of securitization. Our
model shows that securitization alleviates the maturity mismatch problem. As a
result, banks’ participation condition in the secondary loan market is consider-
ably relaxed, depending on the magnitude of the random deposit withdrawal. In
the meanwhile, expecting banks to give up good projects under liquidity shock,
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outside investors are willing to offer a higher price for the securitized loans. More-
over, the equilibrium loan price is proved to be increasing with the probability of
liquidity shock.
In line with a recent empirical study on securitization by Gorton and Metrick
[2012], our model suggests that disintermediation/securitization alone should not
lead to a systemic outage of the banking sector as long as banks make the ‘optimal’
lending decision to maximize their profits and investors rationally anticipate the
pooling risks. Gorton and Metrick [2012] argue that the underlying reason for
the recent financial market dislocation was the rife use of the securitized asset
as collateral in raising short-term funding. Ho¨rdahl and King [2008] document
that the leading US investment banks funded nearly half of their assets by using
repo agreement. Since the ability of raising money from the repo market depends
on the value of collateral, banks were effectively driven into insolvency when the
secondary loan market experienced sharp devaluation, which caused liquidity dry-
up in the repo market. The quality of securitized loans was in this manner playing
a vital part when the short-term liquidity market and securitization market were
deeply interrelated. Banks who failed to internalize the penalty costs associated
with low-quality loans suffered from ‘shadow banking’ run.
In the literature, our work is closely related to Parlour and Plantin [2008],
who are focused on the moral hazard problems associated with securitization in
ex post monitoring, and Chemla and Hennessy [2013] who analyze the interplay
of different market participants in the secondary loan market and provide policy
implications on how to promote originator’s monitoring effort.1 Pennacchi [1988]
and Gorton and Pennacchi [1995] also tackle similar moral hazard problems in the
secondary loan market. In contrast, the present paper concentrates on the adverse
selection problem of banks in ex ante screening. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first attempt that directly examines the adverse selection problem in
the context of securitization. Hoerova, Holthausen, and Heider [2009] also study
adverse selection in interbank borrowing during financial crisis. Yet their paper
does not pertain to securitization/disintermediation and has no implications on
1Other papers studying the tradeoff between the benefit of liquid market and the cost of
losing commitment to monitor include Aghion, Bolton, and Tirole [2004], and Faure-Grimaud
and Gromb [2004].
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loan quality or social welfare.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the most
related papers in literature. Section 3 presents the essential pieces of the model,
the resulting optimal actions of banks and outside investors, and how the general
equilibrium is achieved. Section 4 analyses the implications of our model and
the effects of the proposed regulation within different contexts. The benchmark
framework is extended in section 5 wherein a simplified scenario of maturity
mismatch is examined. Section 6 contains the main conclusions of the paper and
suggests possible directions for future research.
3.2 Related Literature
3.2.1 Theories
Pennacchi [1988] is a pioneering work on the originate-to-distribute banking sys-
tem. Specifically, they study the moral hazard problem inherent in securitiza-
tion. Firstly, they show that competition for deposit financing and regulatory
constraint in required capital make loan sales desirable for banks as banks can
create value by providing screening and monitoring services, which helps reduce
banks’ cost of raising funds. They also demonstrate that weakened incentive to
monitor loans of banks limits the extent of loan selling. To alleviate the moral
hazard problem, they propose an incentive-efficient contract which gives the loan
buyers recourse to claims on other banks’ asset. This recourse would enable
banks to sell the entire loan while retaining their incentive to monitor at the
optimal level. Their model also explains why banks would purchase loans in the
secondary market and why the loan sales volume had increased tremendously.
They argue that banks which have greater advantage in cheap deposit financing
but weaker lending opportunities would purchase loans in the secondary markets.
Their model also predicts that a decline in deposit funding opportunities would
cause an expansion of loan sales.
Gorton and Pennacchi [1995] also focus on the moral hazard problem asso-
ciated with loan sales and propose a model of optimal contract between loan
originators and loan buyers. Specifically, the moral hazard problem arises as
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banks exert unobservable efforts to screen loan applicants and/or monitor bor-
rowers after the loan is issued. To mitigate the problem, they assume that a
bank can retain a portion of loans in its balance sheet and/or offer an implicit
guarantee against borrower’s default. They show that in the presence of these
two contract provisions, banks’ optimal effort level is no longer the most efficient
one. Moreover, their model suggests that the portion of loans retained in the
bank increases with loan sale premium and decrease with banks’ internal capi-
tal cost and banks’ probability of survival. To test the theoretical implications
of the model, they analyse a bank’s individual loan sales data and the empiri-
cal results support their propositions. They argue that loan sales is not simply
a underwriting practice as banks still provide credit evaluation and monitoring
services.
Holmstrom and Tirole [1997] present an equilibrium model of financial inter-
mediation to study how the financial status of firms, intermediaries and investors
impacts firms’ investments, loanable funds, interest rates and intensity of mon-
itoring. In their model, there are two moral hazard problems. Firstly, firm
managers might shirk for their own private benefits, which decreases the proba-
bility of success of the project. Secondly, intermediaries’ monitoring is costly. To
solve these two problems, they use two incentive constraints such that managers
will not shirk and intermediaries will monitor. In the absence of intermediation,
firms with insufficient collateral will not be financed. In the presence of inter-
mediation, monitoring serves as a partial substitute of collateral. Hence, firms
with low net worth can be financed by a mixture of informed intermediary and
uninformed investors. Their model suggests that in the event of capital squeeze,
aggregate investment level will go down and capital-poor firms will be the first to
lose financing. Moreover, they distinguish different sources of capital supply and
document the impacts of changes in capital supply on investment, interest rate
and solvency ratios of firms and intermediaries.
Parlour and Plantin [2008] develop a parsimonious model of endogenous liq-
uidity to study when the secondary market is liquid and when it is socially de-
sirable. They tackle both moral hazard problem and adverse selection problem
in the model. Specifically, they build on Holmstrom and Tirole [1997]’s model
of moral hazard and assume that through monitoring, banks can learn the final
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payoff of the project perfectly and prevent firm managers’ from shirking. In the
meantime, monitoring is costly and banks might shirk when it expects that it can
sell anything in the secondary loan market. In addition, the secondary loan mar-
ket is liquid only when the adverse selection risk is low, i.e., only when the bank
is willing to sell both good projects and bad projects when it has a preference
shock. By maximizing firm managers’ expected profits with all the agents’ incen-
tive compatibility constraints, the authors derive the optimal contracts offered
by the firms in the absence of secondary loan market and the optimal contract in
the presence of secondary loan market, respectively. Their model suggests that
the liquidity of the secondary loan market depends on projects’ probability of
success and securitization is socially efficient only banks have high opportunity
cost of capital, i.e., when the future investment opportunity is highly profitable
or when bank’s financial constraint is tight.
Shin [2009] starts with the analysis on intermediaries’ balance sheets and show
that the endogenous supply of credit depends on some key attributes of interme-
diaries’ balance sheets. Specifically, he assumes that a bank aim to maintain
its market equity at the value at risk level and he proves that a decrease in the
default rate in the model would increase the equity value of the bank and the
bank would thus seek to increase its notional debt and use the proceeds to fi-
nance more end-users investors. Moreover, due to the macroeconomic feedback
effect, the interplay between expanded balance sheets and increased lending will
be magnified, which can serve to explain the observed lending boom. The author
argues that the origin of the subprime crisis lies in the incentive of banks’ to fill
the expanding balance sheets with new assets, and this is the reason why the
banks would issue loans to subprime borrowers and keep bad loans on their own
balance sheets instead of passing all the loans to other investors.
Hoerova, Holthausen, and Heider [2009] focus on the interbank market and
examine how counterparty risk (the possibility that borrower becomes insolvent
and cannot pay back the loan) impacts liquidity of the market and the interbank
interest rate. Banks in their model encounter two types of shocks in the mid-
dle of their investment, namely liquidity shock and the shock to the riskiness of
their long-term assets. They firstly analyse the model with no information fric-
tion, which means the riskiness of the long-term projects are public information,
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and there are two separate markets (and different interest rates) for banks with
liquidity shortage and safer assets and banks with liquidity shortage and riskier
assets. When they take into account information asymmetry, multiple equilibria
arise. Most importantly, their model shows that under certain conditions, adverse
selection can cause dysfunction of the interbank market and even breakdown of
the market in the extreme scenario.
Chemla and Hennessy [2013]’s work is closely related to ours. There are four
types of agents in their model, namely loan originators, uninformed rational in-
vestors, speculators and market makers. Using backward induction, they solve in
order the optimal portfolio choices of uninformed investors, market equilibrium
prices in pooling equilibrium and separating equilibrium and loan originators’
optimal effort levels under different market conditions (opacity or transparency).
Their model suggests originators’ optimal effort level is lower than first-best in all
equilibria due to information asymmetry and they would choose low/zero reten-
tions in equilibrium if they are faced with severe financial constraint and/or loan
prices are highly informative. In addition, they prove that mandatory retentions
of loans in originators enhances social welfare as it can increase effort incentives
efficiently and effort can be also promoted by requiring junior retentions, tranch-
ing, investors sophistication and informative prices. One of the major differences
between their models and ours is that they assume that traders are capable of
generating information on asset quality and prices in the secondary market can
be informative while we assume that investors do not receive any signal regarding
asset quality.
3.2.2 Empirical Studies
There is an extensive literature on the economic consequences of securitization.
For example, in the context of the credit expansion in the US, Mian and Sufi [2009]
examine three potential explanations respectively, namely income-based hypothe-
sis, credit-supply-based hypothesis and house price expectation-based hypothesis,
in order to find out the true driving force behind the rise in mortgage credit before
the 2007 financial crisis. They utilize a unique subprime ZIP code data in order
to study the geographical variation in subprime mortgage growth. In particular,
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they associate the ZIP codes with mortgage default rates and the main findings
are the following: (1) subprime neighborhoods experience weaker income growth
while stronger mortgage credit growth compared with prime neighborhoods dur-
ing their sample period. (2) subprime-prime interest rate spread dropped signif-
icantly between the crisis despite the increased riskiness of subprime mortgages.
(3) Credit growth in the US was accompanied by the expansion of subprime
mortgage securitization and the increase in rate of securitization is much higher
in subprime ZIP codes compared to prime ZIP codes and the increase in mort-
gage defaults are sharply amplified in subprime ZIP codes. (4) Similar results
are also obtained in those elastic-house-supply areas where house price growth is
flat. These empirical facts all together supports the hypothesis that the explosive
growth of subprime mortgages was caused by the excessive supply of credits by
lenders.
Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig [2010] concentrate on the impacts of securi-
tization on the incentive of financial intermediaries to conduct diligent screening.
They empirically examine the relationship between securitization and screening
standards of subprime mortgage loans. In practice, screening loan applicants
involves collecting both ‘hard’ information (such as credit scores) and ‘soft’ in-
formation (such as future income stability). Since credit score is easy to obtain,
lenders do not need to exert much effort in collecting hard information. Since
investors in the secondary loan market purchase securities only based on hard in-
formation, securitization might causes weaker incentive of lenders to collect soft
information. In particular, the authors use FICO scores as a measure of ‘hard’
information and point out that a FICO score of 620 is a threshold, above which
loans are much easier to be securitized. Their empirically document a disconti-
nuity in the number of securitized loans around the credit threshold- loans above
the credit threshold are securitized twice as many as those below the threshold.
Strikingly, the default rate of those ‘better quality’ loans is 25% higher than that
of ‘lower quality’ loans. Moreover, they compare different portfolios with virtually
identical risk profiles and find that the ease of securitization significantly atten-
uates lenders’ screening efforts. Their results suggest that securitization might
have caused a declined screening standards.
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Gorton and Metrick [2012] study the impacts of securitization on economy
from another perspective. They describe the 2007-2008 financial crisis as a run
on the repo market. They argue that different from traditional banking, securi-
tized banking relied on repo agreements as the main source of funding and they
define the combination of securitization and repo finance as ‘securitized banking’.
They analyze a novel data on the credit spreads of securitized bonds to show the
contagion effects of subprime-housing related asset on other assets which have no
connection to housing through the short-term financing channel. Their empirical
findings suggest that the weakening of subprime does not necessarily cause the
systematic problem among banks. It is the increased repo haircuts and increased
amount of required collateral that drove the US banking system insolvent.
Besides, Demyanyk and Van Hemert [2011] and Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez
[2013] also empirically examine different aspects of securitization. Demyanyk
and Van Hemert [2011] document a monotonic decline in loan quality between
year 2001 and year 2007 when the subprime mortgage market grew dramatically.
Moreover, they find that the subprime mortgage rate spread decreased steadily
during their sample period despite the deteriorating mortgage quality. They
argue that it is the unsustainable growth of securitization caused to the collapse
of the market. Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez [2013] present analysis on asset-
backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits to show that securitization in reality
failed to transfer risk from the banking sector to outside investors and they argue
that by devising various securitization methods, banks largely reduced the require
regulatory capital while retaining the risks on their balance sheet.
3.3 The Model
3.3.1 Setup
In the benchmark model, there are only three dates - t0, t1 and T , and two types
of risk-neutral agents- banks, and outside investors. The net risk-free interest
rate is 0 and the subjective time discount factor is 1. The key ingredients of the
model are stated as follows.
Banks. There is a continuum of identical banks with measure 1, each of
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which has access to its own customer base, and has only one unit of capital (i.e.
cash) at t0. No other financial resources are available. For each bank, there are
two risky long-term projects with constant returns to scale emerging at time t0
and t1 respectively. Projects are scalable and identical ex ante and will both pay
off at time T.1
Projects. Issuing loans on the projects will bring the bank either return R or
0 due to limited liability at time T , where R > 1. Let us denote the probability
of realizing R by θ˜i for the project arriving at ti, where i = 0, 1. The term
1 − θ˜i thus measures the default rate. θ˜i is random ex ante for both banks and
investors, and is drawn from the same distribution over the support [0, 1] with
positive density everywhere. The uncertainty of θ˜i is resolved at T . Accordingly,
the expected return of loans can be expressed by R˜i ≡ Rθ˜i, where θ˜i is assumed
to be independent across time and across banks.
Information Asymmetry. A bank, through its screening technology and
relationship with its customers, can perfectly observe the quality of the projects
(i.e. the realization of θ˜i, i = 0, 1). That is, the bank is fully aware of the true
value of R˜i once the project has come up at ti , while an outsider (including
potential loan buyers) doesn’t know the realizations of R˜0 and R˜1 but only their
distributions. We use Ri to denote the true value of R˜i, i = 0,1.
Bank’s Underwriting Decision. At time t0, the bank has only one unit of
initial capital, and need to choose between originating a loan on the t0 project
and retaining the money. At time t1, the bank is faced with five options based
on its previous action: (1) hold the t0-initiated loan until its maturity; (2) sell
the t0-initiated loan in the secondary loan market and keep the proceeds; (3) sell
the t0-initiated loan and invest in the t1 project; (4) continue carrying forward
its initial capital if it didn’t originate the loan for the t0 project; (5) invest the
initial capital in t1 project if it didn’t originate the loan for the t0 project. Note
that banks in our model cannot sell (collateralize) the t1- loan opportunities. In
other words, banks have to initiate loans before distributing them.
1This assumption is for simplicity purpose. Under the alternative assumption that the
second loan matures later than the first loan, the model outcomes and main conclusion of the
paper do not change.
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Rational Investors. Outside investors in our model make rational decisions.
They are aware of the information asymmetry and assess the values of the loans
conditioned on their information set as well as banks’ underwriting decisions. We
posit that the secondary loan market is competitive and buyers are on the long
side of the market. Loan buyers should therefore break even in market clearing,
and the market clearing price of t0-initiated loans, denoted by P , should be equal
to investors’ expected value of loans.
Regulation. A common regulation practice for governments is to impose
the maximum α portion of loans which loan originator can sell in the secondary
market. By holding at least 1 − α portion of the stakes in the borrowers, banks
will have a stronger incentive to finance high-quality projects. The maximum
α set by authorities therefore indicates how much control the regulator exerts
over the market. When α = 1, there is essentially no regulation, and banks can
utilize the secondary market to the largest extent; when α = 0, loan sales in the
secondary market are banned.
Figure 3.1 summarizes the sequence of events.
Figure 3.1: Timeline of events
Another issue we would like to clarify here is that this paper does not con-
sider a signaling effect of the fraction of loans banks retain. Intuitively, the more
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loans a bank keeps on its book, the higher the loan quality the outside investor
would expect. However, the prerequisite is that buyers are perfectly informed
of the fraction of loans retained by each bank, which in reality is difficult to
access for outsiders. Firstly, unlike syndicate lending in primary markets, loan
sales in secondary markets often involve a chain of resales. The multiple layers of
turnover limits investors’ ability to identify the sources of the loans, not to men-
tion the exact portion that each originator reserves. The complexity inherent in
securitization is in fact one of the reasons why government intervention is needed
to alleviate information asymmetry.1 Secondly, securitization is characterized by
pooling various assets and passing them as a pack onto general investors. As a re-
sult, a single buyer in the secondary market usually possesses various securitized
loans issued by different banks. Due to the benefits of diversification, investors
lack incentive to spend resources in finding out what proportion of loans each
originator retains. In reality, the signaling effect did not seem to be significant
in the securitization market, otherwise, we would not have observed the meteoric
declines in banks’ underwriting standards before the financial crisis.
3.3.2 Characterization of the General Equilibrium
In this section, we analyze the optimal underwriting standards of banks, R∗,
which is the minimum expected return of projects that banks will accept at t0,
as well as the market clearing price P in the secondary loan market. As will be
elaborated later, banks’ optimal decision rule is that they strictly prefer to loan
out the initial capital at t0 if R0 > R
∗, reject the project if R0 < R∗, and are
indifferent when R0 = R
∗, where the threshold R∗ ≥ 0.2
Definition 1 A pair of (P,R∗) constitutes an equilibrium, if (I): given price P,
banks’ optimal decision rule is characterized by R∗; and (II): given the decision
rule R∗, the price P clears the secondary market.
1Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig [2010] also point out that there is very limited disclosure
regarding who holds what in the ‘originate-to-distribute’ chain.
2When banks are indifferent, their choice does not affect P because the probability of
R˜0 = R
∗ is 0.
74
The two conditions above will be examined respectively, and we will show
that the interplay between the two agents results in the equilibrium of the model.
3.3.2.1 Determination of banks’ optimal underwriting standards given
loan price
Given the secondary loan price P , banks’ optimal underwriting standards at t0
can be worked out through backward induction. At t1, there are two possible
scenarios based on bank’s previous choice:
i. If it rejected the project at t0, the value of the initial capital at t1 will be
VC ≡ max(1, R1), as the cash can either be carried forward to T with gross
return of 1, or be invested in the t1-arriving project with expected return R1;
ii. If the bank originated the loan at t0, it will have to hold at least 1− α frac-
tion of the asset until maturity due to regulatory requirement, which yields
(1− α)R0. The remaining proportion α, which is allowed to be sold, can be
managed in two ways: it can be either held until time T , with expected return
R0 or sold at price P with the final value of P max(1, R1).
1 The disposable
part of the loan is thus worth max(R0, P max(1, R1)) = max(R0, P, PR1)
per unit, the intuition being that banks are willing to sell the loans only
when the price exceeds the loans’ expected value or there is a more prof-
itable investment opportunity available.2 As the primary channel of rede-
ploying capital, the securitization market essentially offers the bank a call
option on future projects, which can be measured by the difference term
max(R0, P, PR1) − R0 ≥ 0. The properties of this underlying option will
be explored in more detail later. To sum up, the value of t0-originated
loan at t1, consisting of the retained part and sellable part, amounts to
VL ≡ αmax(R0, P, PR1) + (1− α)R0.
1Their decision depends on the outside investment opportunities
2It is easy to prove that the optimal fraction of loans banks would sell in the market
is the upper bound α imposed by government. In a nutshell, when banks can benefit from
securitizing their loans, they should exploit it up to the maximum. Detailed proof is included
in the Appendix.
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Let us return to t0, when R0 is the bank’s private information, and R1 is
uncertain. Since agents do not discount future cashflows in our model, the value
of carrying cash forward is simply the expected value of VC conditioned on R˜1,
which can be written as ER˜1(VC) = ER˜1 max(1, R˜1) ≡ C. 1 Similarly, the value of
investment on loan should be ER˜1(VL) = αER˜1 max(R0, P, P R˜1) + (1− α)R0.
We now introduce this function f(R0, P, α) ≡ αER˜1 max(R0, P, P R˜1) + (1 −
α)R0. The value of originating the loan at t0 is determined by three variables:
project quality, anticipated price in the secondary market, and the portion of loans
that banks can sell to the general investors. It is easy to verify that ∂f
∂R0
> 0,
∂f
∂P
> 0, and ∂f
∂α
> 0, implying that in the face of high loan price /good project
quality /loose regulation, banks are more likely to initiate loans at t0.
The following condition holds when banks are indifferent between holding cash
and issuing a loan:
αER˜1 max(R0, P, P R˜1) + (1− α)R0 = ER˜1 max(1, R˜1) (3.1)
α [ER˜1 max(R0, P, P R˜1)−R0]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected option value
+R0 = ER˜1 max(1, R˜1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
C: Opportunity cost
(3.2)
As shown in Equation 3.2, the right hand side of the equation represents the
opportunity cost of issuing loans. Let C refer to the opportunity costs. The left
hand side of the equation is the benefits of issuing a loan at t0. The foregoing
analysis of function f suggests that equation (1) has a unique solution with respect
to R0, as the left hand side of the equation is strictly increasing in R0. We denote
the solution by R0(P, α). Given the values of P and α, we can work out the
threshold project return R0(P, α), at which banks are indifferent. Accordingly,
the following decision rule directs banks’ underwriting behavior: they strictly
prefer to invest all their money in a loan if and only if the expected return from
financing the project surpasses the threshold, namely R0 > R0(P, α), otherwise,
banks will reserve its capital.
1Here constant C is fixed when the distribution of R˜ is given.
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The threshold return R0(P, α) is plotted in Figure 3.2 as a function of P and
α.1 There are two special cases we would like to emphasize first:
i. Strict regulation and (or) undesirable market prices prohibit banks from se-
curitizing their illiquid assets. When α = 0, no selling is allowed in the
secondary market. The lowest expected return of project that banks will ac-
cept under this circumstance at t0 is always equal to C, which is the value of
holding cash till t1. In other words, banks are willing to issue the loan while
giving up the investment opportunity for the next period only if the project
quality at t0 is high enough (higher than the opportunity cost). The highest
underwriting standard also arises when the anticipated market price P < 1,
regardless of α. The rationale is that when P < 1, retaining initial capital till
t1 is always preferred over selling loans at t1 as max(1, R˜1) ≥ max(1, P R˜1).
Hence, the only reason for banks to originate loans at t0 without securiti-
zation is that the current project is expected to be better than the future
investment opportunities, i.e., R0 > ER˜1 max(1, R˜1). For the above two cases,
banks would adopt the toughest lending standard C.
ii. When α = 1, banks can transfer all their assets to loan purchasers. The
vertical line in the graph shows that in the absence of regulation, banks are
willing to undertake any project as long as they can sell it later at a price
which is higher than 1.2
Apart from the extreme scenarios, the most prominent feature displayed in
the graph is that for a given market price, banks’ optimal underwriting standard
decreases with respect to the portion of assets they can oﬄoad in the secondary
market. Likewise, for a fixed value of α, the higher the market price is, the lower
expected return banks would require to originate a loan. Mathematically, it can
be derived that ∂R0
∂P
= −fP
fR0
≤ 0 and ∂R0
∂α
= −fα
fR0
≤ 0.3
1Since the upper bound of the distribution of R˜0 is R, the domain of P is set to be [0, R]
as the price shouldn’t be higher than the maximum return.
2As analyzed before, when P > 1, banks would apply the highest lending criterion, even if
there is no regulation.
3When P > 1, the strict inequalities hold: fP > 0 and fα > 0. Hence,
∂R0
∂P < 0 and
∂R0
∂α < 0
when P > 1.
77
Figure 3.2: Threshold return R0(P, α)
As shown in Figure 3.2, R0(P, α) can be negative, meaning projects with
any quality will be undertaken. Considering that the distribution of R˜0 has no
negative support, banks’ optimal lending standard R∗ should be written as
R∗ = max(R0(P, α), 0) (3.3)
Figure 3.3 summarizes banks’ optimal lending choice at time t0 in response
to different levels of market price and regulation.
Corollary 1 ∂R
∗
∂P
≤ 0 and ∂R∗
∂α
≤ 0.
Banks’ lending choice at the initial stage depends on the price they anticipate
in the aftermarket, and the limit of loan sales set by authorities. Not surprisingly,
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Figure 3.3: Bank’s optimal lending standard R∗
their credit standard declines with increasing market price and α. This result is
consistent with the empirical facts of the securitization market. In the years
that preceded the financial crisis, securitized loans experienced increasing default
rates. In the meantime, Bord and Santos [2012] document the trend of declining
proportion of term loans that were retained in the banking sector for the same
period.
3.3.2.2 Determination of market clearing price given banks’ under-
writing decision
As analyzed before, banks’ selling behavior at t1 should be driven by two motives:
either the t0-initiated loan is a lemon and overpriced by outsiders or the loan has
a positive NPV, but banks have encountered a better project and thus need to
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oﬄoad the existing one to finance the new one. Due to the lack of transparency in
the secondary loan market, investors do not observe the qualities of the securitized
assets and they cannot distinguish between the two motives of banks’ selling
behavior. As a consequence, loan buyers bet on average and pay a single average
price. In our model, their rational expectation is formed purely based on all the
information available to them.
First of all, the decision rule of banks at t0 suggests that the expected return
of the loan on sale should not be lower than banks’ underwriting standard, which
is R0 ≥ R∗. Otherwise, banks would not have originated it in the first place.
Second of all, banks are willing to oﬄoad the t0-innitiated loan either when the
market price of the loan is high enough or when they face better investment
opportunities, which implies that P max(1, R1) ≥ R0. We posit that investors
are on the long side of the market, i.e., they only break even when market is
clear. Therefore, the equilibrium price of loan on sale should satisfy investors’
conditional expectation of its true value.
P = ER˜0,R˜1(R˜0|P max(1, R˜1) ≥ R˜0 ≥ R∗) (3.4)
To see how investors’ expectation varies, we define a function h(P,R∗) ≡
ER˜0,R˜1(R˜0|P max(1, R˜1) ≥ R˜0 ≥ R∗), whose domains are P ∈ [R
∗
R
, R] and R∗ ∈
[0, R].1 As depicted by Figure 3.4, the main feature of the graph is that h(·, R∗)
is increasing in P for any given R∗ and then the curves move downwards with de-
scending R∗.2 Intuitively, low lending standards in the first period would certainly
drive down investors’ expectations. However, when the underwriting standard is
given, a higher market price is suggestive of better quality assets as investors
would not sell them otherwise.
It can be proved that for any given value of R∗ ∈ [0, R], a solution for P
in Equation 3.4 exists.3 Moreover, we define function g(R∗) as the solution to
1Proof: P max(1, R˜1) ≥ R˜0 ≥ R∗, which suggests P ≥ R∗max(1,R˜1) ≥
R∗
R . In addition, since
P ≤ R is given, the range of P should be [R∗R , R].
2It is trivial to verify that ∂h∂P ≥ 0 and ∂h∂R∗ > 0.
3See Appendix B for proofs.
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Figure 3.4: Investors’ expected loan return h(P,R∗)
Equation 3.4 so that we can study how the optimal lending choice of banks at
the first period affects the secondary market price.1 Hence, g(R∗) is an implicit
function defined by h(P,R∗) = P with g(R) = R.
Lemma 1 P = g(R∗) strictly increases with R∗.
Proof If R∗ > R∗′, then h(g(R∗′), R∗) > h(g(R∗′), R∗′) = g(R∗′). This together
with h(·, R∗) is an increasing function and h(R,R∗) < R implies that h(P,R∗) =
P has a solution within (g(R∗′), R). Then g(R∗) is within this interval, as it is
the biggest root of h(P,R∗) = P . Therefore, g(R∗) > g(R∗′). 
1In the case of h(P,R∗) = P having multiple solutions, g(R∗) equals the biggest root.
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Intuitively speaking, rational investors form model-consistent expectations,
which means their predictions are always valid on average. As a result, market
equilibrium price should reflect the level of expected loan qualities, which should
be increasing with banks’ underwriting standards. In addition, Equation 3.4
suggests that g(R∗) ≥ R∗, meaning that the market price of securitized assets is
never lower than the threshold return banks accept at time t0.
For P ∈ [g(0), R], the inverse function of g(R∗) exists, which is given by
R∗ = k(P ). By definition, k(P ) is continuous and increasing over P ∈ [g(0), R],
with k(R) = R and k(P ) ≤ P.1 Figure 3.5 illustrates this function.
Figure 3.5: The inverse function k(p)
1Because g(R) = R and g(R∗) ≥ R∗.
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Remark 1 The value of g(0) depends on the upper bound, R, of the random
return R˜i.
The value of g(0) deserves special attention as it measures the lowest price
investors would offer when they know that banks would underwrite loans for any
project at t0 (i.e., R
∗ = 0). Let us consider the case when R˜i is uniformly
distributed over [0, R]. According to its definition, h(P, 0) is investors’ expected
value of the loans given that banks’ lending standard R∗ is 0 and the market price
is P . It can be derived that:
h(P, 0) = ER˜0,R˜1(R˜0|P max(1, R˜1) ≥ R˜0) =
{
P R
3+2
3R2+3
3PR3−2R3+2P 3
6PR2−3R2+3P 2
if
P ≤ 1
1 ≤ P ≤ R
}
.
Obviously, P = 0 solves h(P, 0) = P . But if R
3+2
3R2+3
> 1, we have h(P, 0) > P
when P ≤ 1, and thus there exists at least another solution P̂ > 1. By definition,
g(0) = P̂ > 1. The value of g(0) is therefore determined by R, the upper bar of
project return. Recall that the necessary participation condition of banks is that
P > 1 . g(0) = 1 is critical in that banks would not participate in the market if
the expected secondary market is lower than 1. On the other hand, in the face
of lowest lending standard, investors could only pay a price lower than 1 if R is
too small such that g(0) < 1 , which precludes the possibility of equilibrium with
R∗ = 0. In other words, when g(0) < 1, banks will never initiate loans with 0
expected return. We will discuss this point in depth later.
3.3.3 The Equilibrium
The equilibrium of the model is determined through the interaction between
banks and loan purchasers. As shown before, they gauge how the other party
would respond, and base their optimal actions on that. Equilibrium is thus a
stable situation where all competing influences are balanced. In our model, two
agents’ participation conditions should be both satisfied to obtain equilibrium,
i.e., the following equations must hold simultaneously:
R∗ = max(R0(P, α), 0)P = ER˜0,R˜1(R˜0|P max(1, R˜1) ≥ R˜0 ≥ R∗) (3.5)
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For any α ∈ [0, 1] there is a unique equilibrium, denoted by P (α) and R∗(α)
, which solves the above equation system.
As discussed earlier, g(0) varies, relying on the value of R. We therefore
distinguish between the cases when g(0) ≤ 1 and when g(0) > 1. Figure 3.6.1 and
3.6.2 demonstrate the equilibria - the intersection points of the curves represent
sets of equilibrium price and lending standard for different levels of α. It is
interesting to see that when g(0) < 1, the underwriting standard of banks R∗
is always positive (as shown in figure 3.6.1) - banks are selective when funding
projects; When g(0) > 1 in contrast, R∗(α) reaches the lower bound for α close
to 1 - banks would take on any project disregarding its quality. The second case
is certainly worth further analysis. In our model, investors are rational, but they
are willing to offer a good price despite banks’ low lending standard as long as
the possible maximum return of loans is high enough. Intuitively speaking, to
overcome the information asymmetry, risk neutral loan buyers usually hold a
portion of a diversified asset pool, and hence they only care about the average
return of the securitized loans. Since the average return should increase with
the upper bound of the distribution, investors would accordingly adjust their
expectation upwards as well. Moreover, an important motive for banks to sell
securitized assets is to reallocate money to a better project at t1. In the case of
a high R, banks are more likely to give up good-quality t0-initiated assets for an
even greater return from the t1 project. By comparing the curves of function k(P )
in Figures 3.6.1 and 3.6.2, we can see that greater R boosts the price investors
would offer given the same underwriting standard. 1
Both of the graphs indicate the critical role of α in determining the equilibrium
price and lending standards: as the limit of loan sales α decreases, the intersection
point moves towards northeast, indicating higher price and stricter underwriting
criterion. Authorities can thereby regulate the market through this channel by
setting the optimal α to attain the desirable level of price and R∗. We will
examine the mechanism in the next section.
1RH in Figure 3.6.2 represents a higher upper bound of R˜i. In addition, increased R causes
a higher opportunity costs of issuing loans, which is captured by the difference between C1 and
C2.
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Figure 3.6: Equilibria with different g(0)
3.4 Implications of the model
3.4.1 Deterioration of loan quality in a free market
Low-quality mortgage has been accused of triggering the recent financial crisis.
In this subsection, we will examine how the advent of securitization alters the
banks’ credit standard R∗.
According to its definition, R∗(α) is the equilibrium lending standard under
the regulation that at most α portion of loans can be sold to investors. In the
extreme scenario of α = 1, no regulation is imposed on the secondary markets
and banks are free to oﬄoad any portion of their illiquid assets. Our model shows
that in the absence of regulation, disintermediation alone will necessarily lead to
deterioration of loan quality.
Proposition 1 When the secondary loan market is unregulated, banks originate
loans for negative-NPV projects, that is, R∗(α = 1) < 1.1
1
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Proposition 1 is one of the key results of this paper. Projects with expected
return R < 1 are regarded to have negative NPV and should never be imple-
mented in an ideal world.1 However, banks with access to the free secondary
loan market would underwrite bad projects as well, leading to deterioration in
the average loan quality. The fundamental reason lies in risk pooling caused by
information asymmetry. Lacking private information on the projects, investors
cannot distinguish two motives of banks’ selling behavior: either loans are lemon
or banks have encountered better investment opportunities. As a consequence,
loan buyers bet on average and pay a single average price. By holding a diver-
sified portfolio of loans, they can realize the expectation value. For this reason,
even though investors rationally anticipate that there are lemons trading in the
market, they are willing to participate in the secondary market. In the mean-
while, banks expect that they can sell bad loans in the secondary market, which
in effect gives them an incentive to initiate bad loans at t0.
Remark 2 The lowest lending standard can arise in an unregulated market. As
shown in Figure 3.6.2, with g(0) > 1, underwriting criterion R∗(α = 1) = 0,
under which a project with any quality will be accepted at t0.
Let us continue with the previous example with random return R˜i ∼ unif
[0, R]. If the upper bound R is sufficiently high such that R
3+2
3R2+3
> 1, we shall
see g(0) > 1. In this case, it can be verified that R∗ = 0. In contrast, if R
< R, where R is the biggest root of R3 − 3R2 − 1 = 0, then we can prove R∗
=
R−
√
R2+R
3
(R3−3R2−1)
R
> 0.
To assess the loan quality in the secondary market, recall that investors’ ra-
tional expectation is R˜0 ∈ {R˜0|P max(1, R˜1) ≥ R˜0 ≥ R∗}, which is fulfilled in
equilibrium. Figure 3.7.1 and Figure 3.7.2 illustrate banks’ selling decision at
time t1 in the absence of regulation (α = 1). The shaded areas in the graphs
Proof Proof by contradiction: Suppose R∗(α = 1) ≥ 1. From investors’ participation
condition, i.e., equation(3), we obtain that P > 1. But if P > 1, then R∗ must be 0 according
to figure 2, which contradicts with the initial assumption that R∗(α = 1) ≥ 1. Therefore,
R∗ < 1 if α = 1. 
1Without securitization, equation (4) shows that banks will choose the highest lending
standard C = ER˜1 max(1, R˜1) > 1. Negative-NPV projects will never be financed.
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represent the set of loans (with expected return R0) to be sold in the secondary
market. In particular, Figure 3.7.2 is the case when upper bound R > R. The
equilibrium price in this case is P > 1 and the lending standard is R∗ = 0. Figure
3.7.1 is for R ≤ R, when we have P = 1 and R∗ = R−
√
R2+R
3
(R3−3R2−1)
R
> 0.
From the graph, we can identify two motives of selling loans: either the securitized
asset is overpriced ( R˜0 < P ) or a better project has come out at t1 (R˜1 >
R˜0
P
).
These two figures essentially display the distribution of expected returns of loans
in the secondary market. It is worth mentioning that when R is big enough (in
Figure 3.7.2), the worst loans (with R0 = 0) could be on sale in the market.
Figure 3.7: Banks’ selling decision at time t1
Moreover, lower lending standard suggests that more investments will be car-
ried out, which is consistent with the fact that the opening of the secondary loan
market led to massive capital inflows. In addition, the empirical study by Gande
and Saunders [2012] shows that loan sales alleviate firms’ financial constraint,
and firms tend to spend more in investments during the post-loan sale period.
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3.4.2 The effect of business cycle on securitization market
Investment opportunities in our simplified economy are characterized by their
random returns R˜i with domain [0, R]. For the given uniform distribution, the
average return of the projects is increasing in the upper boundary R. For this
reason, the level of R can be used as an indicator of the economic condition.
Economic expansion and recession are represented by great R and small R re-
spectively. Our model reveals how fluctuating levels of economic growth exert
impacts on the securitization market with unchanged regulatory environment
(fixed α).
i. Equilibrium Loan Price: Recall banks’ participation condition (Equation
(3.2)), when the upper bound of R˜i rises to R
H , banks will adopt a stricter
lending standard given the same market price and α, as the opportunity cost
of issuing loans is increased. The arrow in Figure 3.8.1 captures this trend.1
On the other hand, with greater average return (higher R), rational investors
are willing to pay a higher price given the same lending standard of banks,
which is depicted by the arrow in Figure 3.8.2. Intuitively speaking, investors
rationally anticipate that banks are more likely to give up good quality loans
for better opportunities during an economic boom.2 As described in Figure
3.8.3, given the same regulation constraint, the equilibrium price of secu-
ritized loans is higher during an boom than in a recession. To conclude,
the equilibrium price of securitized loans is closely related to the aggregate
1
Proof We prove that banks’ lending standard is increasing in the opportunity cost C, namely,
∂R0
∂C ≥ 0. When P < 1, R0 = C, which means ∂R0∂C > 0; When 1α < P < R, R0 = 0, which
suggests ∂R0∂C = 0.
Banks’ participation condition can be rewritten as α[ER˜1 max(R0, P, P R˜1)−R0] +R0 = C,
based on which we obtain that α[max(R0, PC) − R0] + R0 = C, which gives max[0, α(PC −
R0)] = C −R0. If α(PC −R0) ≥ 0, then α(PC −R0) = C −R0, based on which R0 = 1−αP1−α C
can be obtained. When 1 < P < 1α ,
∂R0
∂C =
1−αP
1−α > 0. Therefore, for P ∈ [0, R], ∂R0∂C ≥ 0.
Moreover, for a given distribution of R˜i,
∂C
∂R > 0. Hence,
∂R0
∂R ≥ 0, namely, banks’ optimal
lending standard should increase with the upper bound R.

2We prove that the curve of k(P ) shifts to the right as R increases. See Appendix for
details.
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economic performance, and thus should evolve in accordance with business
cycles.
ii. Equilibrium Lending Standard: Figure 3.8.3 also indicates two channels
through which economic prospect affects banks’ lending standard in equi-
librium. First of all, faced with high opportunity cost in times of strong
economic growth, banks are reluctant to fund low quality projects as they
have a better chance to encounter good ones tomorrow than in a recession,
which uplifts their underwriting criterion. On the other hand, however, out-
side investors are more tolerant towards a low lending standard when they
foresee that investment projects are on average highly profitable and would
like to pay a higher price given the same underwriting standard. We use two
arrows in Figure 3.8.3 to identify the two competing forces. The net effect
on R∗ largely depends on the limit of loan sales α. When α = 1, banks
can transfer all the loans to outside investors and the lending standard R∗
will drop as a consequence as banks do not bear the costs of lemon. When
α = 0, banks will increase R∗ to CH . When 0 < α < 1, the lending standard
in equilibrium will increase with the upper bound R if α is close to 0 and
decrease with R when α is close to 1.
Figure 3.8: Equilibria under different economic prospects
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3.4.3 The effect of regulation on bank’s lending standard
In our model, the equilibrium loan price P (α) and lending standard R∗(α) are
expressed as functions of α. By steering the limit of loan sales, regulators can
promote their objectives on asset prices and loan qualities. Firstly, market pricing
information is generally regarded as an indicator of the financial health of the
banking system. When regulators tighten their control over loan sales, the market
price of loans should move up as a result.
In our framework, the partial derivative function of P with regard to α can
be shown as follows:1
P ′(α) =
{ −fα
fP+fkk′
0
if
R∗ > 0
R∗ = 0
}
(3.6)
Since P ′(α) ≤ 0, regulators can enhance the market price by lowering the
upper bar of loan sales. We depict this pattern in Figure 3.9.1 and 3.9.2 by
showing the relationship between the equilibrium loan price P and 1− α. When
g(0) ≤ 1, P is strictly increasing with respect to 1−α while in the case of g(0) > 1,
P is a constant equalling g(0) when 1 − α is close to 0 and then increases with
1 − α. These two scenarios correspond to different upper bounds of expected
asset return. In general, the greater portion of loans that is retained within the
banks, the higher loan price should be observed in the securitization market.
Compared to loan prices, regulators are usually more concerned with loan
quality, as negative NPV projects usually bring about detrimental social costs.
The equilibrium lending standard in our model is also a function of α, namely,
1
Proof when R∗ > 0, P (α) is implicitly defined by f(k(P ), P, α) = ER˜1 max(1, R˜1). Hence,
P ′(α) = −fαfP+fkk′ ; When R
∗ = 0, P is a constant g(0). P ′(α) is thus equal to 0. 
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Figure 3.9: Equilibrium price and the retained portion of loans
R∗(α). Moreover, banks tend to lower their lending criteria when they are subject
to looser loan sale constraint.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium lending standard satisfies dR
∗(α)
dα
≤ 0 and the
strict inequality holds when R∗ > 0. That is, a larger retained portion (1 − α)
leads to better quality of the securitized loans.1
Proposition 2 indicates that by raising the required portion of loans retained
within banks, regulators can effectively improve loan quality. Figure 3.10 illus-
trates the underlying mechanisms. As 1 − α increases, there are two conduits
for regulation to influence lending standard R∗. First is through the direct cost
effect. With a bigger portion of loans remaining on the books, banks bear more
risks of the assets. Thus they have less incentive to initiate bad-quality loans,
1
Proof R∗(α) can be written as k(P (α)). Therefore, R∗′(α) = k
′
(P )P
′
(α) ≤ 0, as k′(P ) > 0
and P ′(α) ≤ 0 by equation(4). Also, R∗′(α) < 0 when R∗ > 0, because P ′(α) < 0 when
R∗ > 0.
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which is shown by ∂R0(P,α)
∂α
< 0. On the other hand, however, our general equi-
librium framework reveals the second (indirect) effect caused by regulation. An
expansion in 1 − α also increases the anticipated market price P , which would
in turn encourage banks to originate more loans, including the bad ones. Based
on the model, we can derive that, ∂R0(P,α)
∂P
· ∂P (α)
∂α
> 0. The consequence of these
two opposite effects is not straightforward. From the model, we can find that the
total effect remains positive. On balance, lending standard increases with 1− α.
As shown in Figure 3.10, the vertical arrow captures the direct effect while the
other arrow traces the indirect effect.
Figure 3.10: The opposing effects of regulation on equilibrium lending standard
It should be emphasized that tough regulation is not always desirable. For
instance, when α = 0, banks are forbidden to transfer any illiquid assets to outside
investors. Without the benefits from recycling their funds in the secondary loan
market, banks are prone to adopt high criteria in choosing projects. As can be
seen in Figure 3.2, we obtained R∗ = C > 1 when α = 0. In other words, in
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the absence of the secondary loan market, the underwriting standard is so high
such that banks would even forsake some positive NPV projects if 1 < R0 < R
∗.
From a regulator’s perspective, there exists an ‘optimal’ point of α such that
R∗(α∗) = 1. However, it is hard to conclude that R∗(α∗) = 1 is always the best
solution as it might not lead to the best allocation of social resources.1 The banks’
profit maximization problem follows in the next subsection.
3.4.4 ‘Optimal’ α - Banks’ profit maximization problem
In our model, loan buyers’ expected profit should be nil as they break even on
average no matter what limit of loan sale is imposed. For this reason, we focus
on the other agent(banks) of the model and analyze how the regulators’ decision
affect their profits, leaving other matters (e.g. social costs, liquidity issues) aside
for the moment.
At t0, banks could obtain ER˜1 max(1, R˜1) from holding cash or f(R0, P, α) =
αER˜1 max(R0, P max(1, R˜1))+(1−α)R0 from initiating the loan with expected re-
turn R0. In equilibrium, they should be able to achieve the maximum of the two.
2
The ex ante profit of banks is thus expressed byW (α) = ER˜0(max[f(R˜0, P, α), ER˜1 max(1, R˜1)]).
Proposition 3 The ex ante profit of banks satisfies dW (α)
dα
> 0. Banks’ expected
profit increases when a smaller fraction of loans is required to be retained within
the banks.
Proof To prove dW (α)
dα
> 0, it suffices to show that df(R0,P (α),α)
dα
> 0 for any R0.
1For example, suppose project returns R0 = 0.9, and R1 = 2. Given R
∗(α∗) = 1, banks
would have to reject the t0 project and then invest its one unit of capital in the t1 project. In
contrast, under lax regulation such that the R∗(α) = 0.9, banks would fund the t0 project and
then sell it at price P > 1 in the secondary market. Now banks have obtained αP and would
invest it in the t1 project. If αP > 1, more money is invested in the t2 project than in the
previous case. If we assess social welfare solely based on gross profits, the second case might be
more desirable if the benefit from the t1 project exceeds the loss associated with the t0 project.
2If R0 < R
∗, banks will carry capital till time t1; If R0 > R∗, banks will originate loans
and obtain αER˜1 max(R0, P max(1, R˜1))+(1−α)R0; If R0 = R∗, banks are indifferent because
those two options would lead to the same result.
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Since df(R0,P (α),α)
dα
= fα + fPP
′(α), wherefα = ER˜1 max(R0, P, P R˜1)−R0 > 0,
fp ≥ 0 and P ′(α) ≥ −fαfP+fkk′ , we obtain that
df(R0,P (α),α)
dα
≥ fα − fP fαfP+fkk′ =
fkk
′
fP+fkk′
fα > 0., which completes our proof. 
It is interesting to see that an increment in α causes two offsetting effects
on banks’ profit. The partial derivative function df(R0,P (α),α)
dα
specifies the two
channels: (i) fα effectively measures the option value of securitization, which is
always positive. Intuitively speaking, the more illiquid assets banks can get rid of
in the secondary market, the more efficient allocation of capital banks can achieve
when encountering better projects; (ii) Price effect is reflected by the second term
of the expression fPP
′(α). As we analysed before, high α incurs low-quality loans,
which lowers the equilibrium price, and the amount of capital banks can obtain
from the market diminishes as a consequence. Yet the price effect in magnitude is
only a fraction of the option value, so the overall impact stays positive. With the
purpose of maximizing banks’ profits, regulators should not impose any constraint
in loan sales. The underlying reason is that the securitization market offers banks
an opportunity (an option) to reorganize social resources in a more efficient way
and banks can make most of it when α is equal to 1.1
This paper explicitly models the benefits of securitization by incorporating a
call option on future investment opportunities.
α [ER˜1 max(R0, P, P R˜1)−R0]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected option value
+R0 = C
ER˜1 max(R0, P, P R˜1)−R0 measures the option value of securitization. Recall
that the equilibrium price of loans are established such that the price represents
the expected value of R0.
2 Hence, ER˜1 [P ] = R0 in equilibrium. In other words,
banks cannot profit from mispricing on average. Given a fair market price P ,
the payoff of the option hinges on the realization of R˜1. The underlying option
1Without securitization, banks’ ex ante profit is given by W (α) =
ER˜0 [max(R˜0, ER˜1 max(1, R˜1))]. With the aid of securitization, banks’ expected profit is
increased to W (α) = ER˜0 [max(α(ER˜0,R˜1 max(R˜0, P max(1, R˜1))− R˜0)+ R˜0), ER˜1 max(1, R˜1))].
When α is set to be 1, the expected profit reaches its maximum.
2See Equation 3.4 for investors’ participation condition.
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can thus be viewed as a standard call option on R˜1, the return of future projects,
with strike price R0
P
. The value of an option is a monotonic increasing function of
the volatility of the underlying asset. Given a certain distribution of R˜i, greater
volatility of R˜i suggests higher option value. For this reason, securitization should
be more valuable to banks when the investments are riskier.
3.5 The Extended Model with Maturity Mis-
match
As well documented, maturity mismatch makes the modern banking system vul-
nerable to liquidity shocks. In the benchmark model, we did not address liquidity
issues. Gorton and Metrick [2012] points out that ‘Securitized banking is the busi-
ness of packaging and reselling loans, with repo agreements as the main source
of funds.’ and the 2007-2008 crisis was essentially a repo market run. In support
of their findings, our model implies that securitization alone would not lead to
the systemic failure of the banking sector. In addition, as asserted in Acharya
and Naqvi [2012], banks bear liquidity risk as they are subject to random deposit
withdrawals. In the event of liquidity shortfalls, banks will suffer from fire sales
or resort to external financing at high costs.
In this section, a simplified case of liquidity shock is analyzed. We assume
that banks’ initial capital consists of equity capital and deposits. Depositors can
withdraw cash L(< 1) from the bank at either time t1 or T with probability λ and
1 − λ respectively (see the timeline of cash withdrawal in Figure 3.11). Failing
to pay back depositors will cause liquidation of the bank and the cashflow to the
shareholders of the bank will be 0 due to limited liability.
We examine the effects of liquidity shock in two scenarios, one with α = 0
and one with α = 1. When α = 0, selling loans in the secondary market is
banned. From Figure 3.12, we can see that the lending standard now is uplifted
to Cs = C
1−λL
1−λ , where C = ER˜1 max(1, R˜1), due to potential liquidity shock.
Banks will take on the risk of falling short of liquidity only when the project is
highly profitable. When α = 1, banks call sell as much loans as they want. As
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Figure 3.11: Time line with liquidity shock
shown in the previous section, banks will not participate in the secondary market
if the anticipated loan price is lower than 1. Interestingly, banks’ participation
condition is relaxed in the presence of uncertain deposit withdrawal. The lowest
price banks would accept now is P = L because securitization adds value to the
bank in that it resolves maturity mismatch as long as P ≥ L.
At the same time, rational investors expect banks to sell the loan when there
is liquidity shock L at t1 or P max(1, R1) ≥ R0 when there is no liquidity shock.
Therefore, investors’ expectation of the loan quality should be h(P,R∗, λ) ≡ (1−
λ)ER˜0,R˜1(R˜0|P max(1, R˜1) ≥ R˜0 ≥ R∗) + λER˜0,R˜1(R˜0|R˜0 ≥ R∗), which increases
with probability λ. Moreover, the equilibrium price P should satisfy investors’
conditional expectation:
P = (1− λ)ER˜0,R˜1(R˜0|P max(1, R˜1) ≥ R˜0 ≥ R∗) + λER˜0,R˜1(R˜0|R˜0 ≥ R∗) (3.7)
In the presence of potential liquidity shock, the solution to Equation 3.7 now
depends on both R∗ and λ. Denote the solution P = g(R∗, λ). It is easy to prove
that g(R∗, 0) < g(R∗, λ) for any λ > 0. Therefore, k(P ), the inverse function of
g(R∗), should move to the right when λ > 0, as depicted in Figure 3.12. Intuitively
speaking, since banks might sell off good projects when it experiences random
cash withdrawal, rational investors would expect loans of higher quality to be
traded in the secondary market. The equilibrium results are shown in Figure 3.12.
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The equilibrium lending standard is decreasing with λ, the probability of liquidity
shock at t1 and when λ is high enough, the equilibrium price of securitized loans
will go up as a result.1
Figure 3.12: Equilibrium with maturity mismatch
3.6 Concluding Remarks
This paper presents a model of pure adverse selection in the context of securi-
tization. We employ a rational expectations framework to examine the roles of
banks, outside investors and regulators, and their interactions in the secondary
loan market. Our work contributes to the literature in three ways. Firstly, it
provides a theoretical explanation of why unregulated securitization necessarily
causes deterioration in loan quality even when investors are rational. Secondly, it
shows that securitization is value-enhancing by using an underlying call option,
which increases banks’ expected wealth. Thirdly, it suggests that by imposing
1See Appendix B for proofs of Figure 3.12
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loan sales limits, governments can effectively alter banks’ credit standard, and
the equilibrium price of securitized assets. Our parsimonious model also reveals
the channels through which regulation takes effects.
To better understand the impacts of securitization, two other important el-
ements outside the model should be considered. Moral hazard is the first issue,
and it is related to banks’ ex post effort in monitoring loans. Parlour and Plantin
[2008] offer a comprehensive analysis on this topic. Besides that, our model can
be extended by considering outside financing of banks from short-term money
market. As documented by Gorton and Metrick [2012], securitized assets are
often used by loan issuers as collateral to raise money in repo markets, which
they consider as an indispensable component of the securitized-banking system.
The rife use of loans as collateral causes more concern on the its quality, as the
banks’ ability of obtaining short-term financing is tied to the market value of
its collateral. Hence, it would be interesting to see how rational agents in our
model would react when the liquidity market and the secondary loan market are
interconnected.
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Chapter 4
Risk-taking Choice in Hedge
Fund Tournaments
Summary
We propose a parsimonious model to investigate how a hedge fund manager’s
risk shifting decision is affected by the manager’s tournament concern, incentive
contract and liquidation threat. With a one-year horizon and a pre-determined
concave fund flow function, a hedge fund manager’s risk-taking varies dramati-
cally with his interim absolute performance, performance relative to the industry
and the industry’s interim portfolio strategy. We document that when compet-
ing for more funds, managers would adopt two distinctive risk shifting strategies,
‘contrarian’ and ‘mimicking’, depending on their relative performance. The com-
bined effects of the High-Water-Mark (HWM) and tournaments show that the
extreme risk-taking propensity induced by HWM can be largely mitigated by the
manager’s fund flow concern, while the manager’s mimicking behavior can be
suppressed by the managers’ desire to secure a performance fee when the fund’s
value is above HWM. When the fund’s interim performance approaches a pre-
specified liquidation bound, the manager with a strong tournament incentive will
try to maximize his tracking error variance by choosing the contrarian portfolio
strategy to the industry to avoid potential fund outflows rather than playing safe;
if given an outside opportunity, managers with a poor relative performance will
even voluntarily shut down the funds, especially when the industry as a whole
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has large risk exposures.
4.1 Introduction
The past two decades have witnessed the explosive growth of hedge funds. The
number of hedge funds increased rapidly from only 610 to more than 3600 during
the 1990s. As of June 2009, there were more than 8900 hedge funds operating
worldwide and managing assets worth 1.43 trillion dollars according to Hedge
Fund Research.1 Fierce competition in the industry induces fund managers to
take into account not only their absolute performance but also their relative stand-
ing in the industry when they make investment decisions. Brown, Goetzmann,
and Park [2001] document that hedge funds with poor performance relative to
the industry have a dramatically higher probability of termination. Moreover,
investors chase performance. Hedge funds usually allow their investors to with-
draw money at certain points of the investment period. Therefore, investors have
the opportunity to reallocate their money and shift their investments to better-
performing funds. Since the management fee is tied to the size of assets under
management (AUM), hedge fund managers have a strong incentive to outperform
their peers in order to attract more money. In practice, various hedge fund indices
have been created for both managers’ and investors’ reference.
Although extensive research has been conducted on tournament behavior in
the mutual fund industry, the existing models on mutual funds cannot be directly
applied to hedge funds as there are some remarkable distinctions between these
two types of public investment tools. Firstly, in comparison with mutual funds,
hedge funds have a more complex compensation structure featuring a High Water
Mark(HWM) provision, which entails different risk taking incentives from that of
mutual funds. Secondly, hedge funds have been empirically documented to have a
convex fundflow-performance relationship while this relationship has been found
to be concave for mutual funds. The different shape of the fund flow function
might lead to different risk shifting behavior. Thirdly, hedge funds generally
have a higher attrition rate compared to mutual funds.(See Getmansky [2012].)
In most mutual fund models, the possibility of funds’ shutdown is neglected.
1The total assets under management(AUM) went up to 2.04 trillion in early 2012.
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When it comes to hedge funds, however, we believe that fund termination also
plays a non-trivial role in managers’ risk taking decisions. Brown, Goetzmann,
and Park [2001] empirically examine the termination of hedge funds and point
out that once a manager exits the market, his chance of reappearing in the hedge
fund industry is very small, which emphasizes the importance of the liquidation
threat in manager’s risk choice. The existing papers on hedge fund managerial
risk choice are concentrated on the incentive contracts and on the role of HWM.
Our paper is the first theoretical analysis of the incentive effects of hedge fund
tournaments.
We develop a parsimonious discrete-time model to study hedge fund man-
agers’ interim risk-shifting decisions in the context of hedge fund tournaments.
Motivated by the prior empirical evidence, we assume that fund flows are an in-
creasing and concave function of a fund’s relative performance.1 In the baseline
model, there are one common risky asset and one risk free asset in the market
and managers are assumed to take a random portfolio allocation strategy at the
beginning of the year. In the middle of the year, managers have the opportu-
nity to reallocate their investments after funds’ mid-year performance is revealed.
In particular, with year-end money flows depending on fund’s relative standing,
a hedge fund manager needs to take into account his competitors’ performance
and their portfolio strategies in addition to his own performance. We show that
all of these factors have substantial influence on managerial interim risk-shifting
choice. In the most simplified case, we analyze managers’ risk choice when they
are solely driven by the motive to win more funds. Due to the concavity of the
flow-performance function, we show that a fund manager has a strong incentive
to reduce the volatility of his relative performance (the tracking error of his port-
folio). In the absence of a risk premium for the risky asset, it is optimal for risk
neutral managers to mimic the benchmark and choose a risk level which is pro-
portional to the industry average; and the proportion is determined by the funds’
relative performance to the benchmark. In contrast, mutual fund managers who
are facing a convex fund flow function tend to maximize the tracking error vari-
ance by deviating from the industry benchmark.(See Basak and Makarov [2012]).
In a more realistic setting, we impose a lower bound of year-end capital flows
1See Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross [2003], Chen [2011] and Getmansky [2012]
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due to the fact that money outflow cannot exceed the value of the fund. In the
presence of the lower bound, the flow-(relative)performance function has a con-
vexity region near the lower bound, which induces the manager to deviate from
the industry’s portfolio in order to maximize the tracking error variance. On the
other hand, when a fund is far away from the lower bound, the manager would
still choose to mimic the benchmark. Therefore, the relative performance (or
the distance to the industry benchmark) plays a critical role in determining a
manager’s optimal risk shifting strategy.
Another distinctive feature of the hedge fund industry is that most fund man-
agers are rewarded based on an asymmetric compensation plan. They charge
not only a fixed management fee based on the size of AUM, but also a perfor-
mance fee based on the High-Water-Mark (HWM). Specifically, managers will
receive a proportion of the increase in the net asset value. Several papers are
focused on the implications of the HWM and suggest that the convex compen-
sation structure causes excessive risk taking, especially when a fund’s value is
somewhat below its HWM. In this paper, we find that the high water mark and
fund flow concern can separately generate two distinctive risk shifting patterns.
Consistent with the existing work, the HWM provision results in a bell-shaped
relation between absolute performance and risk taking.(See Hodder and Jackw-
erth [2007] and Buraschi, Kosowski, and Sritrakul [2013]) When combining the
HWM and fund flow concerns, our model yields some interesting results. Firstly,
when mid-year performance surpasses the high water mark, managers have a
strong incentive to reduce risk to lock in performance fees and thus the mim-
icking behavior caused by the fund flow concern is substantially suppressed by
the HWM effect. This result holds under all market conditions. Secondly, when
fund value is below the high water mark, managers’ incentive to take on more
risk are replaced by the incentive to mimic the benchmark. Therefore, interim
losers are relatively more concerned about possible fund outflows, while interim
winners focus more on securing performance fees.
Our paper also examines the impact of potential liquidation on fund managers’
risk shifting decision. According to Getmansky [2012], on average, approximately
7.1% of all hedge funds go out of business every year. During the 2008 sub-
prime mortgage crisis, 70% of the hedge funds had negative returns, which caused
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a liquidation rate of 23%, the highest in hedge fund history. To examine the
effect of the threat of liquidation, we assume that a fund will be shut down
automatically once the fund’s running value hits the pre-specified liquidation
bound, in which case fund managers will get nothing. In the absence of the
fund flow concern, managers with fund values approaching the liquidation bound
will take minimal risk to avoid fund closure. However, when investors can freely
withdraw money at the end of the year, investing in the riskless asset is no longer a
safe strategy for the under-performing managers, due to the concern that massive
fund outflows will also lead to fund closure. Hence, funds ranked at the bottom in
the middle of the year will try to increase the tracking error variance by choosing
an opposite strategy to the industry’s. Their risk choices will primarily depend
on the benchmark portfolio instead of their own absolute performance. Following
Hodder and Jackwerth [2007], we also analyze the case when managers have the
option to shut down the fund after mid-year performance is revealed. Our model
shows that an endogenous closure region appears when a fund has very poor
relative performance. Furthermore, when the industry on average opts for high
risk, managers with poor relative performance are more likely to liquidate their
funds.
In addition, we disentangle two types of risks, market risk and idiosyncratic
risk, and examine their roles in hedge fund mangers’ interim risk shifting de-
cisions. Most hedge funds bear manager-specific risks. According to Deutsche
Bank’s Alternative Investment Survey (2009), investors choose hedge funds largely
because of their diversified or uncorrelated returns. In the extended model, we
consider an economy which has multiple assets representing different sources of
risks. In particular, we postulate that each fund has access to a fund-specific as-
set. In contrast to Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro [2007], our model with multiple
risky assets reveals that in the ‘gambling’ region, hedge fund managers would
opt for the maximum idiosyncratic risk in order to maximize the tracking error
variance, no matter whether they have alpha generating abilities or not, which
are in line with the received wisdom in hedge fund tournaments.(See Chen [2011])
Moreover, by making a distinction between systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk,
we uncover two distinct risk-taking patterns in different assets, which are largely
supported by the extant empirical work. In a nutshell, hedge fund managers
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mainly distort fund-specific risk to gamble when they are behind the benchmark
and the bell-shaped risk-taking propensity induced by HWM is more pronounced
in the fund-specific asset than in the market asset when the manager has alpha
generating skills.
Our paper is the very first to theoretically explore the combined effects of
tournaments and typical compensation contracts on hedge fund managers’ risk-
taking behavior. Compared with existing papers which are focused on HWM,
our model provides a more complete picture on hedge fund managers’ incentives
and a richer set of predictions on their investment decisions as funds’ absolute
performance, relative performance and the benchmark’s portfolio strategy in our
model all have significant influences on managers’s risk shifting decisions. Fur-
thermore, our model can better explain some stylized facts of hedge fund risk
shifting patterns than the existing models. Hodder and Jackwerth [2007] resort
to a multi period model where they show that a long investment horizon mitigates
manager’s aggressive risk-taking near the HWM as it would adversely affect the
fund manager’s compensation in the long run. Similarly, our model points out
that the desire to attract new investors would also temper the excess risk entailed
by the HWM.
Our model setup is similar in spirit to Taylor [2003] and Basak and Makarov
[2012] who examine mutual funds’ tournament behavior. It is worth mentioning
that Basak and Makarov [2012] and Taylor [2003] both argue that interim winners
in equilibrium would increase the volatility of their investments while interim
losers tend to reduce risk. Nevertheless, this prediction does not appear to hold
for hedge funds as Brown, Goetzmann, and Park [2001] and other papers on hedge
fund tournaments all suggest the opposite pattern in reality. In contrast to Basak
and Makarov [2012] and Taylor [2003]’s findings, our model shows that interim
hedge fund winners do not necessarily increase risk due to fundflow concerns
and HWM effects. Firstly, interim winners have a strong incentive to mimic
the industry benchmark, which leads to low risk taking if the industry’s average
risk level is low; Secondly, the HWM-induced lock-in behavior leads to moderate
risk taking when the fund value is above HWM. Hence, the hedge funds’ unique
flow-performance relation and asymmetric payoffs cause managers’ different risk
shifting pattern from mutual fund managers’.
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the most related
work in the literature. Sections 3 and 4 present the economic setup, solutions to
the baseline model and interpretations of the model. Sections 5 and 6 analyze
the extended model with exogenous and endogenous fund closures, respectively.
Section 7 discusses the multiple-asset scenario. Section 8 summarizes the main
findings of the paper as well as future research directions. The appendix contains
proofs, additional figures and numerical procedures.
4.2 Literature Review
Our work is related to four streams of the theoretical literature. First, the most
related to ours are Taylor [2003] and Basak and Makarov [2012], who examine the
tournament effect on mutual fund managers’ investment behavior. Taylor [2003]
is the first theoretical paper which models mutual fund tournaments. He studies
how fund managers adjust their risk taking according to their mid-year perfor-
mance when they compete for cash inflows. He distinguishes between scenarios
with a passive benchmark (e.g., market index) and with an active benchmark
(peers in the industry). When one of the managers is an exogenous benchmark,
the winning manager indexes and the losing manager gambles; however, when
both managers are active, the winning manager is more likely to gamble, es-
pecially when the midyear performance gap is high and meanwhile stocks offer
high returns and low volatilities. The tournament model of Basak and Makarov
[2012] is the closest one to ours in the literature. They investigate managers’
equilibrium portfolios in the context of mutual fund tournaments and predict
that the portfolio volatility of an interim winner is higher than that of an interim
loser. The intuition is that the convexity of the flow-performance relation leads
to the convexity of a manager’s objective function, implying that a manager seeks
to maximize the volatility of her tracking error (the difference between her own
and industry-average returns). Moreover, since the year-end return volatility is
proportional to its corresponding interim performance, the interim winner would
invest in risky assets to leverage her high interim performance. This drives the
interim loser into bonds. One of the main departures of our model from theirs
is that hedge fund industry has been found to have a concave flow-performance
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relationship, which should significantly affect fund managers’ objective function.
The literature related to fund tournaments also includes Chevalier and Elli-
son [1997], Berk and Green [2004], Palomino [2005], Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro
[2007], Christoffersen and Musto [2008], Chen and Pennacchi [2009] and etc.
Chevalier and Ellison [1997] study the agency conflict between money managers
and investors. They suggest that mutual fund managers have a strong incentive
to attract inflow of investments, which undermines investors’ interest as managers
would shift the riskiness of the portfolio in response to the fund’s past returns
rather than to maximize the risk adjusted returns. They empirically estimate the
flow-performance relationship of the mutual fund industry and provide evidence
that managers would alter the volatility of the portfolio at the end of the year to
increase capital inflows. Berk and Green [2004] study the relationship between
endogenous fund flows and mutual fund performance. All investors in the model
are assumed to earn zero expected excess returns in the equilibrium with per-
fect competition. In their belief-updating process, the duration between time 0
and time t matters. In other words, flows to younger funds respond much more
dramatically to performance than flows to more mature funds. They conclude
that investors chase high-performance funds, which, together with decreasing re-
turns to scale, make superior fund performance unpredictable. Christoffersen
and Musto [2008] focus on the effect of HWM on investors’ equilibrium invest-
ment levels, which determines the fund flows or fund size. Like Berk and Green
[2004], they adopt decreasing returns to scale and extend their baseline model
to a model with a continuous distribution of returns to analyze the cross-section
of returns. Their model incorporates Bayesian updating as investors’ learning
processes of managers’ abilities. They find that the confidence in a manager’s
ability is crucial to the provision effect, and this effect is to boost the initial fund
size and to depress initial expected returns while increasing subsequent expected
returns. Palomino [2005] aims to investigate how the entry and investment de-
cisions of fund managers are affected by their relative performance objectives.
Their main difference from Taylor [2003] is that they assume that some managers
have superior information, and for this reason, the difference in interim perfor-
mance of different funds are no longer exogenously-specified. Compared with the
objective of absolute performance maximization, relative performance objectives
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increase managers’ risk taking level and reduce the number of low-quality funds.
Basak, Shapiro, and Tepla´ [2006] argue that money managers in reality are usu-
ally evaluated relative to a benchmark. They demonstrate that in the absence of
benchmarking, a risk averse managers optimal portfolio decision is purely driven
by his risk aversion level. In contrast, when the manager is evaluated based on
his relative performance, the manager exhibits a variety of economic behavior in
choosing his optimal investment strategies. Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro [2007]
investigate a mutual fund manager’s risk taking incentives induced by a piece-
wise convex relationship between money flows and fund’s relative performance.
The optimal risk exposure results from the tradeoff between managers’ risk aver-
sion and the risk-shifting incentive due to potential fund flows. Similarly, Chen
and Pennacchi [2009] model a manager’s portfolio choice by assuming that the
compensation scheme can be either a concave, linear or convex function of the
fund’s performance relative to a benchmark. Both Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro
[2007] and Chen and Pennacchi [2009] find that poor-performing funds would
increase their tracking error volatility, but not necessarily the volatility of the
fund’s return.
A second stream of the literature studies the role of incentive contracts in
hedge fund risk taking strategies. Our model setup is most related to Hodder
and Jackwerth [2007] who study the incentive effects of a typical hedge fund con-
tract with HWM and liquidation barrier for a manager with power utility. Their
main finding is that with a one-year horizon, the manager displays risk taking
that varies dramatically with fund value. However, when the model is extended
to multiple valuation periods, the manager’s risk taking is rapidly moderated.
Although our model only involves one-year period, the fund outflow concern also
mitigates the excess risk taking that the HWM entails. Panageas and Westerfield
[2009] also tackles a similar problem by theoretically model the optimal risk choice
of risk-neutral hedge fund managers in a dynamic setting in order to better un-
derstand the incentives provided by the widely-used high-water mark contracts.
They argue that a HWM contract is essentially a call option to managers, with
the HWM as the strike price. Nevertheless, with an indefinite investment horizon,
the contract should not be viewed as a single option but as a sequence of call op-
tions with a changing strike price. A decrease in fund value today will reduce the
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values of future options. Therefore, even a risk neutral manager would not take
take an unboundedly large position in the risky asset. Specifically, they solve the
optimal portfolio choice of a risk-neutral hedge fund manager who aims to max-
imize the expected present value of her compensation fees and they demonstrate
that she would allocate a constant fraction of wealth on the risky asset just like
a risk averse manager would do. Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross [2003] provide
a closed-form solution to the cost of the high-water mark contract to investors
under certain conditions. Also they argue that the pervasive use of the HWM
in the hedge fund industry might be due to the diminishing returns to scale of
hedge fund technologies. The reason is that most mutual funds can compensate
their managers for past performance with a fixed percentage fee on assets, since
good performance will attract new money; In contrast, hedge fund managers may
not be able to take or even want new funds. However, this argument contradicts
the empirical findings on the existence of tournament behavior in the hedge fund
industry; hedge fund managers do compete for money flows (see Brown, Goetz-
mann, and Park [2001], Chen [2011], Getmansky [2012] and Aragon and Nanda
[2012] ). Carpenter [2000] investigates if a convex compensation scheme would in-
crease a managers’ risk appetite. Specifically, she solves the dynamic investment
problem of a risk averse manager when the mangers is compensated based on a
option-like contract on the fund’s asset value. She suggests that the option-like
contract does not necessary result in a greater level of risk taking when he cannot
hedge the option. Moreover, when the manager is given more options, he would
actually decrease the riskiness of the fund’s asset as these options increase the
volatility of his personal portfolio. Chakraborty and Ray [2008] study an intricate
set of risk, effort and walkaway decisions, which are driven by the HWM feature
of the hedge fund contract depending on how far the fund is from the previous
watermark. They find that, funds’ expected future returns fall as the fund value
drops below the HWM, while the volatility of future returns and the probability
of fund liquidation increases. In addition, all of these effects are most stark for
funds near the HWM and are considerably reduced when the funds are far from
the HWM.
Additionally, some existing papers tackle the dynamic optimal investment
problems of hedge fund managers. For example, Lan, Wang, and Yang [2013]
108
investigate the optimal leverage that hedge fund managers would choose to max-
imize the expected present value of their management fees and incentive fees.
They assume that hedge managers are risk neutral in a multiple-period setup
with path-dependent HWMs and a downside exogenous liquidation bound. Their
results show that a fund’s leverage increases with alpha (which is a manager’s abil-
ity to generate abnormal returns) and decreases with volatility and the manager’s
endogenous effective risk attitude. However, they do not consider tournament be-
havior or investors’ fund flow decisions. Buraschi, Kosowski, and Sritrakul [2013]
study the dynamic optimal investment problem of hedge fund managers who face
non-linear incentives. In particular, the compensation function of managers con-
sists of three parts: performance fee (a call option on fund value), management fee
and deadweight cost, which is incurred if the fund’s value drops below a certain
threshold. Their theoretical results show that the optimal leverage depends on
the distance of the net asset value from HWM and they documented a bell-shaped
risk taking pattern of hedge fund managers.
Third, our paper also contributes to the literature regarding how fund man-
agers shift risk loadings between systematic risks and idiosyncratic risks. Basak,
Pavlova, and Shapiro [2007] examine this issue in the context of mutual fund
tournaments. They use two risky assets representing systematic risk and idiosyn-
cratic risk respectively to see whether managers would take on idiosyncratic risk
to win more fund inflow or not. They show that managers would choose to have
zero exposure to the idiosyncratic risk and only adjust the exposure to systematic
risk based on their relative performance when there is no risk premium for the id-
iosyncratic asset. Also, Chen and Pennacchi [2009] study mutual fund managers’
risk shifting problems with their compensation depending on their performance
relative to the benchmark. They assume a smooth fund flow function, and study
two correlated assets, one benchmark asset and one alternative asset. Ozdenoren
and Yuan [2012] seek to explain why compensation contracts would encourage
mangers to take on excessive systematic as opposed to idiosyncratic risks.
More broadly, our paper is also related to the work on optimal contracts.
Aggarwal and Samwick [1999] derive the optimal contract in a principal-agent
model of strategic competition in which managers can be compensated on both
their own profits and their rivals’ profits. They argue that strategic interac-
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tion among firms can explain the lack of relative-performance-based incentives in
which compensation decreases with rival firm performance. Biais and Casamatta
[1999] analyze the optimal financing of investment projects when managers must
exert unobservable effort and also engage in value-reducing risk shifting. They
argue that if the risk-shifting problem is dominant, then the optimal financing
scheme is a combination of debt and outside equity; when the effort problem is the
major source of moral hazard, stock options should be awarded to the managers.
Makarov and Plantin [2010] develop a model of active portfolio management in
which fund managers may secretly gamble in order to manipulate their reputa-
tion and attract more funds. They study the optimal long-term contract that
deters this risk shifting behavior, and show that contracts that simultaneously
increase and defer the managers’ expected fee after abnormally high returns elim-
inate risk-shifting incentives. DeMarzo, Livdan, and Tchistyi [2011] try to solve
the two-dimensional moral hazard problem- managers’ risk shifting problem and
cashflow diversion (stealing) at the same time. First of all, any incentive com-
patible contract must reward the agent for reporting high cashflow, otherwise,
they would steal the cash or shirk. However, this type of contract also creates
incentives for managers to take on disaster risk. For this reason, they argue that
this extreme risk taking can be mitigated if disaster states can be identified ex-
post by paying the manager a large bonus if the firm survives. But when the
performance is sufficiently weak, the manager will give up the bonus, and take on
disaster risk. Their model explains why suboptimal risk taking can emerge even
when investors are fully rational and managers are compensated optimally.
Empirical flow-performance relation: Some recent empirical papers sug-
gest that tournament behavior exists in the hedge fund industry and that the
risk-shifting decisions of hedge fund managers depend upon relative rather than
absolute fund performance. Brown, Goetzmann, and Park [2001] is the first to
document hedge funds’ tournament behavior. They find that performance rel-
ative to peer funds is important in managers’ strategic use of variance, while
performance relative to the HWM is not. Specifically, mid-year winning funds
significantly reduce portfolio variance while mid-year losing funds tend to in-
crease their risk exposures. Moreover, their survival analysis suggests that hedge
fund managers are seriously concerned with fund closure, as opposed to maximiz-
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ing the option-like feature of their incentive contracts. Consistent with Brown,
Goetzmann, and Park [2001], Chen [2011] finds that annual net fund flows are
positively related to last year’s fund performance, indicating that investors make
investment decisions based on funds’ past performance. Specifically, hedge funds
which have poor relative performance in the 1st half of a year exhibit greater risk
increase propensity in the 2nd half of the year.
Getmansky [2012] examines how the life cycle of hedge funds is affected by
fund characteristics (such as age, asset size, fund returns, and fund flows) and
industry characteristics (such as favorable positioning and competition). They
find a concave relationship between hedge fund’s past relative performance and
year-end fund flows. Aragon and Nanda [2012] analyze if a hedge fund’s risk
shifting is related to the manager’s incentive contract, personal capital stake
and the possibility of fund closure. They document that the HWM provision,
managerial stake in the fund, and low risk of fund closure appear to make a hedge
fund manager more conservative with regard to risk shifting. It is worth noting
that their results indicate that the HWM can actually reduce the propensity of
losing hedge fund managers to increase risk in tournaments. The intuition is
that a hedge fund manager is essentially given a sequence of options given a
long investment horizon. While a riskier portfolio can increase the probability of
crossing the current HWM, it also increases the probability that the assets will
be worth less, causing the future options to be even more out of the money.
Ding, Getmansky, Liang, and Wermers [2009] investigate the impacts of share
restrictions (including lockup period, redemption, advance notice and so on) on
the fundflow-performance relation of hedge funds. They find a convex flow-
performance relation in the absence of share restrictions and a concave flow-
performance relation in the presence of significant share restrictions. They also
document that funds with more volatile returns tend to be smaller and younger,
as these funds are more aggressive and competing more vigorously for money in-
flows. Also, these funds in general impose looser share restrictions. In addition,
their test results suggest a concave flow-performance relation for live funds and
a convex relation for defunct funds. Moreover, they relate share restrictions with
‘Smart money’ effect and find that funds which experienced prior net inflow out-
perform funds which experienced prior net outflow only when they have no share
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restrictions. Hence, they conclude that restrictions on fundflow prevent investors
from shifting money to better funds.
4.3 The Setup
We assume that the economy is populated by n hedge funds indexed by i, and
denote the industry average by j. Hereafter, we utilize the terms ‘fund’, ‘manager’
and ‘fund manager’ interchangeably. Financial investment opportunities are given
by a riskless asset and a risky asset. The properties of asset returns are public
knowledge. The riskless asset yields a constant return r, and the risky asset yields
return x, depending on the state of the world. Return x is normally distributed
with mean µ > r and volatility σ, where µ and σ are constant as well. Manager i
invests θ ∈ [0, θ] portion of the wealth in the risky asset, and 1− θ in the riskless
asset, where θ is the upper bound of allowed leverage.
Past literature on mutual fund tournaments posits that fund flows occur at
the end of a calendar year after investors observe funds’ performances. Following
Taylor [2003],Basak and Makarov [2012], we assume that there are three dates,
t = 0, t = 1 and t = 2, which are referred to as year-start, mid-year and year-end.
At time 0, all the funds start with the same size but different pre-determined
investment strategies. A manager receives a management fee at a given rate
k before he allocates assets, and thus the fund’s initial wealth is expressed as
Wi,0 = (1 − k)I0. Without the loss of generality, we assume that a fund has a
unit wealth at year-start, Wi,0 = 1.
At time 1, mid-year performances mi and mj are revealed; and funds’ mid-year
wealth is Wi,1 = mi and Wj,1 = mj given their year-start strategies. Manager i is
to be in a winning (losing) position if mi > mj (mi < mj ). Based on the interim
performance, a risk averse manager needs to decide on how much to invest in the
risky asset in order to maximize his expected utility. The benchmark j’s portfolio
strategy is assumed to be public knowledge since it is regarded as an exogenously
specified industry index.
At time 2, funds’ year-end wealth is realized based on θi and the realization
of x, i.e., Wi,2 = Wi,0×mi× [1 + r+ θi,1(x− r)] and the industry average wealth
is Wj,2 = Wj,0 ×mj × [1 + r + θj,1(x− r)]. Fund i will experience fund inflow or
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outflow, denoted as Fi, based on the fund’s performance relative to the industry
average. Given the fund’s total wealth including the fund flow Fi, manager i will
receive a year-end compensation Ci, which consists of three components, namely
the management fee from the old investors, the management fee from the new
investment (which could be negative due to fund outflow), and the performance
fee if fund value exceeds the High Water Mark(HWM). Manager i’s objective
function is written as follows:
max
θ∗i
E[U ] = E[
C1−γi
1− γ ] (4.1)
where Ci = kWi,2 + kFi + ymax{Wi,2 −Wi,0, 0}.
We assume that a manager face a standard 2 − 20 hedge fund contract and
hence k = 2% and y = 20%. More importantly, we assume that the year-end
fund flow Fi is subject to a concave function of fund’s relative performance, i.e.,
Fi = f(∆W ) = a(∆W )
2 + b∆W + c, where ∆W = Wi,2 −Wj,2 represents the
fund’s relative performance. We assume that managers have common knowledge
of the function. Specifically, the fund flow function is expressed as follows:
Fi =
c− b
2
4a
if ∆W > − b
2a
,
a(∆W )2 + b∆W + c Otherwise.
(4.2)
where a < 0 and b > 0 and c is the fund flow for the fund which has the same
performance as the industry average. This assumption of the fund flow func-
tion is consistent with empirical findings. Brown, Goetzmann, and Park [2001]
provides the evidence that managers pay more attention to their performance
relative to peer funds than the traditional market index such as S&P500 index,
which justifies our choice of benchmark. Additionally, Chen [2011] and Getman-
sky [2012] document that there exists a concave relationship between individual
net fund flow and individual fund performance in excess of the industry’s aver-
age performance. Chen [2011] estimates the impacts of the relative performance
and its square term on net fundflow. His estimated coefficients will be used to
numerically solve the model in later sections in our paper.
Additionally, we assume that, at t1 and t2, investors will withdraw all the
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money from the fund if the fund value drops below a threshold. In other words,
the fund will be exogenously liquidated, and thus the manager’s compensation is
nil in this case. Following Lan, Wang, and Yang [2013], we set the liquidation
bound as a fraction of HWM, i.e., W = p×H, where H is the high water mark.
Like Hodder and Jackwerth [2007], we will also analyze the endogenous shutdown
scenario in which managers could choose to close the fund at time t1 voluntarily
and take outside opportunities.
4.4 The Concave Flow-Performance Relationship
In order to examine the pure tournament effect, we first assume that the manager
is solely driven by the incentive to maximize the expected fund flow:
max
θi∈[0,θ]
{E[f(∆W )] (4.3)
Given the industry average portfolio strategy, θj, and industry average interim
performance mj, the manager chooses the optimal θi at time t1 to maximize the
expected fund flow:
θ∗i = arg max
θi∈[0,θ]
E[f(∆W )]
= arg max
θi∈[0,θ]
E[f(∆W )|∆W < − b
2a
]P (∆W ≤ − b
2a
) + (c− b
2
4a
)P (∆W > − b
2a
)
= arg max
θi∈[0,θ]
E[a∆W 2 + b∆W + c|∆W < − b
2a
]P (∆W ≤ − b
2a
) + (c− b
2
4a
)P (∆W > − b
2a
)
(4.4)
where ∆W = (miθi − mjθj)(x − r) + (mi − mj)(1 + r) is normally distributed
with mean
E[∆W ] = (miθi −mjθj)(µ− r) + (mi −mj)(1 + r) (4.5)
and variance
V ar[∆W ] = (miθi −mjθj)2σ2 (4.6)
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For easy notation, we refer to ∆W as w. The standard deviation of the relative
wealth is denoted by σw = |miθi − mjθj|σ, and the mean is µw. The expected
fund flow can be rewritten as follows (See Proof 1 in Appendix C.1):
E[f(∆W )] = E[a∆W 2 + b∆W + c|∆W < − b
2a
]P (∆W ≤ − b
2a
) + (c− b
2
4a
)P (∆W > − b
2a
)
= −(aµw + 1
2
b)σwφ(d) + [a(µ
2
w + σ
2
w) + bµw +
b2
4a
]Φ(d) + c− b
2
4a
(4.7)
where φ(.) and Φ(.) are the standard normal distribution and standard cumulative
normal distribution respectively and µw = (miθi−mjθj)(µ−r)+(mi−mj)(1+r),
σw = |miθi −mjθj|σ and d = −−b/2a−µwσw 1
The first derivative of E[f(w)] with regard to θi is given by (See Proof 2 in
Appendix C.1)2
∂E[f(w)]
∂θi
= miσ{−2aµ− r
σ
φ(d)σw + [(2aµw + b)
µ− r
σ
± 2aσw]Φ(d)}
= miσ{µ− r
σ
Φ(d)[b+ 2a(1 + r)(mi −mj)] + 2aσw[±Φ(d)((µ− r)
2
σ2
+ 1)− µ− r
σ
φ(d)]}
(4.8)
In order to examine the incentives of hedge fund managers, we analyze the
sign of each term in Equation 4.8
1. The first term in Equation 4.8 : Given the empirical values of parametera
and b, we assume that mi −mj < − b2a(1+r) always hold.3 Hence, the first
term is always positive. In this case, the manager will always have the
incentive to increase his holdings in the risky asset in order to maximize
the fund flow.
1µw can be expressed as a function of σw, i.e., µw = ±µ−rσ σw + (mi −mj)(1 + r).
2When miθi − mjθj > 0, ∂E[f(w)]∂θi = miσ{
µ−r
σ Φ(d)[b + 2a(1 + r)(mi − mj)] +
2aσw[Φ(d)(
(µ−r)2
σ2 + 1) − µ−rσ φ(d)]}; When miθi − mjθj < 0, ∂E[f(w)]∂θi = miσ{
µ−r
σ Φ(d)[b +
2a(1 + r)(mi −mj)] + 2aσw[−Φ(d)( (µ−r)
2
σ2 + 1)− µ−rσ φ(d)]}
3According to Chen [2011]’s estimates, a = −0.196, b = 1.088 and r = 0.02. Hence,
we can obtain that − b2a(1+r) = 2.72. Moreover, the average mid-year return of the hedge
fund industry is 1.054 based on Getmansky [2012]. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that
mi −mj < − b2a(1+r)
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2. The second term in Equation 4.8:
• When θi > mj
mi
θj , 2aσw[Φ(d)(
(µ−r)2
σ2
+ 1)− µ−r
σ
φ(d)] < 01.
In this case, the manager will have incentive to reduce risk. As a
consequence, the tracking error variance will decrease.
• When θi < mj
mi
θj , −2aσw[Φ(d)( (µ−r)2σ2 + 1) + µ−rσ φ(d)] > 0
In this case, the manager is prone to increase risk, which also lowers
the tracking error variance as σw = |miθi −mjθj|σ.
From the above analysis on the second term of the derivative, we can see that
fund manager would always try to minimize the tracking error volatility due to the
concavity of the fund flow function. Moreover, these two terms of the derivative
function, Equation 4.8, reveal two motives of managers when they make the
optimal risk taking decision. On the one hand, they are prone to take high risk
to win more money flow at year end; On the other hand, they have incentive to
minimize the volatility of their relative performance to their peers.
Moreover, by combining the two terms mentioned above, we can find the lower
bound of the optimal risk level chosen by fund managers. The optimal risk θ∗i
must satisfy the following inequality (See Proof 3 in Appendix C.1):θ∗i >
mj
mi
θj if
mj
mi
θj < θ
θ∗i = θ if
mj
mi
θj > θ
(4.9)
It is worth noting that, we also solve the case with µ = r (no risk premium
for the risky asset), the optimal risk level for fund managers is:θ∗i =
mj
mi
θj if
mj
mi
θj < θ
θ∗i = θ if
mj
mi
θj > θ
(4.10)
The only motive for them is to minimize tracking error variance in the absence
of risk premium.(See Proof 4 in Appendix C.1) Moreover, we assume that mi −
mj < − b2a(1+r) always holds throughout the rest of the paper. Therefore, when we
introduce risk premium to the model, hedge fund manager’s optimal risk taking
1Φ(d)( (µ−r)
2
σ2 + 1)− µ−rσ φ(d) = Φ(d)− µ−rσ φ(d) + (µ−r)
2
σ2 Φ(d) > 0
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level is adjusted upward compared to the case of no risk premium.(see Equations
4.9 and 4.10)
Proposition 4 In order to maximize the expected fund flow, a hedge fund man-
ager has incentives to maximize the expected relative performance as well as to
minimize the tracking error variance. The manager’s optimal risk taking decision
in the middle of the year, t1, is the tradeoff between these two concerns.
4.4.1 Fund flow with a lower bound
It is worth noting that many models in the literature assume that there is no
lower bound of fund value (For example, Taylor [2003]), which is not realistic as
fund wealth can never go below 0, and fund managers will never receive negative
compensation. To account for this, we modify the piecewise fund flow function
by adding a lower bound for the fund value. We assume that the fund flow will
not go below the year-end wealth, i.e., Fi ≥ −Wi,2, where Wi,2 = max{mi[θi,1(x−
r) + 1 + r], 0}. Thus, the fund flow function can be expressed as follows.
Fi =

c− b2
4a
if ∆W > − b
2a
,
a(∆W )2 + b∆W + c if a(∆W )2 + b∆W + c > −Wi,2,
−Wi,2 otherwise,
(4.11)
Figure 4.1 depicts the fund flow function with a lower bound, which will
be used for the remainder of the paper. In order to illustrate the tournament
behavior, we solve numerically for the optimal portfolios of managers who aim
to maximize the expected fund flow. We will frequently refer to a standard set
of parameters as displayed in Table 4.1. Given the values of the parameters,
the manager’s relative interim performance is always smaller than the threshold
− b
2a(1+r)
= 2.72 and thus the sign of the first term of Equation 4.8 is always
positive.
Figure 4.2 shows that this adjustment leads to a very different risk taking
choice when the fund has poor interim performance. When the year-end fund flow
approaches its lower bound, the fund manager has an incentive to increase the
variance of his relative performance as he is essentially facing a call option. The
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Table 4.1: Standard Parameters
Mean µ 0.05
Volatility σ 0.10
Interest rate r 0.02
Industry mid-year performance mj 1.054
Individual mid-year performance mi [0.1,2]
Industry risk-taking θj [0,5]
Risk Aversion γ 4
The coefficient of squared relative performance a -0.196
The coefficient of relative performance b 1.088
The average net fund flow c 0.0568
Management fee k 0.02
Incentive fee y 0.2
Initial fund value W0 1
Current HWM H 1
Liquidation boundary B 0.5
Outside compensation Cout 0.005
Note: we assume the risky asset has a mean return of µ = 0.05 and
a standard deviation of σ = 0.10. The riskless asset yields r = 0.02.
Based on Chen [2011]’s empirical findings, we assume that a = −0.196,
b = 1.088. According to Getmansky [2012], the average net flows into
hedge funds is 5.68% and the average monthly return of the industry
is 0.9%. Thus we set c = 0.0568 and the average industry mid-year
performance of hedge funds as mj = 1.054. The basic management
fee and incentive performance fee are set as the standard rate of 2%
and 20% respectively. The risk aversion coefficient of the manager’s
power utility is γ = 4. In addition, the starting fund value of 1 equals
the current high water mark and the liquidation boundary is set as
B = 0.5.
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Figure 4.1: Manager i’s fund flow function
fund flow function thus exhibits both concavity and convexity features as shown
in Figure 4.1. For this reason, hedge fund managers’ risk taking choice depends
on the interplay of these two opposing effects. Specifically, when a fund is far
behind the industry, convexity dominates concavity and the fund manager would
optimally choose to increase the tracking error variance. When the concavity
of the fund flow function dominates over convexity, managers would mimic the
benchmark to decrease the variance of their performance relative to the industry
average.
In Figure 4.2, we identify two regions where managers would opt for com-
pletely different risk shifting strategies. Given the value of mj, when mi drops
below a threshold M , managers would try to maximize the tracking error vari-
ance, and we label the region where mi < M as ‘contrarian’ region. As we know,
the volatility of the relative performance is σw = |θi − mjmi θj|miσ. To maximize
σw, managers would take either the highest risk θ when
mj
mi
θj is small or no risk
when
mj
mi
θj is too high. When mi > M , managers would mimic the benchmark,
and we call it ‘mimicking’ region. To better illustrate the mimicking behavior of
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Figure 4.2: Risk-neutral manager i’s optimal portfolio choice to maximize the
expected fund flow (with lower fund flow boundary)
managers, we also solve the case when there is no risk premium.(See Figure 18 in
Appendix C.2). Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro [2007] provide similar insights- the
better-performing fund follow the benchmark while the under-performing funds
choose to deviate away from the benchmark.
Since relative performance plays a critical part in the manager’s risk shifting
decision, we alter the value of mid-year industry average performance mj to
see how it would change the manager’s optimal risk choice. Figure 4.3 reveals
that with increasing mj (decreasing interim relative performance mi −mj), the
‘contrarian’ region widens, which means that with poor interim performance,
managers are more likely to allocate all the money to the riskless asset in order
to maximize their tracking error variance instead of minimizing it. This is because
with lower relative performance mi −mj, they are closer to the lower bound of
the fund flow function. On the other hand, the optimal risk level is more likely
to hit the upper bound θ when mj is higher in the mimicking region. This is
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Figure 4.3: Sensitivity analysis of the industry’s interim performance mj
because managers need to take on more risk in order to mimic the benchmark as
mj
mi
increases.
In Figure 4.4, we show the effect of concavity of the fund flow function. As we
know, the concavity feature of fund flow controls manager’s mimicking behavior.
When the concavity is dominant, the more concave of the fund flow function is,
the closer the optimal risk θ∗i is to
mj
mi
θj, as the manager would have a stronger
incentive to minimize the tracking error variance and exhibit stronger mimicking
propensity. However, when the convexity of the fund flow is dominant, parameter
a does not affect manager’s risk choice. As shown in Figure 4.4, the ‘contrarian’
region remains unchanged when we increase the value of a.
Proposition 5 The convexity feature of the fund flow function dominates over
the concavity when a fund’s relative performance is close to the lower bound of
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Figure 4.4: Sensitivity analysis of the concavity, a, of the fund flow function.
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the money flow and the hedge fund manager would shift risk to increase tracking
error variance. As the relative performance improves, the concavity of the fund
flow function becomes dominant and the manager would mimic the industry to
minimize the tracking error variance. Based on the relative interim performance,
hedge fund managers choose one of these two opposite risk shifting strategies.
4.5 Solutions to the Baseline Model
In this section, we will firstly focus on the tournament behavior of risk averse
hedge fund managers and then introduce the high-water-mark provision to ex-
amine the combined effects of fund flow and HWM on managers’ risk shifting
decisions.
4.5.1 Tournament Behavior
A hedge managers is assumed to have a standard constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) utility function defined over his compensation at the end of year. In the
absence of the HWM, the objective of a manager is
max
θi∈[0,θ]
E[U(Ci)] (4.12)
where U(Ci) =
C1−γi
1−γ and Ci = kWi,2+kf(∆W ). The introduction of risk aversion
results in a concave objective function over both absolute performance Wi2 and
fund flow f(∆W ).
With our standard parameters, we present the numerical solution to the man-
ager’s optimal risk taking in Figure 4.5.1 Without the fund flow concern, Merton
[1969] predicts that one’s risk taking level should be constant and equal to µ−r
γσ2
.
Figure 4.5 reveals that the potential money flow induces a manager’s risk choice to
deviate from Merton’s prediction. As analyzed before, the interplay of the convex-
ity of fund flow function and the concavity of the objective function largely affects
fund managers’ risk shifting decisions. The ‘contrarian’ region appears when a
fund has poor interim performance (when mi < 0.5). When the fund moves out
1See Appendix C.3 for details of the numerical procedure
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of the ‘contrarian’ region (when mi > 0.5), hedge fund managers would closely
follow the industry benchmark and the optimal risk level is strongly depressed
due to risk aversion. To see if our results are robust, we have also used the
exponential utility function and the optimal risk shifting strategies (mimicking
and contrarian strategies) for hedge fund managers remain the same. Numerical
results are shown in Figure 19 in Appendix C.2.
Figure 4.5: Risk-averse manager’s optimal portfolio choice(standard parameters
are used)
Figure 4.6 shows the sensitivity analysis of the industry’s interim performance.
As mj goes up, the ‘contrarian’ region enlarges. Intuitively speaking, the fund
manager is more likely to take the opposite strategy to the industry average when
other funds’ mid-year return increases. In addition, since the slope
mj
mi
increases
in general, hedge fund managers’ risk shifting decision becomes more sensitive to
the industry’s average risk level θj. This trend can be identified by comparing the
‘mimicking’ regions of the four sub-figures in Figure 4.6: as mj rises, the surface
of the ‘mimicking’ area becomes steeper.
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Figure 4.6: Sensitivity analysis of the interim industry performance
In order to study the effect of risk aversion, we solve the optimal portfolio
allocations with different γ and present the results in Figure 4.7. We find that the
behavior of an interim loser with mi < 0.5 is almost unaffected by changing the
coefficient of risk aversion. This also confirms that the effect of fund flow convexity
outweighs the effect of risk aversion when the manager’s interim performance is
far behind his peers. Nevertheless, the value of γ largely affects the manager’s
mimicking behavior when mi > 0.5. A more risk averse manager would take on
less risk in order to reduce the volatility of the fund value as well as his own
compensation.
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Figure 4.7: Sensitivity analysis of the coefficient of risk aversion
4.5.2 Tournament Behavior and Incentive Contracts
The prevalent use of the High-Water-Mark provision has raised concerns about the
inappropriate risk taking incentive it brings about. Under HWM, a manager not
only receives the management fee based on the size of assets under management
(AUM), but also gets rewarded if the fund value exceeds the pre-determined
HWM. Thus the manager’s compensation equals the management fee based on
the fund’s year-end wealth and fund inflows/outflows plus a call option struck at
the HWM (which equals Wi2 in our setting).
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(a) HWM only
(b) HWM and fund flow
Figure 4.8: Risk-averse manager’s optimal portfolio strategy
Figure 4.8(a) depicts the pattern of how a hedge fund manager shifts his risk
taking when no money flow is allowed at year end. When a fund’s interim value
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is far below the HWM (i.e. mi = 0.1 ∼ 0.8), the manager’s portfolio strategy
would be mostly driven by his risk aversion propensity, and thus the optimal risk
level can be characterized by Merton’s prediction µ−r
γσ2
. Following Hodder and
Jackwerth [2007], we label it as ‘Merton’s flat’. When the fund value approaches
the HWM (i.e.mi = 0.8 ∼ 1), the manager would rapidly increase the volatility
of his portfolio by investing more in the risky asset, but this incentive tails off
rapidly when the fund value is very close to the HWM (i.e., mi = 1). This is
because the manager wants to play safe to lock in the performance fee and hence
the risk level he chooses will be much lower than the Merton’s level. This pattern
is shown as an ‘Option ridge’ between mi = 0.8 and mi = 1 in the figure. As the
mid-year performance mi crosses the HWM, the manager’s risk taking level will
go up gradually until it reaches Merton’s flat again. These findings are consistent
with the existing studies in the literature.(e.g. Hodder and Jackwerth [2007]).
By comparing Figure 4.8(a) and Figure 4.8(b), we can see the influence of
relative performance concern when fund flow enters the manager’s compensation
function. Firstly, when mi is very low (i.e., mi = 0.1 ∼ 0.6), the manager would
choose an opposite strategy to the benchmark to maximize the tracking error
volatility instead of choosing the Merton’s level of risk. Moreover, the manager’s
risk taking behavior is primarily driven by the industry’s portfolio strategy θj
due to his fund flow concern when the fund value is below HWM. Therefore,
the manager would not take on high risk if the industry’s average risk level is
low. Secondly, When mi surpasses the HWM, the manager’s portfolio strategy is
almost not affected by θj. This is due to his stronger desire to secure performance
fee than to win more fund.
Proposition 6 In the presence of hedge fund tournaments and the High-Water-
Mark provision, a hedge fund manager’s incentive to increase risk is largely mit-
igated by his fund flow concern when fund value is somewhat below HWM. In
the meanwhile, the HWM-induced lock-in behavior suppresses mimicking behavior
when fund value is above HWM.
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4.6 Liquidation Threat
4.6.1 Exogenous fund closure
As suggested by empirical studies, hedge funds have higher attrition rates (8%
per year) than mutual funds. Therefore, it is natural to consider the liquidation
possibility and its impact on fund managers’ risk shifting decisions. Following
Lan, Wang, and Yang [2013], we set the liquidation bound as a fraction of HWM,
i.e., W = p × H, where H is the high water mark and p equals 0.5 throughout
this paper. Once the fund value hits the bound, the fund will be liquidated, and
hedge fund manager will take nothing. Thus, the manager’s compensation at t2
becomes:
Ci =
kWi,2 + kFi + ymax{Wi,2 −Wi,0, 0} if Wi,2 > 0.5,0 Otherwise (4.13)
We obtain the numerical solution to the optimal risk taking decision in the
presence of exogenous fund closure (see Figure 4.9).1 Comparing Figures 4.8(a)
and 4.9(a), we can observe the manager’s different behavior due to managers’
liquidation concern. In order to avoid hitting the liquidation bound, the manager
becomes very cautious as mi approaches 0.5. Specifically, he would choose to
gradually lower his risk exposure rather than taking the Merton’s predicted level
as soon as mi is away from the HWM level.
1Since we assume that the liquidation bound is 0.5, the manager’s interim performance mi
starts from 0.5 rather than 0.1.
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(a) HWM only
(b) HWM and fund flow
Figure 4.9: Risk-averse manager’s optimal portfolio strategy with exogenous
fund closure
Comparing Figures 4.9(a) and 4.9(b), we find that facing potential money
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withdrawals, managers with poor interim performance (i.e., mi = 0.5 ∼ 0.8) does
not necessarily reduce risk even when the fund is close to the liquidation bound.
For example, when mi < 0.6 and θj < 3, managers would actually take the highest
risk. Moreover, for a wide range of mid-year performance (0.55 < mi < 0.8),
managers would closely follow the industry benchmark in choosing their portfolio
weights. In the ‘mimicking region’(i.e., 0.55 < mi < 0.8) shown in Figure 4.9(b),
the average risk taking level is higher than that in 4.9(a).
It is worth mentioning that our results are different from Hodder and Jackw-
erth [2007] who focus on funds’ absolute performance and argue that managers
with poor interim performance would play safe to avoid hitting the bound (which
is similar to the pattern in Figure 4.9(a)), while this strategy is not optimal
anymore when we consider hedge fund tournaments. When the fund’s interim
performance is far behind his peers, investors would withdraw money from the
fund and in the worst case, investors would withdraw all the investments, which
would effectively liquidate the fund.
Proposition 7 Facing a liquidation bound, a hedge fund manager without tour-
nament incentive will considerably reduce risk as his interim performance is close
to the bound, while a manager with tournament concerns will maximize the track-
ing error volatility to avoid potential fund outflows.
4.6.1.1 Sensitivity Analysis
Figure 4.10 shows the sensitivity analysis of the industry’s interim performance
mj. As shown before, interim losers are mostly driven by their fund flow concerns.
To see how the change of winning/losing position affects risk shift decisions,
we examine fund managers’ risk taking choices with different market average
performance mj.
Intuitively, mj can be considered as an indicator of the overall market condi-
tion. During recession (e.g., mj=0.5), managers do not worry about fund outflow
too much as the whole industry performed poorly. Hence their main incentive
is to avoid hitting the liquidation bound or to lock in performance fees. As mj
increases, the ‘contrarian’ region enlarges and more manager will try to maximize
their tracking error variance by deviating from the industry benchmark. More-
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over, as long as the fund value is above the HWM level, the relative standing in
the industry has little effect on the manager’s risk shifting decision as he would
take low risks to avoid the call option falling out of the money.
Figure 4.10: Sensitivity analysis of the industry’s interim performance
4.6.1.2 Equilibrium with Exogenous Fund Closure
In this subsection, we analyze the manager’s equilibrium portfolio strategy. Sup-
pose there are n funds indexed by i in the market with mid-year performance mi,
and the industry average mid-year performance can be computed as mj =
∑n
i=1mi
n
,
and the benchmark risk level is θj =
∑n
i=1
mi∑n
i=1mi
θi, a weighted average of θi. (See
proof 5 )
Definition 2 The equilibrium of the model arises if given the industry average
risk level θ∗j , hedge fund manager i’s best risk shifting response is θ
∗
i , and given
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individual fund’s optimal choice θ∗i , the industry weighted average risk level is
θ∗j =
∑n
i=1
mi∑n
i=1mi
θ∗i .
We numerically solve for the equilibrium of the model. The procedure is the
following: Firstly, we make assumptions on the distribution of interim perfor-
mance mi. To simplify our analysis, we assume that mi is uniformly distributed
between[0.5, 1.6], and the average mid-year performance mj is thus equal to 1.05
in this case.1 Secondly, we compute the optimal risk taking choice θi for each
possible value of θj (which lies in [0, 5]), and then the implied θj which is the
weighted average of optimal θi across different funds. The computation continues
until it reaches the point when the given value of θj equals the weighted average
of the optimal θi.
A standard hedge fund contract with the high water mark provision is in effect
a call option for hedge fund managers. Figure 4.11(a) presents the optimal risk
shifting pattern in equilibrium, which is consistent with Hodder and Jackwerth
[2007]. Hedge fund managers would substantially increase portfolio risks when
the fund value approaches the HWM and gradually reduce risk when the fund
value is close to the liquidation bound. The combined effects of the HWM and
fund flows is shown in Figure 4.11(b). By comparing Figure 4.11(a) and Figure
4.11(b), we can see that the option ridge induced by the HWM is significantly
mitigated by managers’ fundflow concern. Also, the optimal risk level around the
HWM with potential year-end capital flows is in general considerably lower than
in the case without capital flows.
Moreover, in contrast to mutual fund tournaments, our paper suggests that
hedge fund managers who are facing a concave flow-performance function and
are compensated based on the HWM contract would not increase risks when
they outperform the peers as they have a strong incentive to secure performance
fee. In the equilibrium shown in Figure 4.11(b), hedge fund interim winners
would actually choose small risk exposures while interim losers who are close to
the liquidation bound would increase risks. This finding is consistent with the
empirical studies on hedge fund tournaments. (See Brown, Goetzmann, and Park
[2001] and Aragon and Nanda [2012].)
1This is approximately equal to our standard parameter, mj = 1.054, when we assume that
industry level is exogenously given.
133
(a) Equilibrium with HWM only
(b) Equilibrium with HWM and fund flows
Figure 4.11: Risk-averse manager i’s equilibrium portfolio strategy with
exogenous fund closure
4.6.2 Endogenous Fund Closure
Instead of using a predetermined liquidation boundary, we employ a managerial
shutdown option in this subsection following Hodder and Jackwerth [2007] as
many hedge fund managers choose to close their funds voluntarily. An endoge-
nous fund closure option in our model is essentially an American option where
managers can choose to liquidate their funds whenever the fund is above the
pre-specified liquidation boundary. After comparing the value of their outside
opportunities and the expected value of continuing to run the funds, managers
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decide whether they will exercise the option or not.
Specifically, we assume that at time t1, the manager can choose between
shutting down the fund to take the outside opportunity Cout and continuing
running the fund.1 When mid-year performance is revealed, if a manager expects
that the value of his outside opportunity is higher than the compensation from
running the current fund, he will opt to close the fund at t1 rather than waiting
until t2. The manager’s compensation at t2 for continuing running the fund is
the same as shown by Equation 4.13. If the manager chooses to close the fund at
t1, she receives Cout:
Ci = Cout (4.14)
Figures 4.12(a) and 4.12(b) present hedge fund managers’ optimal risk choices
with and without fund flow concerns, respectively. Comparing Figure 4.9(a) with
Figure 4.12(a), we find that the pattern of managers’ risk taking behavior is not
changed when we only consider HWM. This is because the benefit of outside
opportunity is smaller than that of continuing the current fund and thus the
manager would lower the portfolio risk to avoid hitting the liquidation bound.
In order to distinguish between the extreme risk taking 0 and fund closure,
we use the risking taking −0.5 to represent the fund closure decision. In Figure
4.12(b), we can see that the ‘contrarian’ region disappears. Moreover, fund closure
decision is affected not only by fund’s interim performance mi, but also by other
funds’ average risk taking level, which is different from Hodder and Jackwerth
[2007] who suggest that hedge fund managers would prefer to close the fund only
when the fund value is far below the high water mark. Due to the fund outflow
concern, the fund closure region is larger than that in Hodder and Jackwerth
[2007]. Moreover, managers’ endogenous fund closure decision is largely affected
by the industry’s risk level. when the industry on average takes extreme risk,
funds with mid-year performance mi < 0.9 would be closed; When the industry
takes modest risk (i.e., θj < 1), only funds with mi < 0.7 would exit the market.
1This is similar to Lan, Wang, and Yang [2013]’s setting, which assume that (1) the restart
boundary to be 80% of the fund (2) the subsequent fund’s to be 75% of the previous funds and
(3) the new fund’s size is zero when the manager is forced to liquidate. Our assumption is also
similar to Hodder and Jackwerth [2007] who assume that the manager will receive a prorated
fraction management fee plus an prorated annual compensation rate.
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(a) HWM only
(b) HWM and fund flow
Figure 4.12: Risk averse manager’s optimal portfolio strategy with endogenous
fund closure option (Cout = 0.005)
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4.6.2.1 Sensitivity Analysis
Next we are also going to examine how the fund manager’s decision changes in
response to different outside compensation, different industry performance and
different levels of risk aversion. By comparing the four sub-figures in Figure 4.13
below, we can see that the outside opportunity has effects mainly on interim
losers while risk aversion and benchmark performance can influence both mid-
year winning funds and mid-year losing funds.
Figure 4.13: Sensitivity analysis of the outside opportunity(manager’s optimal
portfolio choice with endogenous fund closure)
Figure 4.14 shows that with poor industry average performance (mj = 0.5),
fund manager will shut down the fund only when the fund is on the verge of
liquidation and the industry as a whole opts for highly risky position (i.e., θj >
2). As mj increases, the relative interim performance of the fund worsens and
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Figure 4.14: Sensitivity analysis of the industry’s average
performance(manager’s optimal portfolio choice with endogenous fund closure)
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fund managers are more likely to close the fund due to possible fund outflow at
year end. This is similar to the effect of increasing Cout. In the meantime, the
mimicking tendency of managers is more prominent when the industry on average
has better mid-year performance.
Figure 4.15: Sensitivity analysis of the coefficient of risk aversion (manager’s
optimal portfolio choice with endogenous fund closure)
Figure 4.15 suggests that the endogenous fund closure region is widened when
hedge fund managers become more risk averse, the reason being that risk averse
managers would prefer certain outside compensation over uncertain compensation
from managing the fund. As can be seen from Figure 4.15, risk aversion level also
influence the risk levels in general. As γ goes up, the optimal risk is decreased
for all the funds.
Proposition 8 Given a shutdown option, a hedge fund manager with poor in-
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terim performance would close the fund, especially when the industry on average
takes high risk. Moreover, the voluntary closure region enlarges with the value
of the manager’s outside opportunity and his risk aversion level as well as the
industry’s average interim returns.
4.7 Systematic Risk versus Idiosyncratic Risk
Chen [2011] documents that (relatively) poor-performing funds increase both
market risk and idiosyncratic risk and the magnitude of risk shifting in the id-
iosyncratic risk is much larger than that in the market risk.1 In order to examine
how fund managers choose their risk profiles by taking on different types of risks,
we introduce another risky asset to our previous model. We postulate that each
fund has access to a fund-specific asset which has a random return xid, inde-
pendent from the return of the market asset, and is assumed to be normally
distributed with mean µid and variance σid = σ
2. Moreover, managers who face
leverage constraints invest θs portion of the money in the systematic-risk asset,
and θid in the idiosyncratic-risk asset, and the sum of θs and θid cannot exceed θ.
In the literature, this additional risky asset is widely regarded as manager-
specific investment technology and the risk premium µid − r is interpreted as
manager’s skills.3 In the presence of two risky assets, fund i’s wealth at year end
becomes Wi = Wi,0 ×mi × [1 + r + θs(x − r) + θid(xid − r)]. In the meanwhile,
the industry’s year end wealth is not affected by individual funds’ exposures to
idiosyncratic risks as the fund-level uncertainty can be canceled out when we
compute the industry’s average performance. Hence, Wj = Wj,0 ×mj × [1 + r +
θj(x − r)]. The optimal risk allocation should yield the highest expected utility
for a fund manager:
max
θs,θid
E[U(Ci)] (4.15)
s.t. θs + θid ≤ θ
1This is shown by the results in Table 9 and Table 10 in his paper.
2We also examine the case in which σid > σ and the results are almost identical to the case
σid = σ, given the same mean µid of the fund-specific asset.
3See Buraschi, Kosowski, and Sritrakul [2013] for instance.
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where U(Ci) =
C1−γi
1−γ and Ci = kWi,2 + kf(∆W ) + ymax{Wi,2 −Wi,0, 0}
Intuitively speaking, risk averse agents would not invest in the fund-specific
asset if it had no risk premium. In the context of hedge fund tournaments,
however, hedge fund managers might have the incentive to take on idiosyncratic
risk in order to maximize the tracking error variance. To provide more insights
on this issue, we analyze two cases with and without risk premium. Figure 4.16
illustrates manager’s optimal asset allocations on the two risky assets respectively.
Figure 4.16(a) has µid = r and Figure 4.16(b) is for µid = 0.1 > µ. We do not
consider fund closure here.1
It is evident from Figure 4.16 that: (I) In the ‘contrarian’ region, hedge fund
managers would invest almost nothing in the market asset, while they would opt
for the maximum idiosyncratic risk no matter whether they have alpha generat-
ing abilities or not in the presence of leverage constraint. Consistent with our
prior conjecture, hedge fund managers would not invest in the fund-specific asset
outside the ‘gambling’ region when µid = r. This finding echoes Chen [2011]
in that hedge funds mainly increase idiosyncratic risk when they fall behind the
peers. (II) In the presence of alpha generating abilities (as in Figure 4.16(b)),
the bell-shaped risk shifting pattern around HWM is more pronounced for the
fund-specific asset than the market asset and the volatility shifting in the market
asset is more strongly driven by fund flow concerns than before. (III) Although
fund’s performance relative to the industry plays a key role in determining the
portion of money invested in the fund-specific asset, θid is almost not affected by
the risk level of the industry θj.
1Introducing fund closure will not qualitatively change the results.
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(a) without alpha generating abilities: µ = 0.05, µid = 0.02
(b) with alpha generating abilities: µ = 0.05, µid = 0.1
Figure 4.16: Risk averse manager’s optimal choices on systematic and
idiosyncratic risks
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4.8 Conclusion
In this paper, we suggest a role for the theory of tournaments in studying hedge
funds’ risk taking behavior. A typical compensation contract for hedge funds
would induce managers to pursue high absolute performance, while the year-end
competition for new capitals among managers also generates relative performance
objectives. We characterize the managers’ portfolio strategies in a two-period
(one-year) model where the managers’ compensation depends on both their ab-
solute and relative performance to examine the interplay of tournament concerns,
incentive contracts and liquidation threats.
Our paper extend the work of Basak and Makarov [2012] on mutual funds by
explicitly modeling hedge funds’ features such as (i) high water marks; (ii) the
concave fundflow-performance relation; (iii) and high attribution rates. Different
from Basak and Makarov [2012]’s results for mutual funds that interim winners
opt for a higher portfolio volatility than interim losers, we find that (i) hedge fund
interim winners will mimic the benchmark to minimize the portfolio’s tracking
error volatility and due to the HWM provision, they would only take moderate
risk; (ii) the interim losers managers have strong incentives to maximize their
tracking error variance and their risk choice largely depends on other managers’
risk taking decision.
In addition, we disentangle the idiosyncratic risk from the fund’s total risk and
relate this fund-specific risk to the manager’s alpha generating ability. We confirm
Chen [2011]’s empirical finding that hedge funds mainly shift idiosyncratic risk
in response to their poor performance relative to peer funds and distort both
systematic and idiosyncratic risks when their option-like fee contracts are out of
the money.
Finally, our results indicates a different portfolio strategy when the manager
faces a liquidation bound from Hodder and Jackwerth [2007]: the manager with
the fund flow concern might choose to gamble to avoid fund outflows rather
than playing safe; Given an outside opportunity, the manager’s endogenous fund
closure largely depends on the benchmark’s portfolio choice and they might vol-
untarily shut down the fund even when the fund value is still far away from the
liquidation bound.
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Nevertheless, we might have lost some interesting results by only considering
a short(one year) investment horizon. Since investors enter the funds at different
points in time, hedge fund managers in reality face multiple HWMs. Due to the
fact that old investors always have a higher HWM level than new investors, new
coming funds will lower the average HWM. Thus, for the future research, our
one-year model can be extended to a multi-period one to examine the impact of
new funds on the option value of the contract and thus on managerial risk choices.
In addition, another assumption in our paper that the initial fund size is the same
for all funds can be relaxed, as empirical evidence suggests that managers with
larger assets under management will be more cautious and less prone to take
high risk compared with smaller and younger funds. Therefore, it is also worth
investigating whether the manager’s risk shifting decision is affected by the size
of assets under management or not. Additionally, in our paper the tournament
behavior is subject to a given concave fund flow function. In contrast, Berk and
Green [2004] examine the endogenous fund flows in their model by assuming that
investors use past returns to update their beliefs about managers’ abilities. Thus,
it will be more fruitful for future work to consider investors’ endogenous fund flow
decisions in the context of hedge fund tournaments.
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Appendix A
A.1 Robustness Check: Timing of Earnings An-
nouncements
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Appendix B
B.1 Proof of the optimal fraction of loans that
banks would sell in the secondary market
Proof The necessary condition for banks to sell the loan is that P max(1, R1) >
R0. Suppose banks choose to sell α1 portion of the assets to outside investor,
where α1 < α, the payoff from selling is α1P max(1, R1) + (1− α1)R0, which can
be written as α1(P max(1, R1)−R0)+R0. Since P max(1, R1) > R0, the payoff is
increasing in α1, and should reach the maximum at α. Therefore, we have proved
that the optimal fraction of loans at which banks should sell is the upper bound
α set by government.

B.2 Proof of the existence of a solution to Equa-
tion (3.4)
Proof
i. when R∗ = R, the domain of P is [1, R] Since R˜0 ≥ R∗ = R, and R˜0 ∈ [0, R],
R˜0 must be equal to R regardless of P. Hence, h(P,R) = E[R˜0] = R for any
P ∈ [1, R]. The equation h(P,R) = P holds only when P = R, which is the
unique solution of P in this case.
ii. when 0 < R∗ < R, we can show two inequalities that h(R
∗
R
, R) > R
∗
R
, and
h(R,R∗) < R. As is illustrated before, function h(P,R∗) is continuous and
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increases with P , which together with h(R
∗
R
, R) > R
∗
R
, and h(R,R∗) < R
implies that h(P,R∗) = P has at least one solution of P within [R
∗
R
, R]. As
shown in the graph, when P = R
∗
R
, the curves of h(R,R∗) are always above the
45 degree line while h(R,R∗) is always below it. Since the curves increase with
regard to the horizontal axis, there must exist at least one intersection point
of the curve and the 45 degree line, which solves the equation. Derivation of
the two inequalities is as follows.
(a) h(R
∗
R
, R) > R
∗
R
As is known, P max(1, R˜1) ≥ R˜0 ≥ R∗. When P = R∗R ,
we have R
∗
R
max(1, R˜1) ≥ R˜0 ≥ R∗. Since max(1,R˜1)R ≤ 1, we can obtain
R˜0 = R
∗. Accordingly, function h(R
∗
R
, R∗) = E[R˜0] = R∗. Therefore,
h(R
∗
R
, R∗) ≥ R∗
R
.
(b) It has been proved that h(R,R∗) = R when R∗ = R. Since ∂h
∂R∗ > 0, we
get h(R,R∗) < R when R∗ < R.
iii. when R∗ = 0, the inequality h(R
∗
R
, R∗) ≥ R∗
R
still holds. Hence, h(0, R∗) = 0.
In this case, P = 0 is one of the solutions.

B.3 Proof of Figure 3.9.2
Proof We prove that the curve of k(P ) shifts to the right as R increases. In
other words, we need to show that for a given R∗, the corresponding price P is
higher with RH than with RL.
Recall investors’ rational expectation on loan quality, h(P,R∗) ≡ ER˜0,R˜1(R˜0|P max(1, R˜1) ≥
R˜0 ≥ R∗). With a given R∗ and a greater R, to maintain the same level of expec-
tation as with RL , the price P should be lowered. This together with the fact that
h(P,R∗) is an increasing function in P suggests that the curve of h(P |R∗, RH)
should lie above the curve h(P |R∗, RL). Therefore, the intersection point of the
45 degree line and h(P |R∗, RH) should be higher than that for h(P |R∗, RL), as
shown in Figure 18 (PH > PL for the same lending standard R
∗), which completes
our proof.
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Figure 17: Investors’ expected loan return h(P,R∗) under different economic
prospects
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B.4 Proof of the extended model with liquidity
shock
Proof
1. When α = 0 (there is no secondary market),
If the bank issued loan at t0, the expected future cashflow can be calculated
as (1−λ)(R0−L) when R0 ≥ L and 0 when R0 < L. If the bank held cash
till t1, then the expected future cashflow will be λ(1− L)ER˜1 max(1, R˜1) +
(1 − λ)[ER˜1 max(1, R˜1) − L], which can be expressed as λ(1 − L)C + (1 −
λ)(C − L) where C = ER˜1 max(1, R˜1). Since (1 − λ)(R0 − L) > 0 and
λ(1−L)C+(1−λ)(C−L) > 0 , banks will never underwrite when R0 < L.
Therefore, banks’ underwriting standard will not be smaller than L when
α = 0. Moreover, banks are indifferent between holding cash and issuing
loan when the following equation holds:
(1− λ)(R0 − L) = λ(1− L)C + (1− λ)(C − L) (16)
Solving the above equation yields R0 =
C(1−λL)
1−λ .
2. When α = 1,
First of all, it is easy to show that banks’ participation condition in the
secondary market is that P ≥ L. Otherwise, banks would never sell loans
to outside investors. The reason is the following. If the bank issued loan at
t0 and encountered liquidity shock at t1, selling the loan at P ≥ L is not
sufficient for the bank to pay back depositors. If the bank did not encounter
liquidity shock at t1, it would not sell the loan either because it would be
better to simply hold cash till t1. Hence, P ≥ L must hold.
If the bank issued loan at t0, then its expected cashflow is λ[(1−LP )ER˜1 max(R0, P, P R˜1)])+
(1−λ)[ER˜1 max(R0, P, P R˜1)−L], which can be rewritten as λ[(1−LP ) max(R0, PC)])+
(1 − λ)[max(R0, PC) − L], where C = ER˜1 max(1, R˜1) ; If the bank held
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cash till t1, the expected future cashflow will be λ(1− L)ER˜1 max(1, R˜1) +
(1− λ)[ER˜1 max(1, R˜1)− L].
(a) When R0 > PC, the expected cashflow from issuing loan becomes
λ[(1− L
P
)R0]) + (1− λ)[R0−L] and the condition of bank being indif-
ferent is the following:
λ[(1− L
P
)R0]) + (1− λ)[R0 − L] = λ(1− L)C + (1− λ)(C − L) (17)
Solving the above condition yields R0 =
C(1−λL)
1−L
P
λ
. Since R0 > PC, we
must have 1−λL
1−L
P
λ
> P . Hence, L < P < 1.
(b) When R0 ≤ PC, bank’s expected future cashflow from issuing loan
is λ[(1 − L
P
)PC]) + (1 − λ)[PC − L] and the condition of bank being
indifferent is the following:
λ(1− L
P
)PC) + (1− λ)(PC −L) = λ(1−L)C + (1− λ)(C −L) (18)
from which, we can derive that P = 1. Since R0 ≤ PC, now we have
R0 ≤ C

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Appendix C
C.1 Proofs
Proof 1: The expected fund flow
Proof The expected the fund flow E[f(∆W )] = E[a∆W 2 + b∆W + c|∆W <
− b
2a
]P (∆W ≤ − b
2a
) + (c− b2
4a
)P (∆W > − b
2a
) is equivalent to
E[f(∆W )] = {aE[∆W 2|∆W < − b
2a
] + bE[∆W |∆W < − b
2a
] + c}P (∆W ≤ − b
2a
)
+ (c− b
2
4a
)P (∆W > − b
2a
)
(19)
Recall that we assume µw = (miθi − mjθj)(µ − r) + (mi − mj)(1 + r), σw =
|miθi−mjθj|σ and d = −−b/2a−µwσw ∼ [0, 1], we can rewrite the following argument.
P (∆W ≤ − b
2a
) = Φ(d) (20)
E[∆W |∆W < − b
2a
] =
−σwφ(d) + µwΦ(d)
Φ(d)
(21)
E[∆W 2|∆W < − b
2a
] =
(b/2a− µw)σwφ(d) + (µ2w + σ2w)Φ(d)
Φ(d)
(22)
where φ(.) and Φ(.) is the standard normal density and cumulative distribution
respectively. Insert equation (19),(20) and (21) into equation (18) we can obtain
Equation 4.8. 
Proof 2: The derivatives of the fund flow with regard to θi
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Proof Given the expression of the expected fund flow function in 4.8, we can
write the first derivative of the expected fund flow with regard to θi as follows.
∂E[f(∆W )]
∂θi
=
∂{−(aµw + 12b)σwφ(d) + [a(µ2w + σ2w) + bµw + b
2
4a
]Φ(d)}
∂θi
= −[(aµw + 1
2
b)σw]
′φ(d)− (aµw + 1
2
b)σw
∂φ(d)
∂θi
+ [a(µ2w + σ
2
w) + bµw +
b2
4a
]
∂Φ(d)
∂θi
+ [(2aµw + b)
∂µw
∂θi
+ 2aσw
∂σw
∂θi
]Φ(d)
(23)
Insert the derivatives of the following argument into (30),
∂µw
∂θi
= mi(µ− r) (24)
∂σw
∂θi
= ±miσ (25)
∂d
∂θi
=
mi
σ2w
[±(µw + b/2a)σ − (µ− r)σw] (26)
∂φ(d)
∂θi
= −dφ(d) ∂d
∂θi
(27)
∂Φ(d)
∂θi
= φ(d)
∂d
∂θi
(28)
we can obtain Equation 4.9. 
Proof 3: The lower bound of the optimal risk level θ∗i :
Proof
• When mj
mi
θj ≤ θ:
When 0 ≤ θi ≤ mjmi θj, the first derivative of E[f(w)] with regard to θi is
positive. Therefore, the optimal θ∗i can only be
mj
mi
θj; When
mj
mi
θj ≤ θi ≤ θ,
the first derivative of E[f(w)] with regard to θi is positive at θi =
mj
mi
θj,
and decreasing in θi. Hence, the optimal point when θi ∈ [mjmi θj, θ] must be
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higher than
mj
mi
θj. Therefore, when θi ∈ [0, θ], the optimal risk level θ∗i must
be higher than
mj
mi
θj
• When mj
mi
θj > θ:
The first derivative of E[f(w)] with regard to θi is positive. Thus, the
optimal θ∗i = θ.

Proof 4: The manager’s optimal risk taking when risk premium
equals 0
Proof Recall that Equation 4.8 gives the derivatives of the fund flow with regard
to θi, i.e.,
∂E[f(w)]
∂θi
= miσ{µ−rσ Φ(d)[b+ 2a(1 + r)(mi−mj)] + 2aσw[±Φ(d)( (µ−r)
2
σ2
+
1) − µ−r
σ
φ(d)]}. In the case without risk premium, i.e., µ − r = 0, the equation
(9) can be written as
∂E[f(w)]
∂θi
= ±2amiΦ(d)σσw (29)
• When mj
mi
θj ≤ θ:
When θi ≥ mj
mi
θj, we have
∂E[f(w)]
∂θi
≤ 0 and thus the manager will decrease
risk. When θi ≤ mj
mi
θj,
∂E[f(w)]
∂θi
≥ 0 and thus the manager will increase
the risk taking. In both cases, the manager’s optimal risk level θ∗i =
mj
mi
θj,
which also minimizes the tracking error volatility.
• When mj
mi
θj > θ:
θi ≤ θ < mj
mi
θj.
∂E[f(w)]
∂θi
is always positive. Hence, θ∗i = θ

Proof 5: the equilibrium portfolio strategy in the case with exoge-
nous fund closure
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Proof For each hedge fund, its year end wealth Wi,2 = mi[θi(x − r) + 1 + r],
and industry average year end wealth can be expressed by:
Wj,2 =
∑n
i=1Wi,2
n
=
∑n
i=imi[θi(x− r) + 1 + r]
n
(30)
=
∑n
i=1miθi(x− r) +
∑n
i=1mi(1 + r)
n
(31)
=
∑n
i=1mi
n
(1 + r) +
∑n
i=1miθi
n
(x− r) (32)
Let m =
∑n
i=1mi
n
and θ =
∑n
i=1
mi∑n
i=1mi
θi
Then
Wj,2 = mi(1 + r) + θ
n∑
i=1
mi(x− r) (33)
= m[θ(x− r) + 1 + r] (34)
Therefore, m can be regarded as industry average mid-year performance and θ is
the average risk taking level of all the funds. 
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C.2 Figures
Figure 18: Risk-neutral manager’s optimal portfolio choice to maximize the
expected fundflow with lower bound (no risk premium)
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Figure 19: Risk-averse manager’s optimal portfolio choice in mutual fund
tournaments(with exponential utility function)
C.3 Numerical Procedures
When an analytical solution cannot be obtained, we implement numerical pro-
cedure to solve the model. The method that we use is in spirit similar to the
one in Hodder and Jackwerth [2007]. The major difference is that our model is a
discrete-time model while Hodder and Jackwerth [2007] utilize a continuous time
framework. The result of the model is presented in a three-dimensional plot with
a grid of mid-year performance mi and industry average new risk level θj, and
the variable of interest if the optimal risk level θi, which is shown in the Z axis.
The range of mi is [0.1, 2] with step 0.01, and with the assumption of leverage
constraint, the range of risk level is [0, 5] with step 0.01.
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First of all, we need to approximate the distribution of the random return
x. The range of x we choose is [−0.45, 0.55] and the step is 0.01. Our results
are not affected by different choices of the range of x. Given the industry mid-
year performance mj, industry average risk θj and manager’s new risk level θi,
all the possible fund value Wi,2, fundflow f(∆W ), and compensation Ci can be
calculated according to their formulas:
Wi,2 = Wi,0 ×mi × [1 + r + θi,1(x− r)] (35)
Fi =
c− b
2
4a
if ∆W > − b
2a
,
a(∆W )2 + b∆W + c Otherwise.
(36)
Ci = kWi,2 + kFi + ymax{Wi,2 −Wi,0, 0} (37)
In addition, we assume that x follows a normal distribution with mean µ and
volatility σ. To calculate the expected fund value, we use the discrete normal
distribution. Specifically, we compute the probability for each point of x indexed
by i using the density function of normal distribution p(x) = 1
σ
√
2pi
e−
(x−µ)2
2σ2 , and
then divide the probabilities by their sum such that they will add up to 1.
P (xi) =
1
σ
√
2pi
e−
(xi−µ)2
2σ2∑0.55
xi=−0.45
1
σ
√
2pi
e−
(xi−µ)2
2σ2
(38)
Since Wi,2 = Wi,0×mi× [1 + r+ θi,1(x− r)], applying the probabilities P (xi)
for each possible Wi,2, we can obtain the expected fund value E[Wi,2]. Similarly,
we can calculate the expected fundflow and expected compensation values. ( In
the case of risk averse investors, we calculate the expected utilities instead based
on U(Ci) =
C1−γi
1−γ )
Second of all, with θi varying between 0 and 5 in the steps of 0.01, we calculate
the expected compensation/utilities (depending on manager’s objective function)
for each point of θi. The one which yields the highest E[Ci] or E[U(Ci)] is the
optimal risk level θ∗i that the manager should choose.
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Thirdly, we change the values of mi and θj and find the optimal risk θ
∗
i
for each combination of these two variables. In Matlab, we use the command
mesh(mi, θj, θ
∗
i ), which produces the desired optimal trading strategy θ
∗
i as a
function of mi and θj.
The above procedures are adjusted for the following extensions of the model:
• Fund closure: When exogenous fund closure is considered in the model,
we change the wealth function by setting the fund value as 0 when Wi,2 =
Wi,0 × mi × [1 + r + θi,1(x − r)] hits the liquidation bound 0.5. In the
event of fund closure, managers will get nothing; When endogenous fund
closure is considered, we need to compare the expected utility from taking
the optimal risk θi and the expected utility from outside opportunity. If
the former is higher than the latter, the manager would continue running
the fund taking the optimal risk θ∗i . Otherwise, he would close the fund
voluntarily.
• Equilibrium: To find the optimal risk shifting choice in equilibrium, we
implement the above procedures to find the optimal proportion of money
invested in the risky asset θ∗i given a θj, and we also compute the implied
θ∗j =
∑n
i=1
mi∑n
i=1mi
θ∗i , which is equal to the weighted average of optimal θ
∗
i .
We repeat this process with different θj until the given θj equals the implied
θ∗j , which is the industry average risk in equilibrium. The situation with
endogenous fund closure option is a bit more complicated, as we need to
take into account the number of managers who choose to close down the
business.
• Two risky assets : For the case of two risky assets, we add one more random
variable xid as the return of the second asset. Moreover, we assume that
this second asset is independent from the first asset (Cov(x, xid) = 0), and
has mean µid = r, and volatility σid. Firstly , we need to find the joint
distribution of the two random variable. With the x lying between -0.45
and 0.55 in the steps of 0.01 and xid lying between -0.5 and 0.5 in the
steps of 0.01, we obtain 10201 pairs of (x, xid). As shown before, we need
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to calculate the probability of each possible x and xid. With index j, the
probability of xidj can be computed as:
P (xidj) =
1
σ
√
2pi
e−
(xidj
−µ)2
2σ2∑0.5
xidj=−0.5
1
σ
√
2pi
e−
(xidj
−µ)2
2σ2
(39)
For each pair of asset returns, we calculate the probability as P (xi, xidj) =
P (xi)P (xidj). We denote the risk loading in the first asset as θi,1 and the
risk loading in the second asset as θi,2. θi,1 and θi,2 both lie between 0
and 5 in the steps of 0.01. With leverage constraint, θi,1 + θi,2 must not
exceed 5. Given the values of mi, mj and θj, we can calculate the expected
compensation or expected utility for each pair of θi,1 and θi,2. The optimal
trading strategy is the pair of (θi,1, θi,2) which brings the highest expected
utility.
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